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Abstract 
Strategic management research is often criticised for lacking relevance and 
usefulness for practitioners. The practice perspective of strategy recognises that 
strategy research and education must once again focus on providing practitioners 
with useful advice for improving their strategising activities. While strategy tools are 
a common component of strategic management courses, journal articles and 
textbooks, little is known about how these are actually used in practice, and how 
organisational and institutional contextual factors influence the way practitioners 
perceive and use them. 
This thesis investigated why and how conceptual strategy tools are used by 
practitioners in three hotel companies. The hotel industry was chosen since strategic 
hospitality management researchers have called for in-depth studies to determine 
whether generic strategy tools can be used in the hospitality industry. 
Due to the limited extant literature on the use of strategy tools, and the exploratory 
and descriptive nature of the study, an inductive, qualitative case study method was 
employed. The empirical evidence was triangulated through observations, interviews 
and document analysis. Thematic analysis was used to interpret the findings. 
The findings suggest that top executives often reject strategy tools for the very 
reasons academics and consultants recommend them. These include their perceived 
lack of legitimacy, the need for creative and fast decisions, and the unwillingness to 
structure strategic thinking. While lower-level managers were found to use these 
tools to structure their research and data collection, such use is `veiled' since they 
are used implicitly and intra-departmentally. The industry context also influences 
the use and perceived value of tools due to its unique ownership-management 
structure and the value placed on practical work and quantitative data. 
The thesis contributes to the academic literature by addressing calls for in-depth 
studies of strategy tool usage across hierarchical levels, in multiple firms and within 
a single industry setting. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a rationale for the research into why and how strategy tools 
are used, and argues that the international hotel industry is an appropriate 
context for the empirical investigation. It then identifies the study's aims and 
objectives and concludes by providing an overview of the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Research Rationale 
Strategic management research has over the past few decades focused on either 
strategy content or the strategy process (Bourgeois, 1980; Chakravarthy & Doz, 
1992), neither of which has adequately considered the actual work that managers 
undertake in their strategy endeavours. Both the content and process subfields 
have largely treated strategy as a series of "causally related variables" (Balogun, 
Jarzabkowski, & Seidl, 2007, p. 197) in which human action virtually disappears. 
Strategy content researchers (e. g. Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980) have essentially 
tried to determine what a firm's strategy should be and have often provided 
normative guidelines and frameworks for the different strategic choices that can 
lead to improved performance. This research stream has tended to explain the 
success and failures of strategies purely on the basis of economic forces and, as 
such, has treated managers as "faceless abstractions" (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995, 
p. 6). Chia and MacKay (2007) point out that it has often been criticised for being 
too "course grained" (p. 220) to explain what actually happens during strategy- 
making. 
While content researchers have largely ignored the organisational challenges and 
contextual factors involved in making strategy, Johnson, Melin and Whittington 
(2003) acknowledge that strategy process researchers (e. g. Mintzberg, 1994; 
Pettigrew, 1987) have recognised that strategy is an organisational phenomenon 
and not a problem detached from the organisation's Internal dynamics. However, 
processual scholars study organisations as wholes (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992), 
and although they have uncovered many important aspects of how strategy is 
developed and implemented within organisations, they have not examined the 
practices Inside those processes (Brown & Duguid, 2000) or the way practitioners 
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engage with those practices. This is important since, as Whittington (2001) 
points out, it is these practices that drive strategy's processes and emergence. 
Processual research has, instead, largely neglected practical managerial activities, 
and as such the role of managerial agency Involved in these processes (Bettis, 
1991; Chia & MacKay, 2007; Johnson et al., 2003). 
This lack of attention to the practical role practitioners play in strategy-making 
has spurred much of the recent criticisms about the usefulness and relevance of 
contemporary strategic management education and research (e. g. Gopinath & 
Hoffman, 1995; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008a; Lyles, 1995; Pfeffer & Fong, 
2002). Mintzberg's (2004a, 2004b) recent work, for example, has focused on the 
failures of academia to properly prepare students for work in management and as 
strategists since academics often reduce strategic management to a toolkit of 
analytical techniques that do not necessarily provide practical value for 
organisations. The field's research Is often Irrelevant to many practitioners 
(Bettis, 1991; Lyles, 1995; Nicolai, 2004) since It does not provide useful 
solutions to their real problems (Johnson et al., 2003) and does not consider the 
reality of how strategy is actually practiced In real situations (Mintzberg, 2004b). 
Recently there have been Increasingly frequent calls for more realistically 
applicable strategy research and teaching (e. g. Bower, 2008; Greiner, Bhambri, & 
Cummings, 2003; Pettigrew, 2001; Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001; Starkey & 
Madan, 2001). Hambrick (2004), for example, has called for strategy research to 
begin "filling in, or adding depth, texture and linkages to our many disparate 
nuggets of insight about the work of general managers" (p. 93). 
A practice perspective of strategy (Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 1996) has 
emerged, In part, as a response to these increasingly frequent criticisms that 
strategic management research has been 'de-humanised', lacks relevance for 
practitioners, and fails to study the 'messy' reality associated with actually 'doing' 
strategy. By recognising the critical roles that both individuals and society play in 
determining strategy practices, it returns strategy research to its original purpose 
of understanding and Improving the work of practitioners, and builds on a recent 
trend of examining other management disciplines, such as organisational learning 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991,2001) and technology (Orlikowski, 2000) from a social 
sciences notion of practice (see Bourdieu, 1990; DeCerteau, 1988; Giddens, 
1984; Schatzki, Cetina, & Savigny, 2001). 
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The Strategy as Practice (SasP) perspective provides a new way of looking at the 
micro-level of strategy since it focuses on the practical, formal work of 
strategising, and even more specifically on its situated and concrete activities 
(Whittington, Jarzabkowski, Mayer, Mounoud, Nahapiet, & Rouleau, 2003) as it 
shifts the focus of research to the actual practice and practices of strategy 
practitioners. That is, from a practice perspective one questions what 
practitioners are actually doing when they are engaged in their strategy work. 
This research stream thus takes an activity-based view (Jarzabkowski, 2005; 
Johnson et at., 2003) for studying strategy as it focuses its concern and 
investigations on the mundane and "unheroic work of ordinary strategic 
practitioners" (Whittington, 1996, p. 734). 
SasP's proponents focus on the actual practices of strategists since they believe 
that strategy research must return to the its original purpose of understanding 
and Improving the work of practitioners, and because helping managers to make 
effective decisions in complicated complex organisations starts with helping them 
to understand how organisations really work (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2004). It Is 
concerned more with the performance of strategy work than with the economic 
performance of firms (Whittington & Cailluet, 2008). Studying strategy from the 
practice perspective means reinstating the role of agency in strategic action and 
thus seeing strategy not only as something organisations have, but also as 
something people `do' (Jarzabkowski, 2005), and where what matters is the 
strategist's performance (Whittington, 2004). It implies wanting to help 
practitioners understand and improve how they act and Interact during the 
strategy process as this will affect the quality of an organisation's strategy 
process, choices and outcomes (Jarzabkowski, 2005). While the SasP perspective 
is similar to the processual school in that both advocate close-up examinations of 
how strategy is accomplished, rather than study the cultural and political aspects 
of the overall process over time, for example, SasP is more concerned with a 
post-rational exploration (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2004) of the skills, techniques and 
tools that are used when creating strategy (Johnson et al., 2003). As Whittington 
(1996) notes "practical competence requires a readiness to work within existing 
structures and routines, rather than knowledge of some textbook ideal" (p. 732). 
It is particularly concerned with the contextualisation of these micro-activities 
since: 
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Micro-phenomena need to be understood in their wider social 
context; actors in their micro-situations are not acting in 
isolation but are drawing upon the regular, socially defined 
modes of acting that arise from the plural social institutions to 
which they belong (Balogun et al., 2007, p. 199). 
One way to better understand how strategy is actually rather than theoretically 
practiced, and how contextual factors influence this practice, is by studying the 
way that practitioners use strategy tools. The efficacy of such tools has been 
increasingly called into question. For example, fifteen years ago Prahalad and 
Hamel (1994) observed that practitioners were "abandoning traditional 
approaches to strategy ... (while academics were) re-examining the relevance of 
the concepts and tools of the strategy field" (p. 5). Jarzabkowskl and Wilson 
(2006) have more recently noted that while traditional strategy research has 
focused on the step between the creation or acquisition of strategy knowledge 
and the design of tools, models or other knowledge artefacts, the practice 
perspective Is more concerned with their practical applications for and by 
practitioners since little about this use is known. They suggest that one should 
study how strategy tools are and are not used by practitioners since academics 
often disseminate their theories to practitioners through such tools as templates, 
models and frameworks. 
Academic textbooks (Grant, 2008), strategic management courses (Bower, 
2008), consultants (Morecroft, 1992) and the popular media (Mazza & Alvarez, 
2000) have all helped popularise tools rather than their underlying theories. 
Conceptual frameworks, such as SWOT analysis, Porter's (1980) five forces, and 
the BCG growth-share matrix are, for example, often cited as important and 
popular strategy tools (e. g. Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Rigby, 2003) which form 
the basis for the more common strategic analysis techniques (Furrer & Thomas, 
2000). Given their popularity in the research literature, business school strategy 
courses, and, apparently with practitioners, it is thus surprising that that so little 
is understood about how the field's conceptual strategy tools are actually used by 
practitioners. 
Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006) believe that this lacuna exists because most 
academics "seem wedded to a representational epistemology, conceptualising use 
as primarily prescriptive application" (p. 362). The limited empirical evidence 
suggests that strategy practitioners do use the field's knowledge artefacts, but 
these studies have generally focused on what tools are used (e. g. Clark, 1997; 
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Frost, 2003) or on the changing popularity of different tools (e. g. Pascale, 1990; 
Rigby, 2001b; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005). Even fewer studies have investigated 
how or why the tools are or are not used (Knott, 2008; Stenfors, Tanner, & 
Haapalinna, 2004; Witcher & Chau, 2008). This question of how and why 
strategists use and do not use strategy tools thus continues to remain largely 
unanswered and under-investigated (Hodgkinson, Whittington, Johnson, & 
Schwarz, 2006; Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 
2006). 
Both practitioners and academics need better knowledge about the relevance and 
role of strategy tools within specific contexts (Ambastha & Momaya, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Johnson et at., 2003), and according to the SasP 
literature there are several reasons why practice-based studies of this are 
necessary. First, according to Whittington, Molloy, Mayer and Smith (2006), 
dynamic environmental contexts imply that strategies are increasingly only 
temporary, and as such: 
Mastering the key practices, tools and procedures for repeated 
re-organising and re-strategising matters at least as much as 
perfecting any particular strategic or organisational design 
(p. 616). 
Second, because strategy is increasingly part of middle and lower-level managers' 
work (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Westley, 1990) more people than ever are 
involved in important strategy tasks, and as such they may need useful advice 
about their practical role and contributions, including their use of strategy tools 
and techniques. Studying why and how formal strategy tools are and are not 
used in the strategic management process can help reveal what "is involved in 
being a competent strategist and how some practitioners are more influential 
than others" (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008b, p. 283). 
Third, although SasP research is not prescriptive, it can help improve practice 
since explanations about practices can help practitioners to better reflect on their 
own strategy work and process (Johnson et al., 2003). While not generalisable, 
Jarzabkowski & Whittington (2008b) suggest that such studies can "indicate the 
underlying situational mechanisms involved in human action" (p. 283). As such, 
this kind of research may assist practitioners in understanding their own use and 
perception of strategy tools. 
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Fourth, as Johnson et al. (2003) note, as many resources (Barney, 1991) are 
more transparent and mobile than ever before, most are not a solid foundation 
for any competitive advantage. They suggest, therefore, that sustainable 
advantage may only arise from the interactive behaviours of people which are 
"micro assets' that are hard to discern and awkward to trade" (p. 4). Strategy 
tools, and the way they are used, may be revealed as examples of such 'micro 
assets'. 
Fifth, the complexity and volatility of the environments in which many companies 
currently operate means that not only are generalisations about the effectiveness 
of content-driven research findings less likely (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), but 
also that there may be a decease in the usefulness of traditional strategic 
management tools (Martinez, Priesmeyer, & Menger, 1999). Explanations of how 
practitioners perceive the value and role of these tools, based on their 
experiences with them, can help researchers and educators to update their own 
research and pedagogical practices. Similarly, understanding how and why 
practitioners do not use these tools can provide a better understanding of the 
limitations of tools with regards not only to their rational and analytical purposes, 
but also their practical implementation. 
This thesis thus takes a practice perspective of why and how strategy tools are 
and are not used by practitioners from across hierarchical levels during their 
everyday strategy-making activities. It Is therefore concerned with tools-in- 
practice and not the tools themselves. It argues that the activities involved In 
using strategy tools are not only analytical but may also be practical since, for 
example, the rapid pace of changes in the external environment means that the 
use of tools cannot always be conducted with analytical detachment and patience 
(Whittington et al., 2006). Since strategy-making is contextually based (e. g. 
Pettigrew, 1977; Pettigrew, 1987), it also examines how the use of tools within 
the strategy formulation process may also be defined by antra-organisational and 
extra-organisational social systems and their shared understandings, cultural 
values, and institutionalised practices and norms. As such, it asks of 
practitioners' use of tools "What works for them and what does not work? " 
(Johnson et al., 2003, p. 16). By studying how and why strategists do not use 
tools, It also heeds Carter et al. 's (2008) warning that by only focusing on what 
strategists do, SasP scholars could mistakenly neglect what is not done or 
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practised and thus potentially miss some of the "strategic spaces in which 
strategy is constituted" (p. 94). This thesis' examination of the contextual factors 
that influence how and why tools are and are not used is thus built on their idea 
that: 
What is necessary is to explore not only what is done but what 
is not done, that which is not practised, that which is not said, 
using external stakeholder articulations as a sign of what might 
be but is not (p. 94, italics added). 
1.2 Research Context and Scope 
By concentrating its empirical research within the international hotel industry this 
thesis addresses calls within the SasP literature for single Industry studies 
(Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006) and for studies specifically within the 
service sector (Dougherty, 2004). By doing so it also addresses concerns about 
the validity of certain strategy tools across industries (Johnson, Langley, Melin, 
& Whittington, 2007; Okumus & Wong, 2005b). The chosen industry context is 
especially relevant since the hotel industry has, with mixed results, habitually 
incorporated findings and recommendations, including tools and concepts, from 
the broader general business environment (Olsen & Roper, 1998). This limited 
success has led Okumus and Wong (2005b) to state that: 
There is an essential need for more in-depth and rigorous 
research in order to explain and justify whether the models, 
frameworks and theories on strategy developed for the 
manufacturing industry can be used (in the hospitality industry) 
and the extent to which they need to be modified (p. 267). 
As the SasP literature also calls for studies across multiple organisations 
(Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006; 
Wilson & Jarzabkowski, 2004), the empirical research takes place within three 
hotel chains. The firms studied range from among the largest hotel companies in 
the world, to a medium sized firm that is rapidly expanding, to a relatively small 
multi-unit organisation. This selection addresses the fact that practice-based 
studies are meant to produce patterns and not predictions (Kaplan, 2007). The 
research also investigates the role of tools for board members, senior executives, 
middle managers and lower-level managers, and therefore responds to 
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suggestions that strategising activities be studied across multiple organisational 
levels within individual firms (Hambrick, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). 
1.3 Research Approach 
Researching strategy from the practice perspective requires a focus on 
practitioners and their practical activities, as well as on how social and economic 
contexts influence these (Johnson et al., 2007). This implies that activities in 
practice must be studied anthropologically since what is of interest is not what is 
done, but rather why and how it is done. Given the importance of context with 
regards to the use of tools in strategising activities, this study agrees that 
research about the practical knowledge used by managers should focus on local 
practices if it is to have theoretical value (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 
2002). As the hotel industry context is examined in this study, it is also 
important to note that there is an increasing recognition that hospitality 
management research can and should be conducted using qualitative methods 
(Kwortnik, 2003; Sandiford & Seymour, 2007; Walsh, 2003). Walsh (2003), for 
example, argues that qualitative research findings can be used to "identify the 
important ways in which hospitality managers view a particular problem" (p. 68) 
and that this can help teach researchers about the realities of working in the 
hospitality industry. She suggests that such research "can capture insights from 
the field and specifically examine their implications for the ways that (hospitality) 
organizations strategize" (p. 72). This approach similarly addresses calls for case 
studies with descriptive results that can contribute to understanding how 
hospitality organisations engage in strategy and the key relationships which are 
inherent in this context (Olsen, 2004). This thesis thus takes an activity-based 
perspective (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2003; Stenfors & Tanner, 
2006) and investigates the phenomenon through a qualitative case study 
approach using ethnographic methods of data collection. 
1.4 Research Aims and Questions 
The SasP field is characterised by the problems it addresses rather than by the 
theory it uses (Jarzabkbwski et al., 2007), and as such it is important to define 
more precisely the problems the research seeks to investigate. This study 
examines how and why strategy tools are and are not used and as such fills a gap 
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in the strategy literature about the relationship between context and the use and 
perception of strategy tools. This thesis aims to contribute to an improved 
understanding about practitioner use of strategy tools through the empirical 
study. The few studies that have looked qualitatively at the Introduction or 
implementation of a particular tool (Chesley & Wenger, 1999; Hill & Westbrook, 
1997; Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006) have not considered many of the issues 
that this thesis seeks to explore. For example, they have not (1) compared use 
across organisations, (2) compared use across organisational levels, or (3) looked 
at their use within the hotel Industry. In addition, these studies have not taken a 
practice perspective of (1) who uses them, (2) how or (3) why the tools are used, 
(4) how their use is linked to intra and extra-organisational Influences or (5) how 
their use is related to the strategy formulation process within the organisation. As 
limited work in these areas has been done, it is an exploratory study and 
therefore seeks to reveal general patterns of behaviour and identify issues for 
further study. Since studying strategy from the practice perspective means 
examining the relevance (or irrelevance) of practices to practitioners and to the 
creation of strategy, several related and key overarching questions are examined 
in this thesis. These are: 
I. Why do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
2. How do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
3. How do contextual factors influence the use of strategy tools? 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter identified the research aim as well as the specific 
objectives necessary to accomplish it. It also presented a rationale for the 
research based on gaps identified within the strategic management literature and 
the need for such a study in the international hotel industry. 
Chapter Two reviews the SasP literature and, more specifically, the role and use 
of strategy tools in the strategy formulation process. This review, in turn, helps 
to inform and structure the empirical investigation. 
Chapter Three situates the hotel sector within the more general service and 
hospitality industries, examines the relevant information about the international 
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hotel industry's structure and management characteristics and highlights the lack 
of industry-specific strategy tools and the question about the transferability of 
generic tools. It then reviews the limited extant literature about how strategy is 
practiced within the industry and identifies needs for such studies. 
Chapter Four explains the research design and presents the rationale for taking 
an inductive and qualitative approach to the primary investigation. It argues that 
the case study approach is an appropriate methodology for investigating the topic 
and why, through various research methods such as document analysis, 
observations and semi-structured interviews, a triangulation of data helps to 
support the reliability and validity of the findings. 
Chapter Five presents the research findings for each case study. These findings 
are presented independently for each case. 
Chapter Six discusses the empirical findings in relation to the extant literature 
and the identified research questions. The two themes that emerge through this 
process are used to frame the discussion. 
Chapter Seven provides some conclusions derived from this research. It then 
identifies the thesis' original contributions and some limitations of the research. 
Implications of the findings for practicing managers and educators are identified. 
The chapter concludes with some recommendations for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the practice perspective of strategy and, 
more specifically, the different roles that strategy tools are thought to play within 
the practice of strategy. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2, the 
overview, Introduces the Strategy as Practice (SasP) perspective of strategy by 
placing it within the historical body of the academic strategic management 
literature. Its key differences from the content and process subfields are 
highlighted. This section also introduces the SasP research agenda and presents 
examples of some of the key work to-date In the field. The need for empirical 
research into the use of strategy tools by practitioners is emphasised. Section 
2.3 presents a more detailed look at the concept of strategy tools with a specific 
focus on the strategic management field's conceptual frameworks and matrices. 
This section discusses why and how fashionable and institutionalised tools might 
be used, adopted, adapted or rejected by practitioners, as well as why 
practitioners may create their own new tools. A critique of tools and explanation 
for why they may in fact not be useful for practitioners is also provided. Section 
2.4 focuses on the role that strategy tools are thought to play according to 
deliberate/rational, emergent and post-rational perspectives of strategy 
formulation. Section 2.5 reviews the limited extent empirical data about the use 
of strategy tools, including who uses them and when they are used. The chapter 
summary highlights the need to investigate the relationship between contextual 
factors and the use of strategy tools In more detail and within a single industry 
setting. 
2.2 Strategy as Practice 
This section introduces the SasP perspective and the key differences between it 
and the more established process and content subfields. It then identifies the 
SasP research agenda and reviews some of its relevant but limited extant 
empirical research. 
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2.2.1 History and Underlying Theory 
The term 'Strategy as Practice' first appeared as the title and subject of Richard 
Whittington's 1996 article in Long Range Planning. The article's experimental and 
provocative subject placed it in the journal's `Strategy at the Leading Edge' 
section which features short reports on new research streams and experiments, 
rather than among the more traditional articles the journal normally features. 
The article has since become the journal's 17th most cited article of all time 
(Cummings & Daellenbach, 2009, in press) as Whittington's call for research into 
the practice of strategy has been emphatically embraced. It has resulted In 
special editions of the Journal of Management (January, 2003), Long Range 
Planning (2006) and Human Relations (2007), was the focus of the European 
Management Review's Inaugural volume (2004), and has become a specialised 
interest group at numerous conferences, including those of the Strategic 
Management Society, the American Academy of Management, the British 
Academy of Management, the European Academy of Management, and the 
European Group for Organisational Studies. To date it has provided the 
perspective for two books (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007) and only a 
few doctoral theses (Diatlov, 2005; Ikävalko, 2005; Jarzabkowski, 2000; 
Mantere, 2003). While the school's contribution to the strategy literature Is 
growing, there are still relatively few scholars publishing peer-reviewed articles, 
and the majority of these are conceptual rather than empirical (Jarzabkowski & 
Spee, 2009). 
SasP emerged largely as a reaction to the fact that most research has tended to 
see strategy as something organisations have and that its dominant view has 
been economics-based (Whittington, 1996). Here 'have' can refer to different 
types of strategies, such as, for example, growth, diversification and cost- 
reduction. Similarly, it can refer to the different processes that organisations 
have, such as decision-making and strategic planning (Johnson et al., 2007). 
SasP, instead, sees strategy as a type of work and as something people, rather 
than organisations, do (Jarzabkowski, 2005). While they recognise that previous 
researchers have not completely Ignored the notion that strategy Involves people 
doing things (e. g. Lindblom, 1959; Pettigrew, 1985), and that in the past there 
have been Implicit as well as explicit studies of strategy practices (e. g. Mintzberg, 
1973), many scholars argue that most earlier research has either elevated the 
concept of `doing' "to a level of abstract categorization" (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 3 
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italics in original) or assumed too much about what people actually do and 
achieve when they `do' strategy (Stacey, 2007). 
SasP seeks to shift the research in strategy back to the practitioner, and thus 
responds to a growing call for more research that reflects the real concerns and 
work of practitioners (Hambrick, 1994; Mintzberg, 2004b). Johnson et al. (2007) 
suggest that the SasP concern with the practical echoes a recent 'pragmatic turn' 
in philosophy which has increased the attention and respect paid to practical 
wisdom. They explain that pragmatism emphasises the importance of the 
practical and of knowledge which is "discovered in practical activity" (p. 32). 
Whittington (1996; et al., 2003) notes that the SasP perspective was originally 
founded on social theory's turn over the past 25 years towards a more practice- 
based theorising (e. g. Schatzki et al., 2001). Although a discussion of the 
`practice turn' in social theory is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to 
note that while it has many strands they are all primarily concerned with what 
people actually, rather than supposedly, do (Johnson et al., 2007). Johnson et al. 
(2007) note that Schatzki (2001) synthesised the different focal points of many 
practice-based social theory perspectives into three main points. (1) Minute and 
routine activities are as important to study and understand as are larger and 
extraordinary activities. (2) This activity is situated within the wider society and 
as such actors rely and draw upon shared understandings, language, technologies 
and skills. (3) Studying practice means that one is interested in the skills and 
resources people use in their ordinary activities which they say means that these 
individuals "should be seen not simply as programmed by social practice, but 
rather as potentially artful manipulators" (p. 35). Thus, according to this view, 
practical activity is important and so is its relationship to the "larger social 
systems or structures in which it is embedded" (p. 34). 
The theory underlying the school's rationale, and Its focus on the practical 
strategy activities of practitioners, thus reside In the growing concern of both 
sociology and philosophy with the practical and pragmatic work of Individuals that 
take place within contexts of, for example, their organisations and industries 
(Johnson et al., 2007). As is discussed next, this concern with the practical is one 
of the key ways the practice perspective of strategy differs from the more 
traditional and established content and process subfields. 
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2.2.2 Strategy as Practice, Process and Content 
Strategic management research has traditionally focused on either process or 
content. While process research focuses on the actions of an organisation which 
lead to and support the strategy content, research on strategy content is 
concerned with the subject of strategic decisions (Huff & Reger, 1987). 
According to Johnson et al. (2007), social theory's practice turn delineates three 
important differences from processual research. (1) The practice perspective is 
focused on actors' practical activities rather than an organisation's larger activity. 
(2) The dependent variable of practice-based research is not focused on 
organisational performance as it is in more traditional process research, but 
rather with the performance of "artful individuals" (p. 36). (3) The social and 
economic contexts are not only Important as with processual studies, but with 
practice they are essential elements that are required to understand actors and 
their possibilities for action. The school's particular focus, and its differences with 
the process and content schools, is now examined in more detail in light of these 
three issues. 
Activities 
Whittington (2007) remarks that while practice is often confused with, or seen as 
only an extension of process (see Carter et al., 2008; Chia & MacKay, 2007), 
they are in fact two separate domains since they are concerned with different 
types of activities. While strategy process research examines how effective 
strategies are shaped, validated and implemented by organisations (Chakravarthy 
& Doz, 1992), SasP focus on the more minute work of practitioners through 
which strategy is actually formulated and implemented (Whittington, 1996). 
Although they are different In many ways, Stacey (2007) points out that the 
content and process 'subfields' are each about interaction. He argues that 
content research is concerned with the interactions of organisations and their 
environments while the process subfield is focused on "interactions between 
people and groups of people within an organisation" (p. 166-167). SasP is also 
highly concerned with interaction, though on a much more micro-level of practical 
activities. To understand this one must first recognise that for SasP, strategy is 
conceptualised as a situated, socially accomplished activity (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007) and that strategising refers to these activities and the interactions of the 
multiple actors engaged in them (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007). Strategic 
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activities, or micro-processes, are those that can be considered as consequential 
for a firm's direction, outcomes, survival and competitive advantage (Johnson et 
al., 2003). Whittington (2007) notes that these practices are the activities which 
form "the Internal life of process" (Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 95). Here top 
strategists are said to interact not only with each other as they create and 
implement strategy in their every day strategy work, but also with middle 
managers, lower level staff, external actors and organisations, as well as with 
material artefacts including tools and the techniques for using them 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). The practice view of strategy therefore seeks to 
explain and understand activity by: 
How skilled and knowledgeable strategic actors constitute and 
reconstitute a system of shared strategic practice that they also 
draw upon as a set of resources in the everyday activities of 
strategising (Wilson & Jarzabkowski, 2004, p. 15). 
Managerial Performance as a Dependent Variable 
While SasP involves a different interpretation of strategy and strategy-making 
than the more traditional content and process perspectives, like both of these 
subfields it is also ultimately interested In improving performance. However, 
while the content subfield focuses on what strategic choices and/or positions will 
best result In optimal performance, and process research focuses on how 
organisations can regularly improve those choices or positions, SasP sees 
strategy as something people do (Jarzabkowski, 2005), where what matters is 
the strategist's performance (Whittington, 2004). By focusing on their daily work 
and actions, Including the tools they use while acting and Interacting as they 
strategise, SasP takes a micro-perspective of strategy and of the strategist as an 
individual (Denis et al., 2007). SasP research thus attempts to "get inside firms' 
overall strategy processes to the actual activities of strategy practitioners" 
(Whittington, 2004, p. 64) in order to find practical ways for Improving their 
performance. The important questions, therefore, are how a strategist's own 
performance can influence and improve the quality of an organisation's strategy 
process, choices and outcomes. 
The Role of Context in Strategy as Practice 
"Contextualism recognizes that there Is a gap between universal theory and 
concepts useful in a specific context, that is, useful to a specific manager, at a 
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specific time, on a specific issue" (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007, p. 87). Due to its 
primary focus on what people actually do in relation to strategy, SasP is also 
Interested in the context in which they strategise (Johnson et al., 2007). 
Whittington (2006) has suggested that by integrating both the intra- 
organisational (i. e. individual or departmental) and extra-organisational (i. e. 
societal or sectoral) levels into their studies, SasP researchers will `complete the 
practice turn' and better understand practitioner behaviour. He argues that 
focusing on extra-organisational contextual factors is critical since, for example, 
according to Bourdieu's (1990) notion of habitus, people unconsciously but 
systematically incorporate social traditions and norms into their everyday 
conduct. He says that since an organisation's strategising practices and activities 
may succeed or fail as a result of the external context (Maitlis & Lawrence, 
2003), it is important to understand the influence of these extra-organisational 
factors on strategising activities. 
Given the importance of context and the suspected lack of attention SasP 
researchers have paid to it, Johnson et al. (2007) note that they amended the 
school's earlier definition (see Johnson et al., 2003) to reflect this. They now 
conceive of SasP as "a concern with what people do in relation to strategy and 
how this is influenced by and influences their organisational and institutional 
context" (Johnson et at., 2007, p. 7 italics added). This implies that the context of 
strategy-making is not a separate factor in the process, but rather that It plays an 
important role in practitioners' situated strategy activities. As compared with the 
process perspective, therefore, SasP "looks more deeply Into the micro-activity 
Inside organizational process and attends more seriously to the macro-context 
outside process" (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 36). 
2.2.3 The Strategy as Practice Research Agenda 
According to Kaplan (2007), practice theory means that researchers should not 
focus on the strategy literature's existing research questions, but instead should 
raise new types of questions that a practice perspective permits them to ask. 
Whittington (2003) identified six such questions as the SasP research agenda. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate fully on each one, it is 
important to Identify them and some of the limited extant findings with regards to 
each as they contribute to a better understanding of this thesis' focus on the role 
of strategy tools. 
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Two questions pertain to who strategises and what skills they need for the task. 
SasP builds on the idea that the formal work of strategy formulation has moved 
away from being the work of a centralised, professional, top-management 
strategic planning team (Mintzberg, 1994) and practitioners are therefore any 
individual actors who undertake strategising actions and rely upon practices, such 
as tools, to do so. Carter et al. (2008) suggest that it is the rituals and practices 
of strategy-making, including the mastering of certain tools, that help provide a 
person with the status of strategist. This Includes academics (Marcus, Goodman, 
& Grazman, 1995) consultants (Trigo, Angwin, & Wilson, 2005), people on the 
periphery (Regner, 2003) and middle and lower-level managers (Bowman, 
Singh, & Thomas, 2002; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992,1994; Vogler, 2005; 
Westley, 1990). 
Since it is often the actions and interaction of middle managers and lower-level 
employees that leads to the development of different strategies (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992; Hambrick, 2004), understanding how they engage in 
strategising practices, such as how they use different tools, is as critical as 
knowing how top managers do so. Hoon (2007) notes that middle managers' 
strategising activities have been shown to develop within an organisation's 
structural context as these individuals interpret top management's strategising 
activities as an attitude they hold about a specific strategic issue, which, in turn, 
helps to legitimise their own role In developing the issue further (see Dutton, 
Ashford, O'Neill, & Hayes, 1997; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001). 
Middle managers also utilise specific tactics to help `sell' strategic initiatives and 
to guarantee that their superiors pay sufficient attention to these issues (Dutton 
et al., 1997,2001). For example, their use of labels such as 'threats' or 
`opportunities' when providing information about internal and external events 
influences the way their superiors see a situation (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1994). Floyd and Wooldridge (1994) thus argue that these tactics 
mean that middle managers `saturate Information' with their own views and are 
thus not necessarily objective with the data they transmit. 
Middle managers also provide the contextual knowledge and experience 
necessary for shaping strategy (Dutton et al., 2001). Hoon (2007) thus suggests 
that their knowledge can be a type of practical expertise about acceptable and 
normal behaviours within the organisation and about "how the organization 
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actually works" (p. 924). She points out that their contextual knowledge and 
experience shapes the way middle managers provide input into an organisation's 
strategic direction (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992, Regner, 2003) and how they 
champion strategic issues by attempting to influence their firm's strategic 
activities even when this goes beyond their operational responsibilities (Mantere, 
2005). Nordqvist and Melin (2008), for example, found that in addition to a 
formal competence with the specific technical and analytical strategy skills that 
permit them to "apply concepts, tools and models of strategy ... for systematic 
strategic analyses" (p. 327), `strategic planning champions' use other skill sets to 
guide the strategic planning process. For example, as `known strangers' they find 
a balance between familiarity and distance to provide other practitioners with a 
sense of both objectivity and confidence which facilitates better information 
exchange. They also act as 'artful interpreters' who understand local norms and 
routines and adapt practices accordingly since they recognise that particular 
practices need to be adjusted to specific contexts. 
Three less-investigated questions concern where strategising is done, how the 
work of strategising is done and organised, and how its products are 
communicated and consumed. Strategising practice often occurs in episodes 
(Hendry and Seidl, 2003) which have been the focus of several recent practice- 
based studies, including, for example, boardroom discussions (Samra-Fredericks, 
2003), meetings (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008) and workshops (Hodgkinson et 
al., 2006). Giraudeau (2008), meanwhile, studied the strategic plans for one 
company's particular investment strategy and found that they were creative and 
open documents even if the planning process used to produce them hindered 
innovative strategising. Here the main concept is that of the strategy praxis, 
which is the work that comprises strategy and it "includes such taken-for-granted 
things as the meeting, talking, form filling and presenting in which strategy is 
constituted" (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 282). Whittington (2006) refers to the 
strategy praxis as the intra-organisational work actors actually do when 
formulating and implementing strategy, and that this includes the resource- 
consuming activities and tasks that practitioners actually do in practice and which 
are involved not only in strategy's deliberate formulation but also in its 
emergence (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
Whittington (2006) suggests that a firm's strategising work is largely defined by 
both the extra-organisational and organisation-specific practices that practitioners 
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use and build on during the strategy praxis, and that due to the fact that they 
are considered appropriate, help legitimise strategic processes. He defines 
practices within SasP as "shared routines of behaviour, including traditions, 
norms and procedures for thinking, acting and using `things" (p. 619). 
Organisation-specific practices include established routines and operating 
procedures, while extra-organisational examples may include sectoral practices 
and/or industry discourse and recipes that the firm has adopted (Whittington, 
2003). 
The use of practices is fundamentally about `doing' things and as such they 
provide behavioural and procedural resources "through which multiple actors are 
able to interact in order to socially accomplish collective activity" (Whittington, 
2006, p. 9). ' Jarzabkowski and Whittington (2008b) suggest that strategy 
practices "include the social, symbolic and material tools through which strategy 
work is done" (p. 282). For them, these practices include "those theoretically and 
practically derived tools that have become part of the everyday lexicon and 
activity of strategy, such as Porter's five forces" (p. 282), and for the SasP 
research agenda this relates to the fundamental question of the common tools 
and techniques used in the strategising practice. That is, if and how they are 
used in practice. 
This question continues to remain largely unanswered and under-investigated 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) note, for example, 
that although there has been much theoretical work about the diffusion and use 
of the strategic management tools and practices that are Included in textbooks 
and taught In classrooms, "there has been little empirical attention to either the 
actual diffusion of these practices or how these practices are engaged in or 
constitutive of strategy practice" (p. 832). Similarly, Jarzabkowski and Giuletti 
(2007) remark that "little is known of how, or indeed whether, managers use the 
theoretical resources gained from management education" (p. 1). Such an 
understanding is critical since the concepts that comprise an organisation's 
strategy discourse help legitimise certain strategies and Influence how decisions 
are made and resources allocated (Whittington et at., 2003). The following 
sections therefore examine this issue and the relevant but limited theoretical and 
empirical research related to strategy tools and their use. 
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2.3 Strategy Tools 
This section examines the limited theoretical and empirical research related to 
strategy tools and their use. It focuses on the role tools may plan within firms 
during the practices involved in strategy formulation. 
2.3.1 Definitions and Uses of Strategy Tools 
The strategic management field has not settled on a single definition of strategy 
tools (Spee, Tanner, & Gunn, 2008). Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006) suggest 
that tools are mediators of activity that help establish a connection between 
practitioners and praxis. According to Stenfors (2007) strategy tools can be 
physical, processual or conceptual, and as such the range of tools that fit her 
description and studies include, among others, computers, post-it notes, project 
management techniques and analytical models and frameworks. Clark (1997) 
acknowledges a wide range of strategy tool types and thus refers to them as the 
"numerous techniques, tools, methods, models, frameworks, approaches and 
methodologies which are available to support decision making within strategic 
management" (p. 417). Later, with Scott (1999), Clark reiterated his view that 
the term strategy tool is a generic name for any of the above ways that strategic 
decision-making is supported. Knott (2008) similarly recognises a wide variety of 
strategy tools and thus explains that for him they "encompass the full range of 
approaches, concepts, ideas and techniques that structure or influence strategy 
activity" (p. 26). 
As a result of the wide variation in definitions, researchers have considered a 
large number of different types and examples of tools in their studies of strategy 
tools, and this makes comparison across studies problematic. For example, 
qualitative findings about their use may vary since interviewees are reflecting on 
different tools with some taking a much broader view than others. Similarly, list- 
based surveys have provided vast and different selections of tools for 
respondents to rank, which makes their findings difficult to compare. 
Within this review of the strategy tool literature, Clark's wider definition of 
strategy tools is appropriated since it has not only been used by studies 
subsequent to it (e. g. Clark & Scott, 1999; Frost, 2003; Spee et al., 2008), but 
because it also does not Include the physical tools and technologies that are not 
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of interest in this study. This thesis, however, takes a more narrow view of 
strategy tools during the later empirical work for two fundamental reasons. First, 
since it looks at the use of tools, and not at their stated popularity, it is, for 
practical purposes, necessary to limit the types of tools that can be considered 
empirically. The second reason is the study's fundamental interest in the use of 
supposedly popular academic and consultancy tools. It focuses, therefore, on the 
conceptual and analytical frameworks, matrices and models that are intended to 
help simplify and represent complex situations as part of the strategy formulation 
process. These include frameworks that might be considered descriptive since 
they are intended to help structure problems, as well as theory-based frameworks 
that are intended to help prioritise a situation's issues, and explain their 
relationship and effect on performance (Grant, 2008). These tools can therefore 
be considered conceptual and/or analytical. 
In order to avoid excessive repetition the terms `strategy tool', `framework', 
'model' and 'matrix' are used interchangeably. Although they do connote some 
subtle differences, their common purpose is to sort and structure information and 
thoughts related to strategic issues. For example, according to Dutton et al. 
(1983) strategy models: 
Provide a framework or structure within which to explore 
strategic decision contexts or issues; they are mechanisms 
which can be used by decision makers to sift through, simplify 
and synthesize (i. e. diagnose) a large body of data pertaining 
to firms' products, markets, strategies and goals and those of 
its competitors (p 318). 
Morecroft (1992), meanwhile, notes that frameworks add structure by imposing: 
Logical or spatial constraints on the arrangement of text or 
symbols. It is a map whose layout is guided by theory. 
Whereas a simple list just captures items of knowledge, a 
framework packages and organizes knowledge. A framework 
also filters knowledge because some ideas will not easily fit 
within the constraints of the framework (p. 13). 
According to Morecroft (1992), the effective use of a framework depends in part 
on the ease with which knowledge can be fitted into it. For example, he notes 
that while the concept of a value chain existed before Porter's (1985) work, 
Porter provided a major contribution to it and its popularity by "designing a 
visually compact map" (p. 15) which provides a "`working space' of boxes and 
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labels" that provide the physical place where practitioners can "categorise the 
facts they know (or gather)" (p. 16). For Eppler and Platts (2009), it is this 
visualisation component of many strategy tools that helps practitioners to elicit, 
structure, synthesise and share large amounts of both quantitative and 
qualitative data and Information. Examples of other such tools that have 
originated through the development of academic theory and/or consultants' 
experiences include SWOT analysis (Learned, Christensen, Andrews, & Guth, 
1965), the five forces framework (Porter, 1980), and portfolio planning matrices 
such as the BCG growth-share matrix (Henderson, 1979). 
The common consensus within the literature is that most strategy concepts and 
tools are developed to help managers deal with the uncertainties they face when 
creating and/or implementing a strategy (Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006). For 
example, many strategy tools provide practitioners with a framework for action 
and a means for structuring their work's context and categorising its activities. 
Stenfors et al. (2004) suggest that while most tools may solve practical problems, 
specific tools may have other benefits. For example, they suggest that scenario 
planning may help balance planning and intuition, Six Sigma may clarify 
processes, and the Balanced Scorecard may help produce more diverse opinions. 
From a practice perspective, therefore, one question pertains to the other 
practical roles strategy tools may play in practice, including, for example, with 
regards to social Interaction (Grant, 2003). Eden (1992) notes that from a social- 
psychological view strategic problems can be seen to be addressed through social 
and not just than logical processes. He says that strategy tools are a type of 
"processual toy" (p. 804) and suggests that this implies that strategic planners' 
analyses will have a larger impact on their firms if they have at their disposal 
models: 
That are more transparent so that they can be used to facilitate 
the management of new meanings. This may mean an 
increased use, and development, of visually attractive 
interactive models that all members of a group can use 
together (p. 804, italics in original). 
Morecroft (1992), meanwhile, suggests that Porter's (1985) value chain diagram 
provides management teams with "tangible focus for debate and discussion" 
(p. 16). 
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Improved visualisation was cited as a key benefit In Stenfors et al. 's (2004) 
survey of top executives in Finland. According to Whyte, Ewenstein, Hales and 
Tidd (2008), material artefacts that are visual representations can help sustain an 
organisation's memory and help organisational members to focus their attention 
on areas where knowledge can be developed and evolved. They note that such 
tools can be used as a "holding ground" (p. 76) to help practitioners to remember 
a piece of a problem while they are working towards an overall solution. They 
point out that projects are episodic by nature and this means that there is a 
greater risk of knowledge being lost as teams disband and take on other work 
and that this has implications not only for the project but also for the wider 
organisational context in which the project take place. 
Strategy tools may also act as boundary-spanning objects (Kaplan & 
Jarzabkowski, 2006) since they can help mitigate the communication problems 
that result from the effects of geographic and hierarchal decentralisation and 
divisionalisation. For example, they may help provide a common interface 
between diverse groups and individuals, and therefore help mediate strategising 
activities (Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006; Stenfors et al., 2004). Stenfors et al. 
(2004) also found through their survey that the most commonly cited benefits of 
tools were related to the social world, including improved work processes and 
communication. The use of tools during meetings and workshops was seen as 
particularly beneficial since they were said to help open up discussions and raise 
different insights. 
2.3.2 Strategy Theory and Strategy Tools 
The creation and adoption of strategy's paradigms and ideas are important issues 
for managers and academics (Marcus et al., 1995). Both academics and 
practitioners acknowledge, however, that little is known about which of the 
strategy concepts and theories that are taught in strategic management courses 
are actually used by managers in practice (Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 2007). This 
is in part because only a few empirical studies that examine this issue have been 
conducted, even though the question is regularly raised at conferences and in 
special editions of academic journals (e. g. Academy of Management Journal, 
2001; Administrative Science Quarterly, 1982; British Journal of Management, 
2001). More importantly for this thesis Is the recognition that even less is known 
about why and how such theories are and are not used. 
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It is difficult to empirically examine how academic theories are used in practice 
since there is no consensus on what makes up the management theory that is not 
relevant to practice, and as such it is difficult to operationalise a set of theories 
that are used In practice and which can be studied (]arzabkowski & Giulietta, 
2007; ]arzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). Practically, it is also difficult to empirically 
query practitioners about the relevance and use of academic theories if they are 
unfamiliar with the academic terms. This suggests that findings from studies that 
take a list-based survey approach to testing the relevance, popularity and/or 
usefulness of theories may be suspect. 
Given the above, one way to examine how and why strategy concepts and 
theories are used in practice is to analyse how and why strategy tools are and are 
not used (Jarzabkowski & Giulietta, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). 
Academics do not often disseminate their theoretical concepts as theory to 
practitioners but rather do so as tools, including different techniques, models and 
frameworks (Morecroft, 1992), and as such, studying their use may provide a 
more appropriate manner for examining the use of theories and concepts 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). 
]arzabkowski and Wilson (2006) posit, however, that strategy theories often 
become dissociated from their theoretical foundations as they are transformed 
into a set of techniques and tools that are easier for practitioners to understand 
and use. The theory underlying the value chain is, for example, said to be: 
Intricate and involved and so, in its `raw form' is unsuitable for 
direct entry into management team dialogue. What 
management teams use is a `value chain diagram' that 
provides some of the theory's labels, concepts and mental 
discipline (Morecroft, 1992, p. 15). 
Similarly, while practitioners may be familiar with Porter's (1980) five forces 
framework, ]arzabkowskl & Giuletti (2007) note that practitioners likely do not 
associate It with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm on which it is 
based. This dissociation may, in part, be due to the fact that many strategy tools 
are said to be "the special province of consultants" (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007, 
p. 79) and it Is through their interventions that many practitioners may become 
familiar (or re-familiar) with these tools. Their use and role is generally a more 
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practical rather than educational one, and as such explaining the underlying 
concepts or ideas are not necessarily a concern for them or their clients. 
From the practice perspective it Is important to understand how the strategy tools 
that result from underlying concepts and theories are disseminated and used 
since both can involve multiple stakeholders and extensive resources, and 
because they can have important impacts on strategic choices and actions 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Whittington, 2002c). Just as strategy concepts 
and tools are created as a result of the interrelationship between many different 
players and sources of information (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Whittington, 
2002b), their dissemination and popularisation can also be seen as a social 
practice that involves, for example, academics (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006), 
consultants (Morecroft, 1992; Schwarz, 2004), fellow practitioners (Abrahamson, 
1991) and the business press (Mazza & Alvarez, 2000). These interrelationships 
reinforce the likelihood that the strategy concepts academics and consultants 
create, teach, publish and/or sell, are passed on to students and executives as 
theory and knowledge artefacts and then used by practitioners as tools during 
strategising activities. 
The way and context within which tools are taught and disseminated to students 
may also influence how these individuals later use them in the'real world'. Henry 
(2000), for example, notes that strategy textbooks and academic courses tend to 
take a normative view of strategy with the process of strategy presented as one 
where formulation precedes Implementation. These classes and books are often 
built around different tools, with the majority being economics-based frameworks 
and models that help the student to understand the strategy formulation phase 
and to make strategic recommendations (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). An 
important role of management education is said to help professionalise managers 
by turning them into "model readers" who understand the inherent logic of 
different frameworks (Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 438). In a similar fashion, Liang 
and Wang (2004) suggest that `teaching cases' are largely a way to help 
students learn how to analyse strategic situations using strategy frameworks and 
models. Therefore, future managers appear to learn the analytical function of 
tools In a rational and linear manner. 
While DiMagglo and Powell (1983) revealed that new management concepts often 
spread throughout organisations via mimetic processes, there are additional and 
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alternative ideas about how and why organisations not only adopt and use 
management concepts, but also how they adapt and even create them 
themselves. Just as important is the fact that practitioners often reject strategy 
tools and one must not only understand why this is the case, but what skills and 
techniques practitioners may use and substitute for formal analysis involving such 
tools. These issues are examined in the following sections. 
2.3.3 Adoption of Strategy Tools 
The adoption of existing ideas implies that practitioners have incorporated these 
concepts to help them decide what to do (Beyer & Trice, 1982) and there are 
various explanations for why practitioners may choose to adopt existing concepts 
and tools. One view holds that such choices are rational and made only with 
regards to the best possible outcome for the firm. For example, Coats and 
Colander (1989) believe that when good information about ideas is available, the 
better ones win the competition for management's attention and use and thus 
survive. Similarly, Abrahamson (1991) points out that the 'efficient-choice' 
perspective assumes that certain concepts are adopted while others are not 
because organisations use information about their usefulness to make rational 
and independent decisions. 
An alternative view holds that such choices are not necessarily rational but 
instead emotional and/or subjective. For example, social pressures to conform 
may provide powerful reasons why organisations adopt certain known and used 
techniques (e. g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Similarly, because pre-existing 
concepts already come with reasons why they should be used, it may be easier 
for the practitioner to justify their use (Seidl, 2007). 
Extra-organisational factors such as environmental uncertainty and competition 
can also influence tool adoption and lead practitioners to use those that are 
popular in other firms. Environmental uncertainty may cause organisations to 
replicate the choices of other successful organisations since these may be seen as 
less risky during such times (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Thompson, 1967). 
Similarly, firms facing intense competition may copy an existing tool or activity if 
doing so can help to minimise the benefits it provides the competition (O'Neill, 
Pouder, & Buchholtz, 1998). 
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The tools practitioners copy can be new and fashionable fads (Abrahamson, 
1991). Concepts and tools become fads when: 
New managerial techniques are tried by pioneering 
organisations, achieve some widely publicised successes and 
become attractive to others seeking to improve their operations 
and/or their image (Lozeau, Langley, & Denis, 2002, p. 537). 
The life-cycle of management fads is typically short since these concepts and 
techniques generally do not become firmly embedded in organisations since 
practitioners are only attracted to them for short periods of time, eventually 
abandoning them for new, more promising ones (Abrahamson, 1991; Clark, 
2004). The susceptibility to management fads and fashions is thus likely a result 
of practitioners' collective preferences for new techniques and this therefore 
results in both the diffusion of many inappropriate or technically inefficient 
innovations and the rejection of superior ones (Abrahamson, 1996). 
There are mixed opinions about the reasons for, and value of, the adoption and 
turnover of such ideas among practitioners. On the one hand, practitioners are 
often derided for adopting unproven yet popular tools. For example, Nohria and 
Berkley (1994) believe that managers continue to adopt the "latest panaceas 
(and) off-the-shelf programs" (p. 128) because they don't trust their own 
judgement. Carson et at. (2000), similarly wonder if adopting external ideas 
may not simply be a way for managers to outsource critical thought. 
Practitioners may also adopt new tools because their own legitimacy can be 
enhanced by adopting techniques that are considered rational, modern and 
progressive (Lozeau et al., 2002). Others believe that the adoption of 
management fashions may be positive and the result of rational decisions. 
Ghemawat (2000) and Carson et al. (2000), for example, suggest that 
practitioners may adopt fashions in order to stay competitive as an increased 
speed of change in the real world means that their firms must constantly look for 
new ideas due to the temporality of any competitive advantage. Abrahamson 
(1991) similarly suggests that adopting fashionable concepts that are better than 
previous ones may mean that firms are simply trying to be progressive. 
Ghemawat (2000), meanwhile, proposes that ideas which are quickly adopted in 
mass may reflect successful internalisation. 
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While the strategy field's paradigms sometimes change, this does not mean that 
previous theories or tools are necessarily Invalid or obsolete (Warner, 1997) or 
that they need to be replaced with newer ones (Dunbar, Garud, & Raghuram, 
1996). Practitioners may continue to use the same tools because they are in fact 
useful for analysing different situations and for communicating coherent decisions 
(Cummings & Angwin, 2004). Many of these tools may in fact be adopted since 
they are organisational, industry or social norms and standards. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), many ideas and practices become the 
standard within a field due to political influences (i. e. coercive Isomorphism) and 
professionalisation (i. e. normative isomorphism). They suggest that organisations 
tend to model themselves according to the practices of other organisations in 
their field which they consider to be more successful or legitimate. Similarly, 
practitioners help to establish the perceived acceptability and usefulness of 
certain practices as they endeavour to define their appropriate work methods 
and "to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational 
autonomy" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). Practices that are institutionalised 
therefore include those which firms are unlikely to abandon since they are 
integrally important to the firm's values and cognitive structure (Carson et al., 
2000). Thus, even though new challenges continue to be faced at an increasingly 
rapid pace (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997) 
certain concepts and tools continue to be promoted and used decades after they 
were first created, and they have thus become institutionalised in organisations, 
Industries and the field of strategy itself. 
Just as long-established and `conventional' strategy tools do not disappear, new 
ones may not necessarily take hold as quickly and successfully as some might 
expect. This may be because the strategy field's concepts and tools have become 
institutionalised through the work of academics and consultants. Cummings and 
Angwin (2004) note that MBA programmes worldwide have educated a large 
number of international students in what are largely considered to be the same 
business school curriculum, and as a result today's practitioners all over the 
world, no matter where or when they were educated in business, all speak the 
same 'strategy language'. For example, the BCG portfolio matrix and its 
terminology are said to form part of the standard strategic management language 
(Dutton et al., 1983). 
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Phillips et al. (2004) suggest that it Is often texts that describe and communicate 
actions, and not the actions themselves, that create institutionalisation. They 
argue that texts allow multiple readings by many individuals, and that this helps 
their ideas to transcend time and space and become institutionalised. Whether 
created and promoted by academics or consultants, strategy tools are diffused in 
and as texts to practitioners through textbooks, academic articles, consultancy 
work, speeches, business school courses and the media (Marcus et at., 1995; 
Mazza & Alvarez, 2000). These have not only helped to communicate and 
popularise the tools, but also to legitimise their use since a practice or concept's 
use may be more easily justified when it comes from well-regarded external 
institutions such as academics, textbooks and independent and reputable 
academic and trade journals (Seidl, 2007). 
Whittington (2003) similarly suggests that a particular set of strategic practices is 
more easily accepted as legitimate and more efficient as a routine when it has 
been endorsed by respected academic institutions and/or consulting firms. In 
fact, because many concepts are well-known and considered acceptable or best 
practices, practitioners may be forced to justify not using them (Seidl, 2007). 
This implies that deviation from accepted industry and organisational practices 
can be costly --economically in terms of increased risk, cognitively in terms of 
the need for more thought, and socially in terms of reduced legitimacy (Phillips et 
al., 2004). 
It is important to note that only instrumental use has historically been considered 
a relevant use of theories, concepts and tools (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). In 
fact, non-instrumental use has been said to be thought of as either an example of 
management's failure to use the tool correctly and effectively, or even of a failure 
of the concept itself to have the desired result (Lozeau et al., 2002). Any use 
other than instrumental (Beyer & Trice, 1982) may also be thought of as deviant 
behaviour or corruption of a tool (Lozeau et al., 2002). 
For Botha (1989), once professional practitioners have been taught the tools of 
their trade, then their task is to simply apply this knowledge to an ever increasing 
number of areas. This strictly rational view of practice, however, assumes that 
applying tools is a straightforward process, and disregards the possible 
interpretations, translations or modifications of the tool itself due to human 
subjectivity which, as already discussed, influences strategy development 
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processes. Thus, while there are many reasons why strategy tools are adopted, 
there are also reasons for why, when they are adopted, they are also modified or 
adapted. 
2.3.4 Adaptation of Strategy Tools 
While strategy theory is generally meant to provide practitioners with a set of 
knowledge artefacts that help them to take rational, instrumental action 
(Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 2007), management theories are said to only rarely 
be used as cognitive tools without undergoing major changes (Worren, Moore, & 
Elliott, 2002). Similarly, while some practitioners may carefully choose the right 
strategy tool for the right purpose and then use them as prescribed (Gunn & 
Williams, 2008; Stenfors, 2007), some tools may be adapted in practice 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006) or used in ways for which they were not intended 
(Frost, 2003). 
Practitioners are said to generally be unhappy with the relevance of strategic 
management frameworks (Marcus et al., 1995) and this may lead them to 
intentionally change these tools in order to better suit their own needs. This lack 
of relevance may result because concepts created externally for other firms do 
not necessarily fit another organisation's particular internal or external context, 
and as a result they will not satisfy their intended purpose or goals (Seidl, 2007). 
Witcher & Chau (2008) recently found this to be the case at Tesco where the 
management modified Kaplan and Norton's (1992) balanced scorecard into a 
`steering wheel' and added a fifth 'community' criteria as the firm needed to 
respond to increasing pressures from regulators. Chesley and Wenger's (1999) 
action research case study of the introduction of this same tool into a single 
public organisation found, however, that practitioners also modified it for more 
personal reasons. For example, by almost immediately changing the tool's labels, 
words and arrows, they helped to legitimise their roles in the strategy process. 
Whittington et al. (2003) emphasise that the tools and techniques used in 
strategising are associated with creative and improvisational practices and 
acquire their meaning by being used in idiosyncratic contexts. For example, 
practitioners may innovate with their existing tools rather than acquire new ones 
when they are faced with unexpected or high levels of environmental uncertainty 
(]arzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). Since they exploit plurality when it comes to 
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theories or concepts (Combe, 1999), practitioners may also synthesise different 
tools and experiences. Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006) consider this alteration 
of the concepts to be an example of bricolage (DeCerteau, 1988) where the 
knowledge artefacts are often substantially changed by the practitioner based on 
his/her experience, creating hybrid forms that provide new ways to act. 
Practitioner acceptance and use of practices is therefore not necessarily passive, 
and practitioners may also so substantially modify existing artefacts that they are 
in fact new tools (Seidl, 2007). 
Others suggest more practical reasons for why practitioners create their own 
tools. For example, Cummings and Angwin (2004), citing a gap between theory 
and practice, propose that practitioners need improved frameworks that, while 
retaining the strengths and language of classical strategy frameworks, are 
created in order to help managers better respond to actual changes in their 
business environments. Franklin (2004), meanwhile, suggests that practitioners 
may create their own tools when innovation or differentiation is fundamental to 
their organisation's survival and/or are in-house capabilities. Such firms may see 
this ability as a unique and valuable resource (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991) that is 
difficult to imitate and thus a potential source of competitive advantage (Franklin, 
2004). In addition, because competitive situations pressure firms to periodically 
introduce new strategies (D'Aveni, 1994) and techniques (March, 1981), 
practitioners may not only adopt or adapt some of the concepts that already 
exist, but may also believe that they must develop new ones themselves. 
Studying institutionalised practices contributes to a more thorough understanding 
of strategy analysis at the micro-level, according to Johnson et al. (2007), who 
suggest, therefore, that one study how "formal planning practices (are) 
legitimate, contested or even absent in local arenas" (p. 48). This issue is 
examined next. 
2.3.5 Rejection and Criticism of Strategy Tools and their Use 
The most commonly suggested reason why practitioners reject existing tools is, 
quite simply, that existing research and its associated knowledge artefacts do not 
meet their needs. This gap may be due to a misunderstanding of practitioner 
needs and thus a creation of irrelevant research (Shrivastava, 1987). Academics, 
consultants and practitioners have all been blamed for a continued lack of 
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pragmatically valid research (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Lyles, 1995; Seeger, 
1984). Academics have been criticised for remaining isolated in their universities 
rather than immersing themselves in a real business environment that frequently 
changes in unexpected ways between the writing of academic papers (Lyles, 
1995). Consultants, meanwhile, have been accused of selling their ideas to any 
buyer regardless of the latter's ability to successfully implement them (Seeger, 
1984). Ghemawat (2000) blames a for-profit issue as a key reason for the 
overproduction of management ideas from both consultants and academics. At 
the same time practitioners have been criticised for not supporting or helping to 
shape relevant academic research (Balogun et al., 2003; Ghemawat, 2000). More 
specifically, academia supposedly values rigour while management values 
relevance, and there may not be enough synergies between them to produce 
valuable results for both sets of stakeholders (Marcus et al., 1995). As a result, 
academics who are concerned with their reputation and tenure possibilities may 
be more interested in producing research for other academics than for 
practitioners. All this helps explain why Bettis (1991) believes that a "normal 
science straitjacket" (p. 315) is the key reason that strategy research has limited 
influence on management practices. 
Seidl (2007), meanwhile, believes firms resist and/or fail with general strategy 
concepts due to interdiscursive translation problems between academia and the 
business world. Similarly, Gopinath and Hoffman (1995) believe that theory and 
practice have diverged from one another because, in part, research findings do 
not impact managerial practice since the two belong to two semi-autonomous 
domains (Astley & Zammuto, 1992) that use different standards for judging the 
usefulness of research results and knowledge claims (Shrivastava, 1987). In 
other words, the typical criteria which determine the validity of scientific findings 
do not mean that the same findings will be pragmatically valid or relevant to the 
practitioner (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Shrivastava, 1987; Worren et al., 2002). 
Grandy and Mills (2004), for example, believe that while strategy portrays tools 
as key representations of the real world, they tend to obscure more than 
illuminate. Similarly, while researchers have established that industry and firm 
criteria help simplify inter-organisational comparisons by helping to divide 
organisations into competitive sets or strategic groups, Porac and Thomas (1990) 
point out that "there is no reason to assume that managers use the same criteria 
as researchers when defining competitors" (p. 226). As such, one wonders about 
the practical usefulness of such frameworks for managers. 
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Priem and Rosenstein (2000) suggest that by determining a theory's obviousness 
to practitioners, researchers can begin to understand their regard or disregard for 
it. They say that research findings are often accused of offering little insight and 
of being obvious and/or trivial, and this may be another reason why practitioners 
often consider strategy research irrelevant and unnecessary. As practitioners are 
likely consider as obvious those theories which have been widely disseminated 
and proven effective through their use by other practitioners (Priem & 
Rosenstein, 2000), some of the field's institutionalised concepts and their related 
tools may have lost their appeal. On the other hand, Thomas and Tymon (1982) 
defined non-obviousness as "the degree to which a theory meets or exceeds the 
complexity of common-sense theory already used by a practitioner" (p. 348). 
They argue that in order to be non-obvious a concept needs to add enough 
incremental insight in practice so that it exceeds the existing and accepted 
prescriptive rules of thumb. 
Given the above it is difficult to refute Whitley's (1995) view that: 
The simple model of applied scientific knowledge generating 
high level, problem-solving skills which could directly be used 
to deal with complex practical (management) problems is no 
longer tenable (p. 102). 
Rigby's (2001b, 2003; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005) studies of the popularity of 
general management tools suggest that although they think that by using the 
`right tools' their companies are more likely to succeed, over 80 percent of 
executives surveyed believe that "most management tools promise more than 
they deliver" (2001b, p. 4). He Interprets this to mean that while companies do 
use a lot of tools, their experience using them has been frustrating and 
ineffective. This is perhaps why there has been a reduction in the number of 
tools used per company since the surveys began in 1993. 
Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006) argue that dissatisfaction with certain tools 
could arise because a practitioner's organisation may compete within different 
environmental conditions than those for which the concept was originally 
intended. In other words, tools associated with theories that were devised from 
studies in one set of environmental parameters may not be appropriate for a 
different or contradictory environmental context. Even more specifically, they 
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refer to the fact that today's level of knowledge intensity and environmental 
velocity affect organisations in more drastic and important ways than when the 
tools that are already institutionalised in the strategy field were first created and 
popularised. Practitioners, consultants and researchers often attempt this 
transference nonetheless, resulting in less than expected and desired results and 
a sense that tools are useless or irrelevant. Narayanan and Fahey (2005) 
similarly state that strategy models have a tendency to make a priori 
assumptions about institutional characteristics and as such they may not be 
relevant in all contexts. This implies that the usefulness of such tools may be 
limited to the contexts for which they were designed (Furrer & Thomas, 2000; 
Narayanan & Fahey, 2005; Porter, 1991). 
Dunbar et al. (1996) also believe that because the environment is changing more 
radically and rapidly than ever before, the use of strategy frames is especially 
dangerous. For them, changing contexts means that managers must consider, 
develop and implement different ways of thinking and managing, but that this can 
be difficult due to a reliance on established frames that often assume contextual 
stability. Tools may thus have limited utility due to the fact that they were 
usually developed in order to answer very particular questions or to analyse very 
specific situations (Furrer & Thomas, 2000) or industrial and economic contexts 
(Narayanan & Fahey, 2005). The normative significance of a model, for example, 
depends on the fit it provides between its assumptions and the reality in which 
firms operate (Furrer & Thomas, 2000). Since no model can embody all 
important variables, a model's relevance, and any finding from its use is limited 
to the firms or industries whose characteristics are in line with the model's 
assumptions (Porter, 1991). A critical issue, therefore, is that many strategy 
knowledge artefacts continue to form part of organisational strategy practices 
even though the boundary conditions in which the organisation operates are 
different from those for which the theoretical ideas underpinning the tools were 
originally intended. 
Although the limitations and shortcomings of strategy tools are often not 
considered or explained by the authors who have propagated them (Pickton & 
Wright, 1998), strategy tools and their use are not without critics. Varadarajan 
(1999), for example, recommends that many analytical frameworks, tools and 
techniques should be discarded by practitioners and academics because they are 
outdated. Sheth and Sisodia (1999) suggest that in such cases these tools serve 
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"more to impede and inhibit us than. to illuminate reality in a meaningful and 
useful way" (p. 72). They say that such tools also act as blinders that prevent 
practitioners from seeing the bigger picture. Hill & Westbrook (1997) similarly 
criticise academics because they rarely "conduct any product recalls" (p. 51). 
They believe that ideas and tools that were once valuable may continue to 
influence the field long past their time of usefulness and thus "hold an unmerited 
position in the thinking used in education, management development, 
consultancy, and in the real work of managing businesses" (p. 52). They go on to 
say that the use of such tools can not only can produce negative results, but that 
their use may also inhibit practitioners from adopting newer and better tools and 
techniques. 
Dunbar et at. (1996) believe that in using frameworks practitioners can 
themselves become `framed' as they become too familiar and comfortable with 
certain ways of assessing situations and thus do not consider alternative ways of 
doing so. The researchers believe that while such framing processes may make 
managers more confident in their decisions, which can in turn make action easier, 
these tools may not lead to the best actions or decisions since they tend to 
repeatedly result in the same beliefs and actions. Such over-usage implies that 
frameworks can become restrictive paradigms and thus limit creative and 
innovative thinking and action (Thomas, 1984), thereby reducing a firm's ability 
to remain competitive and effective. In other words, such epistemological views 
can have negative consequences for empirical disciplines (such as strategy) since 
habitual beliefs can result in cases of dogmatism and illusion (Powell, 2003). 
A problem with paradigmatic frameworks is thus that they may become too 
entrenched in the minds of the user. Cummings and Angwin (2004), for example, 
point to the `share of mind' Porter's (1980,1985) work has had on students and 
practitioners. They state that when asked how many forces impact an industry 
MBA students usually say 'five' due to their having learned Porter's five forces 
framework, and that when asked to draw how their firms add value, practicing 
managers tend to outline Porter's value chain. Thus, while these frameworks 
may in fact be as useful as they are popular, familiarity with them may make 
their users unable or reluctant to think about their firms or industries in 
alternative and perhaps more constructive ways. 
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This over-reliance on tools may be partly a result of their supposed simplicity 
which has also been criticised (Dunbar et at., 1996; Pickton & Wright, 1998), 
especially for oversimplifying strategic management processes (Thomas, 1984). 
Schultz and Hatch (2005) suggest that researchers sometimes unfortunately 
oversimplify the implications of their theoretical ideas and research findings for 
managerial action by turning their concepts into "a few straightforward, conflict- 
free implications" (p. 341). For example, although often praised for its simplicity, 
SWOT analysis has also been faulted for generating lists, often times biased 
towards a particular quadrant, rather than providing analytical results (Dyson, 
2004; Hill & Westbrook, 1997; Pickton & Wright, 1998). 
It also appears as if the most popular and easy-to-use tools are drawn upon 
regularly even if they are not necessarily the most appropriate ones for the 
situation (Clark, 1997; Rigby, 2001a, 2003). Certain tools may not be able to 
handle, or may be inconsistent with, the complexities and nuances of the 
situations with which they are meant to assist, even after people learn to apply 
them (Dunbar et al., 1996). Narayanan and Fahey (2005) also believe that 
evidence of the rigorous reasoning needed for the strategist to arrive at 
conclusions from the data is seldom transparent or explicit in the tool itself. 
Thus, while a framework may provide a useful way to organise information, it 
may not necessarily contain within it the means to help the user to make useful 
decisions. 
Ambastha and Momaya (2004), meanwhile, believe that many frameworks and 
models do not provide much assistance to practitioners because these 
practitioners find it difficult to Integrate the frameworks into their functional 
processes. They believe that this Is in part because the frameworks require 
excessively high of levels of attention and commitment in order to be useful. The 
researchers believe that their own workshops and surveys provided them with 
some empirical support to claim that the low usage of strategic theories and 
frameworks is also partially due to the fact that practitioners do not understand 
these frameworks well. One example of such difficult-to-use tools are typological 
frameworks which are said to be more complex than typical linear theories (Doty 
& Glick, 1994). 
Thus, even though strategy tools may be rejected by practitioners, understanding 
the personal, organisational and extra-organisational reasons for this is an 
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important issue for SasP scholars and practitioners. According to Carter et al. 
(2008): 
Analysing strategy is not merely reporting what it is that is 
done but also what is not done ... Thus, strategy conceived in 
research terms as practices that focus solely on that which 
strategists said and did will miss the strategic spaces within 
which strategy is constituted. What is necessary is to explore 
not only what is done but what is not done, that which is not 
practised, and which is not said, using external stakeholder 
articulations as signs of what might be but is not (p. 94). 
Stenfors and Tanner (2006) argue that evaluating the usefulness of a tool is not 
possible through traditional evaluation means since most strategic situations are 
unique, and because "the context in which the tool is used becomes of great 
importance and cannot be separated from the tool in the process of evaluation" 
(p. 22). Many of the critical contextual factors influencing the use of strategic 
analysis frameworks and models surround the process of strategy formulation 
itself. As such, the following section reviews the literature on strategy 
formulation and how its contextual variables may influence the use of strategy 
tools. 
2.4 Strategy Formulation and Strategy Tools 
This section briefly reviews some of the more common thoughts and 
disagreements with regards to the purported uses of tools in relation to strategy 
formulation which, for Johnson et al. (2007), is a key aspect of strategy practice 
and therefore a central concern of the SasP perspective. Strategy is a pluralist 
discipline and one that has fragmented into many different views about strategy 
formulation. According to Hart (1992), the excessive number of different 
competing and overlapping conceptual models and typologies that these schools 
have created for strategy formulation has resulted in a situation of "model 
proliferation" (p. 327). However, since most tools are said to have originated 
from a rational and deliberate view of strategy formulation (Whittington, 2001), it 
first examines this view of strategy formulation, including criticisms of it and its 
prescribed role for tools. This is followed with a discussion of the diametrically 
opposed 'emergent' school's view of strategy formation since it has called into 
question the actual deliberateness of strategy formulation and has suggested that 
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strategy is formed rather than rationally formulated with formal tools and 
processes. It then presents a post-rational perspective of strategy formation and 
tools that draws on some of the strategic management literature about 
organisational politics/power, culture and institutionalism, as these provide 
alternative views of strategy-making and the role of strategists (Mintzberg, 
Ahistrand, & Lampel, 1998). 
2.4.1 The Classical Perspective 
Ghemawat (2002) suggests that the rationale for business strategy can be 
attributed to Drucker's (1954) position that management behaviour should not 
simply be passive and adaptive, but rather a deliberate set of actions taken In 
order to control macro-environmental and industry forces and bring about desired 
results. Learned, Christensen and Andrews (1961) helped establish this 
classical (Whittington, 2001) view of strategy-making as a deliberate action by 
arguing that organisations should have clearly defined purposes in order to keep 
them progressing in a deliberate direction. This perspective Is also founded on 
the view that strategic decision-making should be based on a rational model of 
extensive and comprehensive analysis (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999). Such rationality is said to typically involve the review 
of all possible alternatives, the Identification and evaluation of the consequences 
of choosing any and all options, and the selection of the option that is likely to 
result in the best possible outcome (Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995). This 
rational and deliberate concept of strategy continues to dominate much of the 
thinking about the role and actions of strategists that underpins much of the 
prescriptive strategy literature, including that of Mintzberg et al. 's (1998) design, 
planning and positioning schools. 
Working from this perspective, Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth (1965) 
are commonly credited as the first researchers to suggest that strategy's aim is 
to deliberately 'fit' a firm's internal competencies with its external environmental 
conditions. For them, strategy-making as a rational and deliberate process is 
predicated on "systematic environmental analysis (and) assessment of internal 
strengths and weaknesses" (p. 328). According to Porter (1982), this approach 
established strategy as an analytical process that practitioners could use to not 
only identify the core issue affecting their firms, but that once realised would tie 
together the firm's symptoms and problems and provide insight into needed 
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solutions. For Grant (2008), meanwhile, it marked the origin of the first 
analytically-based strategy frameworks. The ensuing normative strategy 
literature has produced a variety of concepts, theories, models and tools that 
have provided prescriptive advice about how practitioners should analyse an 
organisation's internal and external environments (Learned et al., 1965) create 
or choose strategic options (Porter, 1980), and evaluate strategic alternatives 
according to a set of objective criteria (Ansoff, 1965). 
Much of the prescriptive academic strategy literature thus seems to argue that 
strategy tools can be of substantial use to firms and strategists when they follow 
a rational, linear and analytical approach to strategy formulation (Cummings & 
Angwin, 2004; Furrer & Thomas, 2000; Greiner et al., 2003; Thomas, 1984). 
Porter (1991), for example, believes that frameworks offer detailed advice, 
`inform practice' and help practitioners to define and make strategic choices. 
While there are variations in the normative models associated with this view, they 
usually include a comprehensive and complex set of analytical tools intended to 
assist practitioners in making their decisions and formulating their firms' 
strategies (Fredrickson, 1983). Peters & Waterman (1982) summed up a popular 
view when they suggested that "Before the rise of the analytic model, the seat- 
of-the-pants technique was all there was. And it was wholly inadequate for 
dealing with a complex world" (p. 32-33). 
Criticisms and Limitations of the Rational and Analytical Perspective 
While this mechanistic view of strategy formulation has been described as the 
`embodiment of rational thinking' (Alvesson & Wilmott, 1995), not everyone has 
praised this approach to strategy-making. Whittington et al. (2006), for example, 
suggest that the problem with traditional strategy is not the formal or 
deliberateness of the approach, but rather that it can be overly analytical and 
detached. Hayes and Abernathy (1980), meanwhile, blame its popularity for 
some of the failed strategic thinking of U. S. companies in the 1960's and 1970's. 
They state that the problem with this rational-analytical approach to strategy 
formulation is that practitioners "increasingly relied on principles which prize(d) 
analytical detachment and methodological elegance over insight, based on 
experience, into the subtleties and complexities of strategic decisions" (p. 70). 
Glaister and Falshaw (1999) similarly suggest that one reason why strategic 
planning became less popular towards the end of the 1970s was "the inability of 
strategic planning tools to deliver what was expected of them" (p. 107). Greiner 
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et al. (2003), meanwhile, note that the subsequent decades have also been a 
time of growing disillusionment with these analytical models. 
Much of the criticism of the rational-analytical perspective of strategy formulation 
also centres on questions of the actual existence of rational and analytical 
thinking during strategy-making. The prescribed use of analysis is often critiqued 
because research into the way strategists actually think has suggested that, due 
to their cognitive biases and mental limitations, such an approach to strategy- 
making is an attempted rather than realistic exercise In rationality (e. g. 
Schwenk, 1988). Scholars cite the fact that practitioners often rely on heuristics 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) rather than analysis for making decisions, and they 
thus tend towards judgemental biases (e. g. Nutt, 2002) when using cognitive 
simplification tools such as strategy frameworks and models. Mintzberg et at. 
(1998) note that Simon's (1955) notion of bounded rationality suggests that 
strategy-making cannot be purely rational even if based on analysis. They argue 
that rather than make rational strategic decisions based on extensive analysis of 
the best available Information, strategists, due to their cognitive limitations, tend 
to rely on simplified models and limited information and to adopt the first 
strategic choice that is even satisfactory. Johnson et al. (2007) similarly point 
out that actors who are boundedly rational "are prone to rely upon past routines 
rather than de novo calculation in their activity" (p. 40, italics in original). This, 
they say, means that "their struggle to make sense of their worlds becomes a 
problematic and consequential process In itself" (p. 40). From this view one 
recognises that the use of analytical models and frameworks may be of limited 
value, and in fact dangerous, if they are used with excessive confidence and 
without recognising the limitations they may impose on strategists' thinking, 
analysis and intuition. In other words, strategic analysis does not necessarily 
imply rational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1994). 
While he does note the potential benefits of learning from the hard data that 
comes from analysis, Mintzberg (1994) also remarks that the value of analysis in 
the strategy process is often undermined by both the time needed to ensure its 
accuracy and quality as well as by its overly aggregated nature which does not 
address important subtleties. Langley's (1989). study of the roles of formal 
analysis in three public (non-profit) organisations also suggests that it is used for 
multiple reasons not related to rational strategic decision-making. Although it 
was often used to obtain information, she found that much of this information did 
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not serve any real or stated purpose for making strategic decisions. She found, 
instead, that formal analysis is used most often to: (1) pass on prior convictions, 
(2) symbolise a concern for participatory decision-making, (3) procrastinate 
decision-making, (4) control subordinates by making them focus on solving 
particular problems and implementing certain decisions and (5) to persuade 
superiors or convince subordinates and colleagues to support a project. 
Not everyone believes that all strategists should be rational and analytical. For 
example, Mintzberg et al. 's (1998) discussion of the Entrepreneurial school 
notes that many researchers have demonstrated (and advocated) that 
strategists rely on `vision', or a mental representation of strategy created in their 
head, rather than on rational thinking and analysis. Here, strategy formation is 
considered to be a semiconscious process which largely relies on experience, 
judgement, wisdom and intuition (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Executives displaying 
these traits have been found to lead their organisations with little use of formal 
systems (Isenberg, 1984; McKiernan, 1996a), meaning that the role of formal 
tools for them is questionable at best. 
2.4.2 The Emergent and Post-Rational Perspectives 
While the classical approach to strategic analysis and design seems to have 
emerged through efforts to develop a practice-based integrative perspective 
(Volberda & Elfring, 2001), the notion that strategy is or can be formulated in a 
rational and deliberate manner has generated a lot of scepticism. For example, 
the classical view that strategy is made by top managers with deliberate 
outcomes is often rejected in light of findings that many important strategic 
decisions and actions are often made at lower organisational levels (Fenema, 
Koppius, & Dissel, 2004), without prior intent (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), and 
only later approved by top management (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984). Intended 
strategies are often not realised and other strategies often emerge informally. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) demonstrated that organisations often create 
coherent patters of activities without a rational, linear mode of thinking or 
deliberate intention. Denis et al. (2007) similarly note that formal processes 
associated with strategy-making have been found to often be absent or irrelevant 
to final decisions and/or actions. This perspective argues that strategy processes 
rarely follow deliberate, linear steps largely because both the environment and 
organisations are too complex to allow precise objectives to be achieved with 
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prior determination (McKiernan, 1996b). While the same analytical models 
proposed by the rational school may be used, this view of strategy formation 
suggests that their use is not often the direct antecedent of realised strategies. 
Even if one accepts that strategy is emergent, there is still a need to understand 
how practitioners act to help strategy emerge (Fenema et al., 2004; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2007) since "While many outcomes might be emergent, managers 
endeavour a good deal that is formal, analytical and systematic, and we should 
take this seriously" (Whittington, 2003, p. 121). One entry point here is via the 
study of the use of strategy tools, especially those created with a deliberate, 
rational view of strategy in mind, since scholars disagree about the role that 
formal tools play in strategy's emergent reality. McKiernan (1996b), for 
example, suggests that the planning and learning approaches to strategy creation 
both use rational analysis techniques and tools to either lead or support the 
strategy process because they are useful for dealing with changes in the internal 
and external environments. Similarly, according to Johnson (1988), because 
conceptual frameworks include implicit rules for their use and interpretation, both 
intended and realised strategies are usually configured according to their 
paradigm's parameters. Okumus and Wong (2005b), on the other hand, believe 
that the view of strategy as emergent means that for the school's proponents the 
creation of models and frameworks to assist practitioners in designing strategy 
are not as prevalent or important. 
Recently there have been renewed efforts to reconcile the different views of 
strategy (Combe, 1999; Mintzberg, 2001), such as the planning and learning 
approaches (Brews & Hunt, 1999; Grant, 2003), and as a result it is now thought 
that the emergent strategy process may not be as unstructured as originally 
thought. For instance, based on the notion that vision is flexible, Mintzberg et al. 
(1998) argue that entrepreneurial strategy is deliberate in terms of an overall 
vision but emergent when it comes to how the vision's details unfold. Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997), meanwhile, discuss semi-structures, and Grant (2003) raises 
the notion of `planned emergence' and a coexistence of formal and informal 
strategic planning processes. This is in line with Mintzberg and Waters' (1985) 
suggestion that perfectly deliberate and perfectly emergent strategies are rare 
and that most often real strategies fall somewhere along a continuum. 
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Building on the post-rational perspective of strategy-making, researchers (e. g. 
Johnson et al., 2003; McKiernan, 1996b; Pettigrew, 1977) have recognised the 
importance that contextual factors, determined in large part by organisational 
structure, culture and politics (or power), play In strategy-making and 
implementation. Strategy formulation, for example, is often times a process of 
bargaining and compromise, where it is not possible to formulate optimal 
strategies due to political games (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Pettigrew, 1987). 
Practitioners also often neglect official and formal strategy processes In order to 
satisfy personal goals and political agendas (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2004). From a 
culture perspective, strategy Is created through a process of social Interaction 
that is dependent on the shared beliefs and understanding of an organisation's 
members (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
Since strategising is also a political process (Pettigrew, 1987), which tools (if any) 
get used will in part be determined by who is involved in determining the 
parameters of strategy praxis and the practitioners involved (Whittington, 2006). 
Material artefacts can, for example, be the focus of power struggles between 
different occupational groups (Whyte et al., 2008). Morecroft (1992) notes that 
models are more likely to be used by management teams when their members 
believe that their own ideas and knowledge figure in the model. Strategy tools 
may also figure within the social and psychological negotiations that play a 
fundamental role in achieving the political feasibility of strategy formation (Eden 
& Ackermann, 2001). Hill and Westbrook (1997) suggest that practitioners can 
easily modify the findings from the use of tools such as SWOT analysis in order to 
help support their own ideas and interests. Stenfors and Tanner (2007a), 
meanwhile, found that executives with power are likely to use tools to further 
their own interests, by, for example, using particular tools, interpreting their 
results, and then building on the findings of tools in self-interested ways. Dutton, 
Fahey and Naraynan (1983) also found that the use of strategy tools had political 
connotations during their study of strategic issue diagnosis. They state that: 
Individuals' political interests become charged as they 
recognize how the use of the models may be turned to their 
own advantage or may adversely affect their own Interests. 
Individuals may use the models to impress others, defend their 
own `position', question the arguments of others or support 
their own arguments (p 318). 
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Organisational culture is also said to influence strategy creation because it affects 
an organisation's thinking styles and use of analysis as the Interaction of shared 
beliefs and values leads to organisational paradigms that help determine how 
strategy is made and which strategies are pursued (Mintzberg et al., 1998). For 
example, strategic solutions are believed to often be adopted because they are 
acceptable to those who make, influence or implement the decision, and not 
because of purely objective measures (Johnson, 1987). Culture also helps to 
determine an organisation's dominant logic which is its "conceptualization of the 
business and administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in that 
business" (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p. 491). Prahalad and Bettis explain that 
the firm's dominant logic is expressed as learned, problem solving behaviour and 
that the success managers have with certain behaviors leads them to "develop a 
particular mind set and repertoire of tools and preferred processes, this in turn 
determines the approaches that they are likely to use" (p. 492). In other words, a 
firm's cultural values and norms means that certain practices and tools may be 
used while others are ignored (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
The institutional perspective of strategy is also based on the concept of social 
construction (Johnson & Greenwood, 2007). It assumes that an organisation's 
internal reality is influenced by social expectations and norms and that people 
behave in a way that represents how they see the world, and as such they 
actually create their world in line with their perceptions. As such, it does not 
adhere to the orthodox view of strategy formation as rational process of decision- 
making where the firm's internal and external environments can be rationally 
analysed by practitioners. Instead, practitioners' choices are constrained by 
social norms and prescriptions which help the practitioner to legitimise his or her 
actions and choices. These social prescriptions often become 'taken-for-granted' 
and resemble or mimic those already accepted and used by peers, and thus are 
often hard to resist or change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This implies that 
practitioners may rely on a set of strategy practices that are seen as legitimate or 
appropriate within their organisation, industry or larger society rather than 
because they are the most effective, and as such practitioners may find it difficult 
to use other practices and tools which may be more appropriate. For Johnson 
and Greenwood (2007) this means that: 
Common approaches are adopted, common assumptions made, 
and common practices followed ... the strategy tools and techniques advocated by strategy writers and consultants are 
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employed in reality to post-rationalise and legitimise the 
relatively institutionalised strategies managers follow (p. 25). 
Thus, the role of tools in strategy development is important to study regardless of 
one's position in this debate since, in all likelihood, strategy is a combination of 
both deliberate and emergent processes, and of rational and more socially- 
influenced behaviour. Even if they are not part of a formally Intended and stated 
strategy, but rather more of an emergent reality, micro-practices such as the use 
of strategy tools may be consequential for a firm's direction. 
2.5 Strategy Tool Popularity and Context 
The following section reviews the limited extant empirical findings about the 
actual use of tools, including what is known about which tools are used, who uses 
them, and when they are used. As most studies have used aggregate list-based 
surveys, it first discusses the benefits and limitations to this method in order to 
qualify their findings. It then presents the most important findings of the extant 
quantitative and qualitative studies as they relate to contextual and practical use 
since, as Johnson et al. (2007) suggest, studies based on surveys are useful to 
SasP researchers because "knowing what people typically do can provide 
important contextual background in interpreting particular interactions" (p. 43). 
2.5.1 A Critique of Quantitative Methods and Their Results 
Most studies that have explicitly studied strategy tools have been conducted to 
identify which and when tools are used rather than how or why they are or are 
not used. Their findings have been gathered through the use of list-based 
surveys even though such a method may not correctly Identify which tools 
managers are actually using. For example, based on the 10 Interviews he 
conducted with top managers, Knott (2008) identified that (1) practitioners may 
not think of popular and generic business practices as tools, (2) that they do not 
consider to have used tools if it was only part of their initial inspiration for a 
project, and (3) that they cite having used a tool even when the use was either 
not formal or only used to a very limited extent. As such, he believes that 
survey-based studies are not "a measure of actual activity, but simply a gauge of 
what is fashionable talk" (p. 29). 
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Some of the results from list-based surveys also raise doubts as to the reliability 
of such an approach and/or the generalisability of their findings. For example, 
while SWOT analysis Is generally ranked as the most popular tool across surveys 
(Clark, 1997; Grant, 2003; Gunn & Williams, 2008; Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 
2007; Oliveira, Rosa, & Antonio, 2008), there is little consistency regarding the 
popularity of other tools. Value chain analysis, for example, is ranked highly for 
Jarzabkowski and Giuletti (2007) and Oliveira et al. (2008), but much lower for 
Stenfors et al. (2007) and Spee et al. (2008). There are various possible reasons 
for the discrepancies across these studies. Firstly, practitioners may know the 
tools by different names or not be aware of the name of the tool they are using, 
thus either not acknowledging its use or mistaking it for another. For example, 
Jarzabkowski & Giuletti (2007) suggest that their study's finding that PESTLE was 
not more widely used may be due to the fact that it is also known by other names 
such as PEST or SLEPT. Secondly, the different studies did not all compare the 
same list of tools, therefore possibly skewing the rankings across surveys. 
Similarly, the number of tools provided for practitioners to choose and rank varies 
across the studies. Thirdly, these studies examined different sets of practitioners, 
with some focusing only on top executives in a particular country (e. g. 
Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Clark, 1997; Oliveira et al., 2008; Stenfors & 
Tanner, 2006) and another only on graduates from UK business schools 
(Jarzabkowski & Giulietta, 2007). Finally, some factors such as size of company, 
nationality and industry sector have not generally been accounted for or are not 
similar across the studies, and since strategy formulation (Pettigrew, 1977) and 
strategising (Johnson et al., 2003) are said to be contextual, these factors may 
underlie the reasons for some differences in their findings. The different studies 
do suggest, however, that the classical school's strategy tools are used, albeit to 
different degrees. A review and analysis of their other findings also provide 
valuable ideas on the value of tools in practice and they are examined below. 
2.5.2 The Popularity of Tools 
As discussed above, most studies have sought to determine which tools are used. 
The fact that the most popular tools appear to be those for strategy analysis may 
also be due to the fact that most studies have surveyed top managers and this is 
an area where they are more involved, as opposed, for example, to strategy 
implementation which is largely the domain of middle managers (Floyd and Lane, 
46 
2000; Mantere, 2005; Regner, 2003). As such, it is not surprising that strategy 
implementation tools do not figure among the most popular. 
Several studies quantify tool use as an average number of tools a company uses. 
For example, Stenfors and Tanner (2006) found that most companies use 
between four and five tools. As Gunn and Williams (2008) suggest, the number of 
tools an organisation uses may be important since using a large number may help 
ensure that different views and perspectives are considered during strategy 
formulation (Hussey, 1997). 
The studies also point to the fact that tools which are easy to learn and use, and 
are flexible and well-known are those that managers prefer (Frost, 2003; Rigby & 
Bilodeau, 2005; Stenfors & Tanner, 2006). These findings support Jarzabkowski 
& Wilson's (2006) notion that managers are more likely to use tools that they can 
easily adapt to their needs, have enough research behind them to support their 
claims to legitimacy, and that are more readily available. As such, one can better 
understand why even though its usefulness has been questioned by researchers 
(e. g. Grandy & Mills, 2004; Pickton & Wright, 1998), SWOT analysis, which is 
popular in schools and books, easy to use and well-known through its longevity, 
is consistently ranked as the most popular. Jarzabkowski & Giuletti (2007) also 
found that some tools which are thought by practitioners to have relatively low 
value are some of the most popular, and others which are thought to have high 
value are rarely used. According to the researchers, this means that the notion 
of using the best or most appropriate tools to accomplish a specific strategy 
project may not be the underlying reason why certain strategy tools are adopted. 
It also suggests why many tools that are at one point popular may fade away 
after practitioners do not have success with them (Abrahamson, 1991; Rigby & 
Bilodeau, 2005). 
2.5.3 Individual Context 
Previous research has rarely looked at tool use across different hierarchical levels 
and most studies have queried top managers (Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Knott, 
2008; Oliveira et al., 2008; Spee et al., 2008). Implicit reasons for this may be 
because the support of top managers is necessary for to legitimise certain 
strategy practices (Hodgkinson and Wright 2002) and because most previous 
strategy process research has focused on them (Van de Ven, 1992). More explicit 
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reasons why researchers make this choice are because they believe that top 
managers are more likely to use strategy tools since they have more strategic 
responsibilities and because other organisational members take part in less 
strategic exercises (Grant, 2003; Hill and Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson et a/, 
2006). 
Two studies did look at the popularity of tools across organisational levels. 
Jarzabkowski & Giuletti's (2007) survey of graduates from 30 UK business schools 
found that most tools were used more often by top managers, then by middle 
managers, and then by professionals. Spee et al. 's (2008) study across three 
nations, meanwhile, found that some tools were used at several hierarchical 
levels. 
Masters degree holders may tend to use tools more often than those with 
undergraduate degrees (Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 2007), and these tend to be 
conceptual tools that frequently form part of management education courses 
(Gunn & Williams, 2008). Similarly, academically-trained managers have been 
found to use tools that are more reliant on theoretical frames, while those who 
were professionally trained were more likely to use tools associated with 
consultants such as SWOT, benchmarking and the balanced scorecard (Gunn & 
Williams, 2008). Jarzabkowski & Giulettl (2007) suggest that the greater 
popularity of tools among those with higher degrees and more education may be 
due to the use of case studies, practical experience and a work experience entry 
requirement that together improve cognitive retention of the concepts and tools. 
As no study has looked at the types of schools managers attended (for example, 
professional versus liberal arts), there is only anecdotal evidence that managers 
who have not received formal management education are familiar with and/or 
trained In the use of strategy tools. 
Jarzabkowskl & Giuletti (2007) point out that research in organisational behaviour 
and learning suggest that educational concepts are used more often by persons 
who were recently exposed to them. While recognising that they are limited by 
the number of responses they received from respondents who were out of school 
for less than five years, they suggest that according to their research there seems 
to be little difference in tool use based on the time elapsed since a person's 
formal education. They suggest that this may be due to the fact that tools may 
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be used throughout a career and thus not easily forgotten, or because popular 
tools become part of the strategy lexicon and thus are used unconsciously. 
2.5.4 Organisational Context 
This section examines several contextual factors at the organisational level 
including organisational size, culture and strategy process. 
Organisational Size 
Recent studies have tended to focus on large (or even the largest available) 
companies (Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2008; Spee et at., 2008; 
Stenfors, 2007). In the one study of tool usage in SMEs, Frost (2003) found that 
managers in this sector generally rely on the same tools, perhaps because the 
pool of tools they consider is much smaller than the set that their larger 
counterparts draw upon. Past studies that compared tool usage across firms of 
different sizes have generally suggested that larger rather than smaller 
organisations use more strategy tools (Frost, 2003; Rigby, 2003; Rigby & 
Bilodeau, 2005), though it should be noted that Jarzabkowski & Giuletti's (2007) 
study did not confirm this. 
Culture 
Two qualitative studies suggest that organisational values about strategy-making, 
experience, intuition and formality may also influence their use of tools. Knott 
(2008), for example, found that certain practitioners he interviewed were 
reluctant to explicitly use formal tools because their organisations did not value 
`textbook' types of tools. Similarly, in his look at large multi-national oil 
companies, Grant (2003) found that while some strategy analysis tools were 
widely used, several firms were sceptical of most formal tools "and the jargon 
associated with them" as they believed that these "created a barrier to deploying 
experience-based knowledge" (p. 510). Knott (2008) also found that some 
corporate headquarters mandated the use of specific tools while others had a 
corporate university that promoted the use of certain tools. Still, most felt little 
pressure to use particular tools. 
The Strategy Process 
Strategy tools are consistently shown to be used more for strategic analysis and 
situation assessment than for strategic choice or strategy implementation (Clark, 
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1997; Grant,, 2003; Hodgkinson et al., 2006). Still, previous studies tend to show 
that most tools are used for more than one kind of task and at different stages of 
the strategy process even though they may be considered useful during all 
phases (Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Jarzabkowski and Giuletti, 2008). This implies, 
therefore, that tools are either flexible enough to be used for numerous types of 
tasks, that practitioners adapt tools to suit their needs (Knott, 2008), or that they 
rely on familiar tools even when not appropriate (Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 2007). 
Similarly, it may be that only different parts of the tools (Knott, 2008) are used 
at different stages in the process. In any case, tools seem to be used for many 
different tasks and not for any one specific purpose, including that for which they 
were necessarily designed. 
2.5.5 Extra-organisational Context 
This section examines several contextual factors at the extra-organisational level 
including the macro-environmental situation, the national context and the 
industry. 
Macro-environmental Situation 
There is little consensus about the expected influence that environmental 
uncertainty might have not only on the likelihood that tools are used, but on their 
effectiveness and/or efficiency. Rigby (2003), for example, has posited that firms 
facing difficult times are more prone to invest in tools in order to reduce 
environmental uncertainty. Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006), meanwhile, have 
suggested that many classical strategy tools are not suited for the increased 
levels of uncertainty in today's environment. One reason for this might be that 
there is little time for detached analysis during periods of rapid change 
(Whittington et al., 2006). In the one study that implicitly explored this link, 
Grant (2003) explains that the firms he studied that were in such environments 
relied more on financial analysis method than on conceptual tools since during 
these times financial targets were the focus while formality was less valued. 
National Context 
A comparison of some studies (e. g. Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Clark, 1997; 
Frost, 2003; Matzler, Rier, Hinterhuber, Renzi, & Stadler, 2005; Rigby, 2001b, 
2003; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005) shows that use of strategy tools varies across 
countries in terms of the number of tools used, the frequency with which they are 
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used, and the types of tools used. Spee et al. (2008) purposely compared their 
survey results in two countries with those of Stenfors et al. 's' (2004) previous 
findings in a third country. While the studies used different lists of tools and 
survey approaches, they suggest that their findings do confirm that tool use 
varies across firms from different countries. There have not, however, been any 
arguments as to why this is the case. 
Industry Context 
Recent research points to the fact that the popularity of strategy tools is not 
consistent across different Industries (Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Clark, 1997; 
Frost, 2003; Rigby, 2003; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005; Stenfors et al., 2004). Gunn 
and Williams (2008) found that senior executives used tools which were the most 
common ones In their industry. This may be explained by Spender's (1989) 
notion of industry recipes which suggests that firms within the same Industry 
adopt similar strategies and, perhaps, processes. Similarly, neo-institutionalism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) suggests that certain practices may become 
Institutionalised within particular industries. 
Glaister and Falshaw (1999) differentiated between the manufacturing and 
service sectors In their study of strategic planning's popularity since they believed 
that industry context could affect the degree of formal strategic planning. 
Although much of their evidence was inconclusive, they did find differences in 
firms' formal use of tools across the two sectors and some of their results and 
analysis warrant a closer look. For example, they found surprising their finding 
that while firms in both sectors reported a strong focus on the external 
environment and a relatively high use of SWOT analysis, there was little reported 
use of the five forces framework and PEST which the researchers considered to be 
complimentary tools. They also found surprising that in each of the two sectors 
over 30 percent of the firms did not have anyone with the specific responsibility 
for conducting the elements of a SWOT analysis. Given that they also found little 
use of other tools such as portfolio matrices, they concluded that firms in both 
sectors made relatively little use of a wide range of strategic analysis tools and 
techniques. They believe that the evidence from their sample suggests that 
"many firms are not particularly sophisticated in terms of the tools/techniques 
most regularly used for strategic analysis" (p. 113). 
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Glaister and Falshaw (1999) also note that the strategic analysis tools and 
techniques they found to be the highest ranked for use were also those that were 
experiencing an increase in use, and that this was particularly the situation in 
service sector firms. They found a significantly higher increase In use of SWOT 
analysis in manufacturing firms as opposed to those in the service sector, and a 
greater increase in use of Porter's five forces framework by service sector firms. 
Thus, while there was not much change In use of the major tools and the 
variation did not differ across sectors, the fact that some specific strategy tools 
were gaining popularity in the different sectors may imply that sectoral 
differences can impact which tools are more useful or popular. It is important to 
note, however, that this research was conducted 10 years ago and that a similar 
study conducted today may produce substantially different findings due to such 
Issues as changes in management education, the competitive nature of the 
industries and the diffusion of new management tools and techniques. 
Thus, even though some studies have suggested sectoral differences, there has 
not been any thorough study of which tools might be Industry-specific, nor 
enough studies to determine patterns in use within and across specific Industries. 
Similarly, there has not been any qualitative work to help understand what 
industry or sectoral contextual factors might influence not only which tools are 
used, but why and how they are used. Thus, while some studies have looked at 
this issue indirectly, Johnson et al. (2007) continue to suggest that because 
different MBA strategy practices may vary across types of firms and industries, 
this issue should be examined in more depth. 
2.6 Chapter Conclusion 
SasP shifts the focus of strategy research back to the strategy field's original 
focus on the actual work of practitioners. It differs from the more established 
content and process subfields in several important ways, Including its focus on 
the minute and micro-activities of practitioners, its perspective that improved 
managerial performance Is a worthy dependent variable, and the Importance it 
places on understanding how organisational and Institutional contextual factors 
influence the way practitioners 'do'strategy. 
The SasP research agenda has largely focused on questions of who is involved in 
an organisation's strategising activities, the skills they need for this, where 
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strategising is done and how its work is communicated and consumed. Some of 
the empirical research into these areas has provided some important findings 
about how strategy is practiced and which may influence how and why they and 
their organisations use and do not use the strategy tools created and promoted 
by consultants and academics, which is an additional and under-investigated 
research question for SasP. Several such findings include: 
(1) Middle-managers may go beyond operational responsibilities and 
Influence a firm's strategic activities by championing strategic issues. By 
providing a sense of familiarity and distance, they provide other 
practitioners with a sense of objectivity and confidence to better facilitate 
Information exchange. They may also help adjust particular practices to 
specific contexts due to their understanding of local norms and routines. 
(2) Strategising often occurs in episodes such as workshops and meetings. 
An organisation's choice of such practices is shaped by their traditions and 
norms for thinking, acting and using `things'. 
(3) Strategy practices may be formal and uncreative yet result in creative 
outputs such as strategic plans. 
The more traditional strategic management literature also suggests that strategy 
is not necessarily a rational, linear or analytical process. Rather than the 
deliberate result of planning and formulation exercises it may instead emerge 
based on individual and collective learning. Similarly, an organisation's strategy 
process may be influenced by its culture, politics and structure. As such, a firm's 
use of strategy tools may be influenced by the collective preference of its 
members for particular strategy-making processes and practices including 
workshops, meetings and documents. 
The limited literature on the use of strategy tools is inconclusive as to how tools 
are used and how different levels of context influence their use and perceived 
value. Still, there are some interesting notions that help shape the course of this 
study: 
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(1) Conceptual tools may help strategists to emphasise the different points 
of view that exist within their firms, thus helping practitioners to better 
structure and solve the ill-structured problems they encounter. 
(2) Tools are used for purposes other than those for which they were 
intended, such as to facilitate conversations and communicate ideas. 
(3) The use of tools within the strategic management process has also 
been said to help facilitate management development and effectiveness. 
(4) Tools can, in the 'right' context, help to provide discipline and 
understanding within organisations by revealing taken-for-granted 
assumptions and exploring relationships between different parts of an 
organisation. 
(5) From other research into the roles of formal analysis and the use of 
role of theory in practice, one may assume that the use of tools may not 
necessarily always be rational or instrumental, even if they originally were 
derived with a rational-analytical use in mind. Instead, tools may be used 
for cultural, political or symbolic reasons. 
(6) Tools may be rejected due to similar reasons, as well as because tools 
often do not provide the benefits or results expected of them. 
Overall the limited studies into strategy tool use show that strategy tools are 
used in practice, and that practitioners say that they often see certain tools as 
relevant and valuable for their work even if the tools are not necessarily used as 
or when prescribed by the literature. From a practice perspective, any of the 
above Instrumental or non-instrumental uses might be relevant and useful for 
practitioners. However, more research into the non-instrumental uses has been 
identified as necessary, including social, political and symbolic uses and the 
contextual factors Influencing these. There is also some support for the Idea that 
tool use Is shaped by organisational and individual characteristics, though the 
limited qualitative research does not help explain why or how this is so. The 
review of the literature confirms Ezzamel and Wilmot's (2004) observation that 
there has been minimal attention paid to the Institutional context within which 
strategic decisions are made, including the values that provide legitimacy to the 
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rational models used by top managers. This is particularly important since as 
Langley et al. (2007) note: 
Strategic activities carried out by organization members (i. e. 
the doing of strategy) both influence and are influenced by 
organizational-level actions and institutional-level practices, 
and that the greatest potential for developing new and valuable 
knowledge for the strategic management field likes in exploring 
and understanding these relationships (p. 207). 
While the introduction of tools has been studied at the single-firm level (Chesley 
& Wenger, 1999; Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006), there have not yet been 
studies about the use of tools within multiple firms in a single industry. This is 
important for as Whittington (2002a) notes, industry contexts are Important 
variables affecting strategy tools and their use. According to him an important 
concern for SasP is: 
The relative diffusion of various technologies for doing strategy, 
with the focus on the concepts or tools that prevail within a 
firm, sector or broader society (p. 11). 
The following chapter therefore examines important characteristics of the 
international hotel industry in order to provide the necessary background for 
examining how the use of tools by hotel firms may be shaped by the industry 
context. 
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Chapter 3 Strategy Tools and the Hotel Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
In their review of strategic management research in the hospitality industry, 
Olsen and Roper (1998) cite the need for more hospitality industry-specific 
research since McGahan and Porter (1997) found that organisational profitability 
Is highly influenced by industry contexts. Even though there have been repeated 
calls within the academic literature for more research into the transferability of 
generic tools into the hospitality industry and for the development of industry- 
specific strategy tools, (Becker & Olsen, 1995; Okumus, 2002; Olsen, West, & 
Tse, 1998; Olsen, West, & Tse, 2008), such research and tools have not yet 
been sufficiently conducted or developed. Thus, as this thesis' previous chapter 
noted, it is important to understand the use of tools-in-practice, and the 
contextual factors that affect their use, it is valuable to understand how the 
characteristics of the hospitality industry, and more specifically the hotel 
Industry's contextual variables, might affect such usage by the industry's 
practitioners. 
This chapter now proceeds to review the literature relevant to this issue and it is 
structured as follows. Section 3.2 places the hotel industry within the hospitality 
and service sectors In order to demonstrate that the literatur on services and 
hospitality management can be applied to the hotel industry ßnd its companies. 
This section also explains why the ensuing discussion and later empirical work 
focuses on hotel companies rather than independent properties. Section 3.3 
reviews the strategic hospitality management literature about strategy tools, 
focusing on reasons why strategy tools are transferred rather than created 
originally for the hospitality industry and why such tools may or may not be 
appropriate for the industry's companies. The differences between the service 
and manufacturing industries and the Implications these differences may have for 
hotel companies' strategy-making processes is discussed in section 3.4. Section 
3.5 examines several important characteristics of the hotel industry as these are 
said to impact the strategy processes of its companies. As there is a large 
research lacuna with regarding the strategy process of hotel firms, section 3.6 
examines the research on how one part of the strategy process, environmental 
scanning, is practiced by hospitality companies and through this identifies some 
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potential reasons for how and why strategy tools may and may not be used 
during the strategic management process of these organisations. Section 3.7 
concludes the chapter with a summary of its key points and a brief link back to 
the previous chapter on SasP and strategy tools, as well as a presentation of the 
research questions investigated in the empirical study. 
3.2 The International Hotel Industry 
The hotel industry comprises an important part of the overall service sector 
(Carman & Langeard, 1980; Harrison & Enz, 2005; Schmenner, 1986), where 
the primary good that Is sold is a service and for which the transfer of a physical 
product is only incidental (Ford & Bowen, 2002; Kotler, Bowen, & Makens, 
2006; Thomas, 1978). The hotel industry is also a sub-segment of the service 
sector's hospitality industry (Harrison, 2003; Shoemaker, Lewis, & Yesawich, 
2006) which Litteljohn (1990) defines as "encompassing those commercial 
activities which offer customers accommodation, meals and drinks when they are 
away from home" (p. 209). Thus, while this chapter focuses on the hotel industry, 
it also draws on the more established strategic management literature from the 
broader service and hospitality sectors. 
The international hotel industry is considered among the most competitive in the 
world (Harrison & Enz, 2005). Though most of the world's hotels are small and 
independently owned, some international hotel companies brand and/or manage 
several thousand hotels as a result of their expansion strategies. These 
companies are said to dominate the industry as they establish many of the 
business-related strategies emulated by smaller companies (Harrison & Enz, 
2005). While over 70 percent of the 45,000 hotels (and nearly 5 million 
guestrooms) in the United States are chain-affiliated, this is only the case for 30 
percent of the 1.5 million hotel rooms in Europe (Slattery, Gamse, & Roper, 
2008). More significant, perhaps, is the fact that over two-thirds of new hotels in 
Europe are said to be affiliating themselves to a chain. This trend may be partly a 
result of the fact that between 2000 and 2006 the number of international brands 
in Europe nearly doubled to 185 (Slattery et al., 2008). Given their importance in 
the United States, and their growing importance in Europe, and the fact that most 
tools have been created for (Sharma, 2008), and are used by (Rigby, 2001a), 
larger rather than smaller firms, the following discussion of the role of strategy 
57 
and strategy tools in the hotel industry focuses primarily on hotel companies with 
multiple properties and/or chains. 
3.3 Strategic Hospitality Management Research and Strategy 
Tools 
This section identifies that there is a dearth of strategy tools created in and for 
the hospitality industry and suggests some reasons for this. It also demonstrates 
that strategic hospitality management education is based largely on generic tools 
and presents different views about the viability of such tools in practice. 
3.3.1 The Lack of Hospitality-Specific Strategy Tools 
Olsen et al. (2008) state that hospitality organisations, including those in the 
hotel industry, need strategy tools to help them compete effectively with their 
rivals. The strategic hospitality management literature has, however, largely 
relied on theories first developed by mainstream business researchers, and as 
such hospitality industry organisations have had to rely on concepts and tools 
developed In and for manufacturing firms to guide their competitive decisions 
(Okumus, 2002; Olsen & Roper, 1998). For Olsen et al. (2008) this is 
detrimental for hotel companies since "It has become obvious that using these 
industrial models to manage service firms makes as little sense as using 
agricultural models to run multinational corporations" (p. 13). They note that 
managers and researchers have recently begun to create general management 
models that incorporate the service sector's unique attributes (i. e. Heskett, 
Sasser and Schlessinger's Service Profit Chain), but that these too are based on 
the research literature that has been developed from the manufacturing sector. 
The lack of strategy models specific to the hospitality industry may be due to the 
limited amount of research into strategic management in the hospitality industry 
(Olsen & Roper, 1998). This research lacuna is said to be due, in part, to the 
relative newness of university-level hospitality and tourism education, the fact 
that strategic management courses were first developed and introduced to U. S. 
hospitality students only in the 1980s (Tse & Olsen, 1999), to a focus on teaching 
rather than research in hospitality management educational institutions (Okumus, 
2002), and to the lack of any specific hospitality-specific journals dedicated to 
strategic management (Harrington, 2009). The very small number of graduate 
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and doctoral progammes in strategic hospitality management also implies few 
researchers (Okumus, 2002; Olsen, 2004) and therefore only a limited number of 
doctoral theses and dissertations that examine strategic practices in the hotel 
industry (Tse & Olsen, 1999). Often the source of -and training for -rigorous 
research, this lack of doctoral work may explain the corresponding lack of theory 
construction in strategic management within the hospitality industry (Tse & 
Olsen, 1999). 
The industry's structure is also said to impede the research necessary for 
developing industry-specific tools and concepts. For example, international 
fragmentation and the substantial number of brand segments in the hotel 
segment are said to make it difficult to "conduct large-scale studies that are 
designed to contribute important theoretical frameworks to enhance our 
understanding of the (hospitality) Industry" (Olsen & Roper, 1998, p. 112). 
Okumus (2002), meanwhile, also notes that as opposed to more mainstream 
researchers who can investigate their ideas in any number of Industries, 
researching strategic management concepts and practices in the hospitality 
industry is also difficult because It can only be conducted in a few industries and 
this limits the number of potential and suitable research participants (i. e. 
companies and managers) from whom data can be collected. 
These issues help to explain why much of the research into strategy within the 
hotel industry has been conceptual and descriptive (Tse & ]ogaratnam, 2008) 
and why many generic strategy models have been reworked and applied to the 
hospitality industry without much actual empirical tests for their relevance, 
validity or applicability (Olsen & Roper, 1998). Given this situation, it is thus not 
surprising that Okumus (2002) suggests that strategic management research in 
the hospitality industry is still embryonic and that the gap between it and the 
mainstream strategy literature is growing. 
3.3.2 Strategic Hospitality Management Research and Education 
Jones, Song and Hong (2004) argue that because hospitality management 
research is only partially conducted within the context of mainstream schools of 
thought, "hospitality research is out of step with generic theory development" 
(p. 135). They suggest that one reason for this 'discontinuity' is that many 
mainstream researchers only rarely conduct their empirical work in the hospitality 
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industry. They also posit that other researchers who work only in the hospitality 
field either ignore mainstream theory or only use It when they perceive it as 
relevant. The authors say that such researchers assume that that the hospitality 
industry is unique and different from others and that this may be a reasonable 
view if their background and training has been focused specifically in the 
hospitality field. They note that a problem with this `selective discontinuity' is 
that "research may be conducted on theory and/or methods that in the 
mainstream have already proved to be invalid or unreliable" (p. 137). 
Similarly, researchers in the strategic hospitality management discipline are said 
to have been unable to contribute to the mainstream strategy literature through 
new insights from the hospitality Industry since they tend to pursue research 
issues and agendas long after their colleagues in the mainstream (Okumus, 
2002). Olsen & Roper (1998) note, for example, that while most researchers in 
strategic hospitality management continue to see strategy formulation and 
implementation as two distinct phases in the strategy process, many mainstream 
strategy authors (e. g. Mintzberg, 1994; Stacey, 2007), do not support the idea of 
separating strategy formulation and implementation. Researchers within the 
hospitality field also continue to see strategic management as a linear process 
and to stress the importance of strategic `fit' (e. g. Olsen et al., 2008) even 
though, as discussed in this study's previous chapter, many leading mainstream 
strategy scholars argue against this view. Olsen and Roper (1998), meanwhile, 
argue that most of the hospitality industry's academic literature that has followed 
the orthodox approach to rational strategy-making not only reinforces the 
conventional wisdom found in the general strategy literature, but that it is 
"perhaps a little naive about how strategy really functions" (p. 117). 
Okumus and Wong (2005a) suspect that alternative perspectives of strategy are 
also not being taught in hospitality management courses. Their review of 
hospitality management education programme curricula suggests that most 
courses continue to teach strategy purely from the prescriptive, linear planning 
approach. Even though some general business-related textbooks have begun to 
incorporate alternative perspectives on the strategy process (e. g. DeWit & 
Meyer, 2005; Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2005; Mintzberg, Quinn, & 
Ghoshal, 1995; Stacey, 2007), hospitality-specific strategy textbooks (e. g. 
Harrison & Enz, 2005; Knowles, 1996; Olsen et al., 2008; Teare & Boer, 1991) 
do not. Instead they apply the traditional planning and/or positioning approaches 
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to strategy without extending the knowledge (Okumus & Roper, 1999). It is 
thus not surprising that Okumus (2002) believes that "there are no different 
views as to what strategic management is in the hospitality industry. The one 
dominant view appears to be the classical planning approach" (p. 106). In other 
words, even though strategy is one of the more pluralist disciplines, and although 
the mainstream strategy researchers have incorporated alternative views of the 
strategy process into their research and teaching, strategic hospitality 
management researchers and educators have not yet done so to any real extent, 
and this may explain one reason why the industry's academic literature continues 
to be based on the rational perspective of strategy formulation and its 
corresponding tools. 
3.3.3 Generic Strategy Tools in Hospitality Education and Research 
A review by this researcher of the strategic management textbooks for the 
hospitality Industry identified by Okumus and Wong (2005a), plus a newer book 
by Harrison and Enz (2005) and Olsen et al. 's newest edition (2008), revealed 
that they generally describe and prescribe many of the same generic tools and 
frameworks that have been identified as the most popular among mainstream 
practitioners (e. g. Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Stenfors, 2007) without providing 
any original and tested tools. Please see Table 3-1 for a summary of this finding. 
Table 3-1 Strategic Hospitality Management Textbooks and Tools 
Porter's BCG Porter's 
Reference Book PEST SWOT Five Forces Growth- Share 
Generic 
Framework Matrix 
Strategies 
Olsen, West and  x x x  Tse, 2008 
Harrison & Enz,      2005 
Moutinho, 2000      
Olsen, West and  x x x  Tse, 1998 
Tribe, 1997 x x    
Knowles, 1996      
Teare and Boer,  x x   1991 
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The one significant exception is Olsen et al. 's (1998,2008) textbooks which offer 
the authors' `co-alignment' model as a tool both created for and empirically 
tested In the hospitality industry, and as such it warrants a closer look. The 
authors suggest that their model is designed specifically for the hospitality 
industry and that while underpinned by co-alignment theory (also referred to as 
'fit') from the mainstream strategy and organisational theory literature (e. g. 
Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Thompson, 1967), that it also involves 
some Important changes to the standard manufacturing-based models. In both 
their model and the general strategy literature, the central premise of co- 
alignment is that companies must take structural and strategic actions that are 
consistent with one another and their environmental constraints. Similar to the 
model of strategic fit in the mainstream literature, in Olsen et al. 's model the key 
constructs are the environment, strategy choice, firm structure, and firm 
performance. According to Olsen et al. (2008): 
If the firm is able to identify the opportunities that exist in the 
forces driving change, identify competitive methods that enable 
the firm to gain competitive advantage through these 
opportunities, and allocate sufficient financial resources to the 
competitive methods that create the greatest value, the 
financial results desired by the owners and Investors have a 
much greater chance of being achieved (p. 6). 
While the model they present is not entirely the same as those on which it Is 
based, the instructions they provide to managers seeking to strategise with their 
model also Includes the prescriptive use of numerous frameworks for 
environmental scanning (remote and task), competitive analysis and resource 
allocation. As with models from the mainstream these also Involve the 
identification of threats and opportunities as well as Internal strengths and 
weaknesses. Thus, while the model may be different from those on which it is 
based, and the authors provide valuable advice and Industry examples for 
practicing managers, it also has significant similarities to, and adaptations of, 
previous mainstream manufacturing-based strategy models. It is also perhaps 
relevant to note that in terms of academic research their model appears to be 
used solely within the hospitality industry literature which could suggest that it is 
in fact valuable and/or industry-specific. 
Tse and Olsen (1999) state that the research projects and doctoral dissertations 
from the 1980s and early 1990s that tested the applicability of generic strategy 
frameworks and models to the hospitality industry produced mixed results and 
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were, for the most part, statistically inconclusive. Becker and Olsen (1995) also 
criticised the newer research at that time for its continued: 
Borrowing of theory and concepts from other veins of literature 
and applying them to hospitality firms ... without serious consideration regarding its validity or relevance to our industry 
context (p. 40). 
The more contemporary academic literature continues, for the most part, to focus 
on mainstream theories and tools and to applying them to the hotel industry 
(Olsen, 2004). For example, while Crook, Ketchen and Snow's (2003) 
prescriptive model for hospitality practitioners' decision-making and Harrison's 
(2003) discussion of strategic analysis may have practical implications (Olsen, 
2004), they are built on the mainstream strategy literature tools such as SWOT 
analysis, PEST analysis and Porter's five forces framework, and not on any 
hospitality-specific research or tools. 
3.3.4 The Transferability of Generic Strategy Tools to the Hospitality Industry 
Even though the hospitality industry has evolved over the past few decades from 
one that was primarily entrepreneurial and craft-oriented to one that is comprised 
of more complex, multinational and multidivisional companies (Harrison & Enz, 
2005; Olsen et al., 1998), Becker and Olsen (1995) note that within the 
hospitality industry "the knowledge base used for management guidance has 
failed to keep pace with these changes ... (and) falls far short of meeting the 
needs of contemporary managers" (p. 49). Given this, and the lack of hospitality 
industry-specific tools, it is easy to understand their view that "we need better 
too/s to aid In the complex strategy tasks that face hospitality leaders" (p. 41, 
italics added). 
According to Okumus (2002), however, none of the research that has applied 
generic concepts to the hospitality industry "has provided research findings which 
indicate that there are any particular differences between the strategic 
management in hospitality firms and in any other types of firms" (p. 106-107). 
Becker and Olsen (1995), however, do not see the situation like this as they 
argue that: 
The inconsistent results and non-significant findings from 
recent studies which have utilized manufacturing theory in an 
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attempt to explain relationships in hospitality provide evidence 
that the application of theory from one industry context to 
another is not direct ... These studies suggest that the 
uniqueness of the service industry and the hospitality sector in 
particular, requires the development of a separate knowledge 
base which more closely aligns with the characteristics of our 
industry (p. 40). 
That Is, the findings from academic studies that have provided `inconsistent 
results and non-significant findings' may not only be used to critique the limited 
added-value or quality of research that simply applies mainstream tools to the 
hospitality industry, but also as implicit evidence that the industry is different and 
requires its own theories, concepts and tools. 
Olsen et al. (2008) also maintain that the knowledge generated about strategic 
management from research efforts into the manufacturing industry cannot be 
applied directly into the hospitality industry because its "attributes are notably 
different" (p. 13). Okumus and Wong (2005b), meanwhile, also acknowledge that 
the manufacturing-based models and frameworks "may need to be modified or 
even changed greatly for the service industry" (p. 267). These perspectives are 
also supported by researchers from outside the hospitality field who argue that 
service firms are different (e. g. Dougherty, 2004; Lowendahl, 1997) and who 
have looked at differences in strategy and strategy-making across the different 
sectors. For example, Habib and Victor (1991) found that multinational 
corporations in the service sector have a different strategy-structure-performance 
relationship than manufacturers, which implies that strategy In the sectors is, or 
may need to be, different. 
Other academics from the hospitality field do not, however, agree that the 
hospitality industry is different enough from the manufacturing sector to warrant 
different theories, tools and strategic management processes. For example, 
Harrison and Enz (2005) state that due to its competitive and structural 
evolutions, many of the differences that are assumed to exist between 
hospitality companies and other types of businesses have disappeared. They 
suggest as evidence of this that hospitality companies also have competitors, rely 
on markets for human resources, customers, capital and supplies, can be studied 
In terms of their cash flows, and are affected by economic, political, societal and 
technological trends and challenges just like non-hospitality businesses. For them 
"there are more similarities than differences between hospitality firms and firms 
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of other types" (p. 26) and as such "the general strategic management process 
does not require substantial modifications to be applicable to hospitality firms" (p. 
26). 
The above discussion suggests that while there are not only different views 
among researchers about the degree of difference between the hospitality and 
`mainstream' industries, there is also an important divergence in their opinions 
as to the modifications that hospitality companies must enact with regards to 
their strategies and strategy processes as a result of these sectoral differences. 
In essence, the hospitality field's strategy literature has not yet explained nor 
justified how service Industry characteristics Impact hospitality organisations' 
strategy formulation and implementation processes (Okumus & Wong, 2005b). 
The next section thus reviews the relevant literature and draws some inferences 
with regards to how and why strategy processes and tools may be used 
differently in the hotel industry as a result of the service and hospitality 
industries' contextual factors. 
3.4 Service Industry Implications for the Strategic 
Management of Hotel Companies 
The service sector is said to have a variety of unique characteristics that are 
substantially different from those of the manufacturing sector and which 
represent particular environmental constraints on hotel companies and the hotel 
industry's overall market structure in terms of entry barriers, competitiveness 
and growth (Matovic, 2002). This different market structure, In turn, implies that 
as service businesses, hotel companies may "often require different competitive 
strategies from those of product-oriented companies" (Thomas, 1978, p. 159). 
Strategy for the service industry is also said to be different since service industry 
characteristics have significant implications for strategic planning (Thomas, 1978; 
Carmen and Langeard, 1980; Schmenner, 1986), though as Okumus and Wong 
(2005b) note, the literature does not explain how the industry's characteristics 
impact strategy formulation in hospitality companies. Strategy-making may thus 
not be so different across the industries since, as Olsen (2004) writes, hospitality 
executives, like their counterparts in non-service sector firms, also "seek to align 
their organisations, both internally and externally, in order to seek opportunity 
and avoid threats posed by the environment" (p. 412). 
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There Is, therefore, substantial disagreement about the need for strategies and 
strategy-making to be different for companies in the different sectors, though it 
appears that managers within non-hospitality organisations may see the strategic 
management process similarly to those within hospitality companies. In order to 
better understand why there may be differences between the way strategy is 
viewed and practiced In the hospitality and manufacturing industries, this thesis 
now identifies the commonly-cited differences about these industries, and the 
contextual characteristics of the hotel industry that may impact strategy and 
strategy-making within hotel companies. 
The last 30 years of literature on the service industry (e. g. Carman & Langeard, 
1980; Ford & Bowen, 2002; Kotler et at., 2006; Shoemaker et al., 2006; 
Thomas, 1978) has continuously pointed to a similar set of attributes which 
delineates the fundamental differences between the manufacturing and service 
industries. Together many of these issues can be seen as being part of the 
complex service production and delivery system that characterises the service 
sector. As these issues have been discussed extensively in many publications 
(see the citations above, for example) they are only briefly summarised In Table 
3-2. 
Table 3-2 Fundamental Sectoral Differences 
Service Sector 
Attribute 
Manufacturing Service 
Intangibility Products are material objects with As acts or experiences that are directed to 
defined properties that are customers, the immaterial nature of 
possessed as tangible goods service makes it difficult to measure, 
describe and standardise them 
Products are easy to replicate, 
describe and standardise according Quality is judged by customer's 
to pre-determined features perceptions and standards 
Service used as stage to engage 
individuals and create memorable 
experiences 
Simultaneity of Physical goods inventoried for Experience not produced before guest 
production and purchase/consumption interacts 
consumption of 
service Defects generally identified and Cannot investigate service before 
experience corrected before consumption consumption 
Service defects must be solved on the 
spot generally by front line employees 
Forces service chains to provide their 
services wherever customers are located 
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Co-production of Consumer goods manufactured Customer participates as a type of raw 
service delivery without customer and before material in service delivery process which 
with customer his/her consumption makes control of service delivery and 
experience more difficult 
Control in hands of manufacturer 
Front-line employees work directly with 
customers 
Efforts to "engineer out" variability 
through use of technology and service- 
reduction processes to reduce customer- 
employee interfaces 
Heterogeneity of Physical assets can be High heterogeneity because service 
service standardised across multiple units; quality experience is subjectively 
same product for every consumer measured through customer perception; 
Also due to inclusion as bundle in 
product/service portfolio 
Difficult to standardise hotel experiences 
across encounters for same or different 
individuals; 
Especially challenging to provide same 
experience in multi-unit organisations 
Measuring Measured as ratio of inputs to Measurement more complicated due to 
Efficiency outputs; customer co-production 
Makes measuring efficiency of Customer motivation, expectations, 
products, Inputs and outputs easy knowledge, skills and abilities vary as do 
their demands on service production 
system in hotels 
(Adapted from: Carman & Langeard, 1980; Combs, Ketchen, & Ireland, Z006; Ford & öowen, 
2002; Kotler et al., 2006; Matovic, 2002; Olsen et al., 2008; Schmenner, 1986) 
Due to the above characteristics, a particular challenge facing companies that sell 
and compete on services is that of repositioning themselves in the market due to 
the inherent difficulty they have to create competitive positions that can be 
protected (Thomas, 1978). Within the hotel industry, innovative ideas are also 
hard to protect and this results in a more dynamic and uncertain competitive 
situation which is said to make developing successful strategies especially difficult 
(Olsen et al., 2008). The issues in Table 3-2 can, for example, have important 
implications on service quality variability which can impact a hotel company's 
growth rate and be possible barriers to entry for companies that lack the ability to 
manage these complex and complicated service systems (Matovic, 2002). 
Thomas (1978) notes, however, that people-based service business are malleable 
and this means that even after they have been introduced into the marketplace 
strategies can be modified for minimal cost. 
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The service sector also has some important differences and complications in the 
supply-demand relationship, including demand patterns, the perishability of the 
product, fixed capacity and the wide geographic dispersion of many companies' 
subunits. These are said to be some of the key reasons why manufacturing 
models are not directly applicable to service industries (Olsen et al., 2008). Table 
3-3 provides a synthesis of these differences across the two sectors and includes 
some strategic implications for hotel companies. 
Table 3-3 Differences and Implications of the Supply and Demand Relationship 
Attribute Manufacturing Service/Hotel Hotel Industry Strategic 
Implications 
Demand Demand is Difficult to aggregate Hotel forecasting and analysis Is 
Patterns somewhat constant hotel demand in a often suggested to be 
and determined by particular period as it is decentralised as demand tends to 
current market very temporal and less be local 
demographics influenced by macro- 
demographic features Local situations are constantly in 
These patterns while based more on local flux and subject to local 
make, it easier to conditions and environmental variables 
estimate sales competition 
expectations and 
produce quantities 
that are economical 
Perishability Consumer goods Not possible to stock May create an Impression that 
of product can be Inventoried, services such as hotel urgent new or improved 
and their prices room nights marketing or yield management 
adjusted, to meet functions are needed 
fluctuations In Difficult to recover lost 
demand and supply service opportunity; Similarly, an extended period of 
inability of customer to inefficient room sales can also 
"return" hotel stay lead to an underperforming 
experience if unhappy property which would possibly 
suggest an earlier market exit 
since room nights are lost forever 
On the other hand, by limiting 
perishability through higher room 
occupancy, hotel companies 
improve their asset utilisation 
and financial performance and 
thus their potential to grow 
Can expand Hotels have a set number Too little supply may encourage 
Fixed production and of rooms and thus their competition when a hotel 
Capacity supply when supply is limited in the property or brand demonstrates 
demand increases short term strong performance 
Expansion and Too much supply could suggest 
diversification of auxiliary an underutilisation of the 
services/products seen as properties which could in turn 
solution facilitate divestiture of the hotel 
asset or its conversion to other 
uses such as office space or 
apartments 
When a hotel expands its core 
offering (rooms) to Include 
peripheral services (e. g. 
restaurants, spa, conference 
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rooms) this means even more 
successful implementation of 
more complex services systems 
(see above) which if done poorly 
can limit growth opportunities 
but if done well can act as barrier 
to entry 
Multiple Ability to For chain hotels service is Incremental capital required for 
Locations manufacture in one decentralised and each hotel's infrastructure not as 
or few facilities provided at multiple efficient as adding variable 
which provides cost locations often times with capacity in the manufacturing 
advantages for raw wide geographic industry, and this In turn means 
materials and dispersion, making cost that such capital and logistical 
production efforts economies and logistics concerns can inhibit a brand's 
(as well as service growth 
consistency) more difficult 
Hotel companies must coordinate 
Centralisation and multiple departments at their 
standardisation of different properties that provide a 
processes used to combat wide variety of products and 
weakness services, recruit and train a large 
labor pool in many different 
areas, and stay current of many 
macro-environmental and local 
industry trends and 
developments 
(Aaaptea from: carman & Langeara, iyuu; LOmDS et al., LUUb; rora to tsowen, zuuz; r utter CL Gly 
2006; Matovic, 2002; Olsen et at., 2008; Schmenner, 1986) 
The above characteristics suggest that there are some fundamental issues which 
affect the hotel industry and, therefore, possibly the structure, strategies and 
strategy-making of its companies. These issues are examined in more detail in 
the following section. 
3.5 The Hotel Industry: Structure and Strategies 
Zhao and He (2008) suggest that forming a competitive strategy has become 
more complex in the international hotel industry due to such issues as large 
changes in the global business environment, intensive competition in the lodging 
market, changing demands from lodging consumers, higher returns required by 
investors and the increasing necessity for foreign expansion. Olsen et al. (2008), 
meanwhile, suggest that strategy in the hospitality industry is particularly 
challenging and important not only because of the service industry characteristics 
detailed above, but also due to the distinctiveness of the current hotel industry 
structure. The industry's current structure, which, among other things, is 
fragmented, capital intensive, and involves great deals of real estate that are not 
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generally owned by the people or companies who manage them, is the product of 
over three decades of changes to and in the industry. 
Many of today's largest companies were, according to Olsen et al. (2008), 
founded by visionary entrepreneurs, and their drive for growth meant 
investments in an increased number of hotel units. The authors state that the 
need for growth continues to be the primary challenge for today's hotel industry 
executives as they must increasingly respond to investor demands. International 
growth, meanwhile, is particularly necessary for many hotel companies as a 
better traveled and more globalised customer base are always threatening to 
defect if they do not find their preferred brand in all their desired locations 
(Shoemaker et al., 2006). Business growth and international expansion of hotel 
companies involve making strategic choices about key business objectives such 
as attracting the correct mix of new and profitable customers, the right selection 
of services and products to offer, and the appropriate geographic markets in 
which to compete (Bender, Partlow, & Roth, 2008). 
A number of additional factors currently influencing the strategic situation and 
challenges for the hotel industry and its companies have been identified. These 
include the changing ownership model, increased brand consolidation, 
simultaneous and conflicting pressures for concentration and diversification, the 
role of international expansion, the evolution of niche markets as new sources of 
growth and the need for differentiation in light of an increasingly commoditised 
hotel product (Bender et al., 2008; Harrison, 2003; Harrison & Enz, 2005). 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the overall hotel industry 
situation, several of the just-stated issues are briefly examined below as they 
likely make up the key task environment issues facing most hotel companies 
(Bender et al., 2008) which may impact their strategy-making processes and 
practices. 
Brand Proliferation 
Brand proliferation and segmentation is one outcome of the above-stated need 
for growth (Harrison & Enz, 2005). The creation and growth of new brands over 
the past 30 years resulted as companies determined that their current brands 
were at a mature stage of their lifecycle and had reached saturation levels. In 
order to continue to demonstrate their growth potential these companies needed 
a way to attract new customer types and also to add more hotels to their existing 
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portfolios and markets without stealing demand from their existing hotels. Due to 
an increased rate of consolidation of hotel companies in recent years (Olsen et 
al., 2008) there has been an increased rate of merging and repositioning hotel 
brands in order to create product lines that are diversified and cover all different 
price points, with some brand strategies focusing on standardisation and others 
on differentiation (Bender et at., 2008). Brand segmentation has become such 
an important strategy that, according to Bender et at. (2008), the primary 
business of many hotel companies is now brand management. 
The increased number of brands is said to make managing the larger hotel 
companies more complex as strategies must be created for multiple brands that 
compete at very different price points, attract a wide range of customer profiles, 
and compete in multiple destinations, including an Increasing amount of 
International locations (Shoemaker et al., 2006). As international expansion on a 
large scale is relatively new for many hotel companies, their corporate structures 
have only recently evolved to include a corporate presence in International 
locations (Harrison & Enz, 2005) which could be expected to help facilitate 
effective strategy implementation through decentralisation and more inclusion of 
middle managers in the strategy process (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). 
Ownership-Management Structure 
The growth and profitability of independent hotel companies and properties over 
the past few decades led to acquisitions and investments in the hotel industry 
from external investors and the public capital markets who took over control and 
ownership of these companies (Olsen et al., 2008). During the early 1990s the 
U. S. hotel industry experienced the beginning of a shift in strategies among the 
largest companies from one of profits through hotel asset ownership to one where 
the real estate holdings were divested. This shift in strategy was precipitated by 
the risk/return assessment from the capital markets, an interest by institutional 
owners (such as private equity groups and real estate fund and investment 
trusts) in hotel asset ownership, and the slow process of trying to expand hotel 
brands by relying only on internal equity (Slattery et al., 2008). This latter point 
is especially true in a market as big as Europe which continues to be much less 
branded than in the United States (see Slattery et al., 2008). 
Sometimes called an `asset light' strategy, this real estate divestment has been 
adopted by many companies in the industry over the past fifteen years (e. g. 
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Marriott, Kempinskl, Hilton, Starwood and Intercontinental). It Is also often 
referred to colloquially as the separation of 'the bricks and the brains' since the 
properties ('bricks') are owned by institutional or private investors while the hotel 
companies ('brains') manage or franchise them. These hotel companies have 
therefore shifted their strategy from one of profits through hotel 
ownership/management and, in Europe, leases, to one comprised almost 
exclusively of fees through management and/or franchise agreements. 
Like the market segmentation and proliferation of brands previously mentioned, 
this ownership-management evolution Implies potential additional challenges, or 
at least developments, for strategy formulation practices within hotel companies. 
The implications can be linked to the fact that companies whose businesses are 
more weighted towards the fee-based model have many more stakeholders, such 
as franchisees, property owners, investors and their respective lenders with 
whom they must work (Brookes & Roper, 2008) and from whom they must 
garner support. Owners have, for example, become `far more influential and 
involved' in certain areas of decision-making (Gannon, 2008). Whitla, Walters 
and Davies (2007) suggest that hotel owners maintain an important degree of 
control over their properties even when they are not the managers and that they 
often put their own Interests above that of the hotel group. Convincing 
franchisees and owners to make investments that benefit the brand but which 
may decrease their own short-term profit is, therefore, a challenging obstacle to 
effectively implementing corporate or brand-specific strategic decisions for hotel 
companies (Bender et al., 2008). Similarly, these owners may not be open to 
sharing information and resources with other hotels In the chain. These property 
owners and franchisees may also have similar business relationships with other 
hotel brands from different companies, and this may mitigate the differences and 
advantages one company has over another through greater transparency, which, 
in turn, reduces a hotel company's ability to leverage resources and know-how 
(Bender et al., 2008). Bender et al. (2008) note that another challenging 
development resulting from this ownership-management separation Is due to the 
fact that the hotel employees who are interacting with guests are more than ever 
the employees of hotel owners and not of the management companies, and as 
such achieving brand 'buy in' from the employees is also more difficult. Whitla et 
al. (2007) suggest that such a situation means that "The separation of hotel 
ownership and management thus poses obvious constraints to the adoption of 
integrated global systems and strategy in the hotel industry" (pp. 789-790). 
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Plural market entry methods 
Brookes and Roper (2008) note that plural forms for entering markets have 
existed in the hotel industry for several decades with most large U. S. companies 
using at least three modes and European companies increasingly relying on 
management and franchising for their expansion as they simultaneously move 
away from leasing and owning hotels. The use of ownership, franchising and 
management contracts have also, to different degrees, played important roles in 
the growth of other segments of the hospitality industry such as spas (Hodari & 
Jaeger, 2009) and restaurant chains (Harrington, 2004; West & Olsen, 1989). 
Studies of how restaurant and hotel companies use multiple management 
methods to grow and manage their companies point to the fact that the strategy 
processes in these companies may also be influenced by the way the company- 
franchise relationship is managed. They also suggest that the hotel and 
restaurant industries may not realise the same benefits or use the relationship in 
an identical way even though they rely on similar expansion methods. Bradach's 
(1997) study of the simultaneous use of franchising and ownership methods in 
the chain restaurant industry, for example, identifies that one of the key ways 
chains create systemwide adaptation to changing markets is through mutual 
learning (the others being socialisation, ratcheting and franchisees mimicking 
corporate structures). With regards to mutual learning, he found that franchisees 
"contribute to the strategy selection process uniquely by challenging the 
assumptions and business logic of decisions proposed by the chain" (p. 296). In 
addition, they prove to efficiently pass information from their local areas to the 
key decision makers at the corporate level. He also found, however, that the 
chain managers claim that an important drawback to the involvement of 
franchisees in the strategy making is that it slows down the strategic decision- 
making process. 
Unlike Bradach (1997), Brookes and Roper's (2008) study of the 
internationalisation of hotel chains did not find any evidence that any mutual 
learning, such as organisational processes that help record or test new Ideas from 
franchisees, takes place between owner-leased-managed (OLM) and franchised 
portfolios. This lack of mutual learning, they say, is partly due to a limited 
amount of coordination and communication processes between the divisions. 
They note that their corporate informants even cite a "distinct lack of interest in 
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franchisee innovations or best practice" (p. 16). Instead, the chains seem to rely 
on learning from their own experiences which Ingram and Baum (1997) have 
found provides both advantages and disadvantages for hotel chains. These 
researchers found, for example, that while hotel chains benefit from small 
amounts of their own experience they are harmed by large amounts of it. They 
suggest this is because of the "inertia that develops from exploiting a given set of 
routines, ultimately leading the organisation into a competency trap" (p. 93). 
They believe that the multiunit nature of hotel chains can make it difficult for 
companies to accumulate and apply their experiences across their units, 
especially when these are spread out over wide geographic areas. 
Besides not necessarily learning as much as possible from them, hotel companies 
may also not involve their franchisees in the strategy process in the same way 
they may their owned or managed properties since franchising, according to 
transaction cost economics, implies a higher risk of proprietary knowledge 
leakage than do ownership and management contracts (Chen & Dimou, 2005). 
Thus, managers from different properties may be involved to different degrees in 
the strategy process of hotel companies based on the contractual relationships. 
Just as they may not involve franchisees or their general managers in their 
strategy-making practices, there may be reasons why hotel organisations do not 
involve their own employees in their strategising even though hospitality 
companies are thought to likely achieve greater success if they have more 
involvement from their members who have information to provide during the 
strategy process (Peng & Litteljohn, 2001; Teare, Costa, & Eccles, 1998). For 
example, a strategy process where issues are discussed and decisions are made 
only at the company's top levels generally suggests a process with less 
involvement of organisational members and is said to facilitate faster decisions 
while helping to save valuable resources, such as employee time, for more 
productive uses (Harrington, 2004). A closer look at the limited extant research 
about the strategy process of hotel companies Is explored in the next section. 
3.6 Strategy-Making in the Hotel Industry 
There has been very little research on the strategy process within hospitality 
companies (Harrington & Ottenbacher, 2009; Okumus, 2002; Okumus & Roper, 
74 
1999; Woods, 1994). In his review of the strategic hospitality management 
literature published between 2000 and 2003, for example, Olsen (2004) does not 
mention any articles about the behavioural side of strategy, such as strategy- 
making processes, even though he discusses normative recommendations about 
the prescribed analytical steps within the strategy process. This could perhaps 
suggest that the author did not believe that the literature was worth reviewing, 
that his contingency approach to reviewing the literature prevented him from 
doing so, or as this researcher's literature search suggests, that there was 
nothing written about the subject during the period. 
One reason why there has not been much research into the strategy process of 
hotel companies is that these companies do not in fact employ formal planning 
practices. That is, even though strategic planning may help hotel managers to 
better implement company objectives by closing the gap between themselves and 
the hotel corporations' different management levels (Slattery & Clark, 1988), and 
even though Phillips, Davies and Moutinho's (1999) research suggests that 
hospitality firms which practice strategic planning may outperform their rivals 
who do not, in reality the situation might be one of "non-existent planning 
practices in hospitality organisations" (Okumus, 2004, p. 136). 
While the limited extant research into the formal strategy planning processes of 
hotel companies does little to clarify the reality of it its use within the industry, 
there has been more work done on the role of environmental scanning (e. g. 
Costa & Teare, 2000; Jogaratnam & Wong, 2009; Jongaratnam & Law, 2006; 
Olsen, Murphy, & Teare, 1994; Teare et al., 1998). Environmental scanning is, 
in fact, said to be the most popular topic in the strategic hospitality management. 
literature (see Okumus, 2004; Olsen, 2004; Olsen & Roper, 1998) with Okumus 
(2004) identifying 29 articles published on the subject between 1980 and 2003. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully examine the environmental scanning 
literature as it pertains to the hospitality industry. However, the literature that 
demonstrates evidence of, or theoretical reasons for, its role (and non-role) in the 
strategy processes of hotel organisations is explored as this provides a way to 
infer a more general understanding of the way strategy-making is and is not 
practiced In the hotel Industry. As such, this may provide some understanding of 
how (or even if) strategy tools are actually used during the strategic management 
process of hotel companies. 
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3.6.1.. Environmental Scanning 
According to the classical view of strategic planning, environmental scanning is 
the stage in the planning process when emerging changes and trends are 
monitored and evaluated for their likely impact on the corporation and its 
decisions. It usually involves dividing the external environment into different 
categories such as political, economic, social and technological, which are the 
categories of the PEST framework (Hill & Jones, 2005). While it has consistently 
been considered to be one of the most important elements of the strategic 
analysis phase in both the mainstream (e. g. Fahey, King, & Narayanan, 1981; 
Hambrick, 1982; Jain, 1984) and strategic hospitality management literatures 
(e. g. Harrington, 2004; Harrison, 2003; Harrison & Enz, 2005; Olsen et al., 
2008; West & Olsen, 1989), not everyone believes that formal environmental 
scanning is necessary for hotel companies. Okumus (2004), for example, 
suggests that from a complexity theory point of view one may argue that the 
complex and dynamic reality of the external environment means that hospitality 
organisations may, instead of predicting their environment, be better served by 
learning to quickly adapt their operations and services to it. He also suggests 
that as explained by Mintzberg (1994) and Stacey (2000), formal management 
activities can eliminate any creativity in the lower levels of organisations. 
Similar to the earlier discussion about the lack of research confirming the validity 
of generic strategy tools in the hospitality industry, the literature on the role of 
environmental scanning in the industry has also been faulted for applying the 
traditional normative planning school's environmental scanning frameworks 
without questioning their relevance and practicality in hospitality companies 
(Okumus, 2004). Olsen (2004), meanwhile, claims that recent strategic 
hospitality management research on the subject has done little to advance 
knowledge or theory. He criticises it for continuing to be descriptive and 
prescriptive and for simply adopting, transferring, and reworking mainstream 
strategy research into a hospitality context. He says that the environmental 
scanning models presented during this period provided "only limited evidence of 
the validity of the model in a hospitality context or none at all" (p. 414). The 
practical use of scanning frameworks may be attributed to numerous attributes of 
organisations and individuals and these Issues are briefly examined below 
according to the limited extant research. 
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Individual Management Style 
Rather than demonstrating evidence of formal, detailed environmental analyses 
linked to long-range plans, research on international hotel companies has 
consistently demonstrated that the companies which do scan the environment 
employ an informal and general approach linked to short-term decisions (Costa & 
Teare, 2000; Olsen et al., 1994; Teare et al., 1998; West & Olsen, 1989). Olsen 
et al. (1992) suggest that hospitality management practitioners take this 
approach because they see scanning as "time taken away from more tangible 
pursuits" (p. 58). They go on to say that: 
Active problem solving is much more rewarding to (hotel) 
managers than time spent in such 'soft' activities as scanning. 
The hospitality industry is generally recognized as a 'doing' 
industry filled with managers possessing an entrepreneurial 
spirit not given to engaging in `time-wasting' activities (p. 58). 
Okumus (2004) similarly suggests that the limited use of environmental scanning 
methods in the hotel industry may be due to the fact that hospitality firms tend to 
employ "individualistic people who prefer a `hands on' management style ... 
rather than following methods of structured formal analysis" (p. 138). The 
ineffective use of environmental scanning is also, he says, a result of the 
hospitality industry's tradition of relying on "entrepreneurial traits of initiative and 
intuition" (p. 138). Williams and Tse (1995) similarly note that entrepreneurs do 
not use the same formal analytical techniques as large companies. Hotel 
development directors, for example, must be very entrepreneurial for 
international franchising to achieve its growth objectives (Altinay & Roper, 
2005). 
Organisational Culture 
A hotel company's culture may also impact its use of formal environmental 
scanning techniques and tools. Okumus (2004), for example, suggests that its 
limited use in the hospitality industry is related to the fact that the industry's 
firms overwhelmingly have informal, organic structures in which verbal and 
lateral communication predominate (Wood, 1994). Costa and Teare (2000) 
similarly argue that: 
The lack of a long-term perspective coupled with a commitment 
to immediate tangible pursuits, and a strong reliance on 
quantitative data are deep reflexes of the existing 
organisational culture among hospitality organisations (p. 158). 
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They suggest, therefore, that it may be an organisation's culture, rather than any 
link to the strategic planning process, which enables environmental scanning 
activities to be successfully implemented in hotel companies. According to them, 
an implication of this is that it is up to managers to justify the need for more 
formal scanning within their organisations in order to Improve decision-making 
and planning. One suggestion for more successfully developing and 
implementing meaningful environmental scanning processes within hotel 
companies is for these companies to choose participants for the process from the 
organisational members that are exposed to the relevant information (Teare et 
at., 1998). In his study of the hospitality industry's food service sector, 
Harrington (2004) found, for example, that as environmental complexity 
increased, managers accessed their organisational members' knowledge at more 
organisational levels. 
Internationalisation 
While they note that there is a general lack of sophisticated scanning in the 
industry, Olsen et al. (1994) believe that because they face a larger diversity of 
environmental conditions, hotel companies that operate in multiple countries may 
be more aware of the importance of environmental scanning than single-nation 
hotel firms. Harrison and Enz (2005) also claim that as the industry evolved and 
internationalised over the past two decades, the "mind-set of mangers moved to 
a more strategic way of thinking about the business" (p. 26), which suggests an 
important role for environmental scanning according to their classical perspective 
of the strategic management process. There has also been a view, not yet 
confirmed by the research, that as hotel companies' environmental complexity 
increased along with their growth and internationalisation, they would place a 
greater emphasis on conducting environmental scanning, strategic decision- 
making and strategic plan development at the unit level (Olsen, 1989). The 
broad rather than detailed scanning behavior found in many studies of the 
environmental scanning practices in international hotel companies might, 
however, reflect that these companies take a more pragmatic, rationally bounded 
approach during their internationalisation (Litteljohn, Roper, & Altinay, 2007). 
Organisational Size 
Most of the strategy hospitality management literature is based on strategy 
models meant for large businesses even though the industry consists primarily of 
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small rather than large businesses (Sharma, 2008). As a result, many hospitality 
industry companies may not use, or not effectively use, the environmental 
scanning frameworks or techniques associated with these strategy models. 
Similarly, since smaller hotel firms may be more flexible in responding to changes 
in environmental conditions (Olsen et al., 1994), they may also believe they have 
less need to be proactively scanning the environment. Larger companies may 
also conduct more strategy analysis involving environmental scanning 
frameworks since, as Harrington (2004) suggests, they may have more resources 
to allocate to involving more members in the strategy process. He also suggests 
that larger companies may have more knowledge spread throughout the company 
and that this, in turn, should mean provide an additional reason for more breadth 
(across departments, for example) and depth (across hierarchies) of employee 
participation in the strategy process. 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
Several important issues for this study emerge from this review of the strategic 
hospitality management literature's limited original strategy process research and 
its lack of industry-specific strategy tools. 
(1) The strategic hospitality management literature is largely based on 
ideas and tools from mainstream research. 
(2) The classical rational-linear perspective of strategy is the principle 
paradigm in the hospitality industry's academic and business domains, 
much as it is for non-hospitality segments. 
(3) The generic tools from strategic management's mainstream classical 
perspective are the most prevalent ones in the hospitality literature. 
(4) This transfer of mainstream strategy concepts and tools to the 
hospitality industry has been undertaken by academics without apparent 
consideration for how service sector, hospitality industry, and hotel 
segment differences may affect the relevance, usefulness and pragmatic 
validity of such tools. 
79 
This above scenario may be providing a disservice to strategists in the hotel 
industry since the service sector and, more specifically the hotel industry, are 
based on different value-adding activities and are structured differently, both of 
which may render these tools ineffective and affect the way in which they are 
used by the relevant stakeholders. That is, the strategy-making processes and 
practices may be contextually bound by, for example, organisational structures, 
management styles and cultures, each of which is exacerbated by the fact that 
the growth of hotel companies in size and scope has led them to work in 
partnership and alliances with a large number companies and individuals, each 
with its own culture and structure. The industry's ownership structure may 
similarly influence the way strategy is made in the hotel industry and help explain 
why it may be practiced differently than in other industries. For example, hotel 
companies may involve property owners, franchisees and their own general 
managers differently within the corporate strategy process, and this implies that 
the way strategy tools are used with these stakeholders may vary accordingly. 
Organisational cultures and management styles may also impact the reasons 
why, and manners in which, strategy tools are used. For example, because the 
industry has been populated with practitioners who prefer hands-on work rather 
than analytical tasks, there may be differences in how strategy tools are used in 
the industry as opposed to others where systematic analysis may predominate. 
On the other hand, the literature also raises doubts about the extent to which 
such tools are even used in the industry since there is little research 
demonstrating that hospitality companies use formal strategy processes. The 
notion that there is "limited use of sophisticated management methods in 
hospitality organisations" (Okumus, 2004, p. 136) suggests that there is reason to 
suspect that in the hotel industry there may be a correspondingly limited use of 
formal strategic management tools. This limited or non-existent use may also, of 
course, be the result of the industry's particularities as summarised above. 
While they recognise that hospitality managers should understand strategy's most 
important generic theories because they are likely to use, or will use, the related 
management models and frameworks, there is a dominant view among strategic 
hospitality management researchers that is nicely captured by Okumus and Wong 
(2005b) who state that: 
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There is an essential need for more in-depth and rigorous 
research in order to explain and justify whether the models, 
frameworks and theories on strategy developed for the 
manufacturing industry can be used and the extent to which 
they need to be modified (for the hotel industry) (p. 267). 
As was identified in Chapter Two, previous studies have suggested that patterns 
in strategy-making exist at both the organisational (Bettis, 1995) and industry 
levels (Spender, 1989), and the use of strategy tools may be influenced by antra 
and extra-organisational contextual factors (Johnson et al., 2007). This thesis 
thus aims to demonstrate how contextual factors influence how and why hotel 
companies' senior, middle and lower-level managers, and support staff use 
modify, create and/or reject strategy tools. The study's three research questions 
are therefore: 
1. Why do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
2. How do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
3. How do contextual factors influence the use of strategy tools? 
The following chapter explains how this researcher has gone about trying to 
answer these questions. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
A research methodology is first determined by a study's research questions and 
then by the current level of knowledge in the relevant literature (Janesick, 1994). 
The previous chapters presented both of these. This chapter now explains the 
logic that links the study's research objectives, research methods and data 
collection and analysis techniques (Yin, 2003). It sets out and justifies the 
research design that represents the Investigative plan used to seek and suggest 
answers to the research questions posed within this particular study (Easterby- 
Smith et al., 2002). 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains the study's underlying 
research philosophy and section 4.3 the reasons for its qualitative approach. 
Section 4.4 then discusses the case study strategy and the reasons for its use in 
this study. Section 4.5 explains and justifies the particular research design and 
process used in this thesis. Section 4.6 reviews and explains why and how the 
researcher used documents, interviews and observation to collect the empirical 
evidence. Section 4.7 explains and justifies the data analysis process the 
researcher used to draw out and verify the conclusions. The conclusion to the 
chapter is presented in section 4.8. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), decisions about which research method is 
the most appropriate can only be made after answering questions related to "the 
basic belief system or woridview that guides the investigator, not only in choices 
of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways" (p. 105). 
The SasP researcher's first decision is also about where s/he should be positioned 
among the different research orientations (Johnson et al., 2007), therefore this 
researcher examined the key differences between the two alternative research 
paradigms In social science research, positivism and social construction ism, which 
underpin the choices a researcher must make among different research methods 
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(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Their key views and differences are now briefly 
explained. 
Positivism holds that a reality exists which can be apprehended and confirmed, 
and positivist research thus attempts to verify hypotheses as facts or laws 
through mathematical propositions about the functional relationships between 
variables (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Adherents to this view tend to believe that 
only quantitative data are meaningful and valid, and because its basic posture is 
deterministic and reductionist, positivist research findings are often generalised 
to larger populations and are intended to explain and ultimately predict or control 
phenomena (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
The constructionist approach, meanwhile, takes a relativist rather than realist 
ontological position (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). It holds that reality is not 
determined by objective, external factors, but rather that it is socially 
constructed and given meaning by people (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). As 
such, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) suggest that when researching from this 
perspective, the researcher's task is to "appreciate the different constructions and 
meanings that people place upon their experience" (p. 30). This involves 
examining and identifying both individual and shared meanings, considers there 
to be multiple realities, emphasises the perspectives of different actors, and takes 
Into account the studied phenomena's context. Research from this interpretive 
method seeks to "understand and explain why people have different experiences 
rather than search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain their 
behaviour" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 30). It aims for knowledge 
construction rather than discovery, and because it relies on Individual 
interpretation of data rather than a causal explanation of data relationships, its 
results must be seen as an interpretation and not the interpretation (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
An epistemology implies certain assumptions not only about the most 
appropriate ways to study the nature of the world or any of its phenomenon 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), but also about how such knowledge can be 
demonstrated (Mason, 1996). Positivists generally rely on quantitative methods 
to study and demonstrate a pre-existing reality. However, given that the use of 
tools in organisations implies that use is socially constructed (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007), the researcher did not assume any pre-existing reality that could be 
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positively or quantitatively determined but instead sought to "understand how 
people invent structures to help them make sense of what Is going on around 
them" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 34), which is a more phenomenological or 
interpretivist standpoint. An interpretive framework thus guided the researcher's 
actions and beliefs about how the research questions should be studied and 
understood (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The gap in the knowledge about how and 
why strategy tools are and are not used in practice, and the importance of 
understanding how this may vary in different contexts, further led the researcher 
to take a phenomenological approach and see the topic from the subjective, 
socially constructed viewpoint (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). This approach is In 
line with established strategy as practice researchers who, while they aim to 
describe and explain practitioners' actual activities, understand that these 
individuals' reflexivity and views about how and why they do what they do (and 
do not do) are critical to such an understanding (Balogun et al., 2003; Johnson et 
al., 2003). 
Since the most appropriate methodology largely depends on the researcher's 
ontological and epistemological positions, and because research methods should 
be fitted to the study's methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), this study adopted 
a qualitative research approach which is often associated with the 
phenomenological position and SasP research. The reasons for this approach are 
further explained below. 
4.3 The Qualitative Research Approach 
A number of different reasons support the use of a qualitative approach to 
studying strategy practices in this thesis. These include the field's current level of 
knowledge, the exploratory and descriptive nature of its research questions, the 
importance of context and the relationship required between the researcher and 
practitioner. These issues are examined further below. 
The Limited Extant Literature and Descriptive - Ex lorry Nature of this Study 
Theorising about strategy as practice is still in its infancy (Johnson et al., 2007), 
and extant SasP empirical studies have generally been exploratory and have 
examined particular issues for the first time, almost always using qualitative data. 
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The use of qualitative research in these studies is considered appropriate since it 
is most effective when seeking to describe and explain particular phenomena that 
have not been previously studied (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and when building 
rather than testing theory (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) as is the case with most 
SasP research. 
This also holds true for thesis since knowledge about how and why strategy tools 
are and are not actually used in practice is virtually nonexistent. As Table 4-1 
demonstrates, the majority of studies that have directly investigated tools have 
assumed a positivist approach and focused on identifying which, and in certain 
cases when, different strategy tools are used during the strategy process (e. g. 
Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2008; Rigby, 1993,2001a, 2001b, 
2003; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005; Spee et al., 2008). Other studies have looked 
quantitatively at the use of one specific tool (e. g. Dyson, 2004; Speckbacher, 
Bischof, & Pfeiffer, 2003). The few studies that have looked qualitatively at the 
introduction or implementation of a particular tool (Chesley & Wenger, 1999; Hill 
& Westbrook, 1997; Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006) have not considered many of 
the issues that this thesis seeks to explore. For example, they have not (1) 
compared use across organisations, (2) compared use across organisational 
levels, or (3) looked at firms in the hotel Industry. In addition, these studies have 
not taken a practice perspective of (1) who uses them, (2) how or (3) why the 
tools are used, (4) how their use is linked to intra and extra-organisational 
influences, or (5) how their use is related to the strategy formulation process 
within the organisation. 
Context and the Researcher-Practitioner Relationshin 
Qualitative research techniques facilitate the study of phenomena in their 
contextual surroundings, and this helps researchers to "make sense of, or 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). Qualitative fieldwork allows the researcher to immerse 
him/herself Into the study's setting and thereby examine the full contextual 
situation and develop a closer working relationship with practitioners, something 
that is critical for studies of practice (Balogun et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2007). 
According to Whittington (2004), because understanding strategy practice 
"demands intimate engagement" (p. 66) and the production of rich descriptions, 
researchers should study how practitioners interact with both the social and 
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physical in the everyday activities A hat make up their practice. Similarly, 
]arzabkowski (2005) notes that since all strategy "activity is situated activity, 
actors cannot be considered separately from the context or situation in which 
they act" (p. 21). SasP scholars have thus adopted qualitative research as the 
fundamental methodological approach for studying strategy practices since it best 
provides the required details and rich descriptions. 
This thesis Is concerned, in part, with answering contemporary 'how' questions, 
and thus its research takes place in contextual settings (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002) such as the organisational and sectoral environments in which tools are 
used and the strategy is 'made. ' Close observation and dialogues with 
practitioners Is also required in order to understand their use of, and views about, 
strategy tools, which are thus further justifications for taking a qualitative 
approach. 
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4.4 The Case Study Research Strategy 
In their study of trends in strategy research topics and methodological choices, 
Hoskisson et al. (1999) note that the recent shift back towards more qualitative 
research includes a greater use of case studies. This choice is particularly true in 
the SasP domain as its proponents have often employed the use of qualitative 
case studies in their research (e. g. Jarzabkowski, 2000; Maitlis & Lawrence, 
2003; Regner, 2003). Johnson et al. (2003) credit this, in part, to the fact that 
strategy's process school previously legitimised case studies based on the small 
in-depth samples that are also required if one Is to successfully study the minute 
details associated with micro-strategy practices. The SasP field's case studies 
have included many variations, including, for example, some that are single- 
industry/single-nation, retrospective/longitudinal (Jarzabkowski, 2003) , single in- 
depth supplemented with `lighter' retrospective cases (Regner, 2003), single, 
longitudinal (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003), and multiple cross-industry (Langley, 
1990). The case study method has also been used in a few of the limited number 
of doctoral theses that examine how strategy is practiced (Jarzabkowski, 2000; 
Langley, 1988). As such, it is a valid and recognised method for strategy 
research and doctoral work in SasP. 
As with the discussion on qualitative research above, issues of context, 
researcher-practitioner relationship, and exploratory, descriptive research are 
also important criteria for choosing the case study method. One can easily see 
the natural link between case studies and SasP by examining Yin's (2003) 
definition of the case study method and the important role that the issue of 
context plays in it. He begins by stating that case studies investigate "a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (p. 13). He 
also sees that an important advantage of the case study method is the ability to 
examine the "holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events" (p. 2) 
when the researcher believes that contextual conditions may be very pertinent to 
the study's phenomenon. As already discussed, studying the use of strategy 
tools means investigating their use within practitioners' work contexts as the 
relationship between context and tool use remains to be investigated, and thus 
the case study method provides a framework for doing so. The limited extant 
literature has not investigated the relationship between context and strategy tool 
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use, and thus it is Important to recognise that the phenomenon of strategy tool 
use should not be assumed to be the same across firms but rather to be highly 
linked to context until 'proven' otherwise (Johnson et at., 2007). 
The exploratory and descriptive nature of this study also helped the researcher to 
determine that taking a qualitative, case study research approach was 
appropriate. The case study approach taken is exploratory in that the research 
tries to reveal something about phenomena that are not well-understood (Yin, 
2003). It is also, however, descriptive, in that the case studies are primarily 
informational and the researcher tries to 'paint a picture' of the topic within each 
case. This type of case helps to identify "salient actions, events, beliefs, 
attitudes, and social structures and processes occurring in phenomenon" 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 33). The case study approach taken is thus both 
exploratory and descriptive as it tries to develop thick descriptions of relatively 
unexplored and complex issues. Thus, because the use of tools cannot be 
separated from the real-life context and 'situatedness, ' and because this is an 
exploratory and descriptive project that focuses not on what tools are used but 
rather how and why strategy tools are used, the case study method using 
qualitative research is an appropriate choice. 
Qualitative case study research has some important limitations that have been 
identified and, as far as possible, addressed in this study. These limitations are 
often Identified as lack of validity, generalisability and reliability. As these Issues 
are explained in detail in many works on management research, and due to space 
limitations, the researcher does not provide a detailed explanation of each. 
However, Table 4-2 presents a brief explanation of each issue and the reason why 
it may be considered a limitation In general, its applicability to case study 
research, and the way the researcher attempted to mitigate its potential 
limitation. 
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Even though these limitations are often used to deride qualitative research, 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) point out that not everyone believes that the standard 
criteria mentioned above and which are generally applicable for positivist 
researchers need to be applied to phenomenological research. For example, 
Sandiford and Seymour (2007) identify that reliability may not be applicable to 
qualitative research when the phenomena being investigated is socially 
constructed. Similarly, they note that replicability is not necessarily a relevant 
concern for interpretivist researchers because of the many assumptions such 
researchers must make about social phenomena. Denzin and Lincoln (1994), 
meanwhile, note that the proponents of the constructivist perspective often 
replace internal validity, reliability and objectivity measures with ones of 
`trustworthiness' and `authenticity' (p. 480). Nevertheless, the following section 
explains in more detail how the study's research design and process helped 
ensure valid and reliable findings. 
4.5 Research Design and Process 
Although there are many different recommendations for designing a research 
project around the case study method (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1994; Yin, 
2003), this thesis' research design did not follow any single recommendation. 
Instead, keeping in line with suggestions about conducting SasP research 
(Johnson et al., 2007) it drew on the different aspects that together best suited 
the researcher's particular situation and the particularities of the research topic 
while still addressing the key elements that are commonly addressed in all case 
studies, such as the link between a study's questions, unit(s) of analysis, and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings. These issues, as well as several other 
choices the researcher made to conduct the case studies, are now examined. 
4.5.1 Research Questions 
Johnson et al. (2007) note that SasP researchers differ about the amount of 
theoretical and conceptual framing that is required before entering the field. This 
can range from, for example, only identifying theoretical angles and specific 
research questions after data collection is underway (Eisenhardt, 1989) to having 
clear, open-ended research questions right from the start (e. g. Gioia & Pitre, 
1990; Langley, 1989). 
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Eisenhardt (1989) argues that in order to avoid becoming overwhelmed by an 
overabundance of data it is important for the researcher to have some 
preliminary research questions when hoping to build theory from case studies. 
Similarly, Johnson et al. (2007) "recommend all researchers to enter the field 
with clear research questions and some conceptual handles with which to bound 
the focus of their study and to structure their data collection and analysis" (p. 57). 
Following their advice, several research questions were formulated: 
1. How do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
2. Why do practitioners use strategy tools when strategising? 
3. How do contextual factors influence the use of strategy tools? 
4.5.2 Variables 
In line with Yin's (2003) comments about the importance of having a sound 
theoretical framework when conducting research using the case study method, 
the researcher identified several possible variables prior to the data collection. 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that though not common in theory-building studies, 
identifying such variables can assist the researcher in more accurately measuring 
(and later triangulating) important constructs during data collection. Some of the 
variables identified by the researcher include: 
" Industry structure 
" Organisational structure, culture and size 
" Organisational history (strategy making, life cycle) 
" History of tool use within the organisation 
" Strategy-making (formulation, decision making) policies within the firm 
" Managerial backgrounds (education, work experience) 
It is important to note that even though certain research problems and variables 
were identified as possibly important and relevant to the investigation, in order to 
limit any potential bias in the findings the researcher did not enter the field with 
the idea of any specific relationship between the variables and theories 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, no attempt was made to identify all relevant 
variables prior to the data collection. The researcher instead remained open to 
the fact that some would only emerge once data collection began. 
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4.5.3 Multiple Case Studies 
The research project followed a multiple case study approach (Yin, 2003) for 
several reasons. First, the researcher did not identify a crucial, extreme or typical 
case that would support the choice to undertake a single case approach (Yin, 
2003). Multiple cases also means that findings may possibly be replicated which 
can help provide for more compelling evidence (Yin, 2003) and assist In building 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). More specifically, Balogun et al. (2003) argue that 
insights from SasP case studies tend to only go part of the way to producing the 
data necessary for understanding strategizing practices and micro-processes 
because they are rarely multi-site and/or multi organisation. Johnson et al. 
(2007), for example, suggest that Oakes, Townley and Cooper's (1998) study 
into the roles of business plans would have been substantially more useful had 
the researchers engaged In a more `systematic comparative analysis' (p. 163) of 
organisations, departments and managers who were either especially proactive or 
resistant to the use of business plans. By comparing what Influenced the 
responses of different managers they believe that the researchers would have 
then been able to "tease out the conditions and activities required to Implement 
business planning effectively" (p. 164). Since many organisations apparently use 
tools and the use and views of them can be compared across them and their 
members, this study followed attempts to provide wider resonance by locating its 
fine-grained study within a wider context by conducting its research across a 
variety of organisations and organisational contexts. 
4.5.4 Selecting the Case Study Organisations 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that cases in a collective case study can be chosen 
randomly, and Stake (1994) says that they can be chosen without knowing in 
advance whether or not they reflect certain common traits; as such they may or 
may not be similar, redundant or reflect variety. Stake (1994) argues that the 
choice of cases should reflect the researcher's belief that by studying them s/he 
can acquire a deeper understanding of the phenomena being studied and thus 
possibly produce a greater degree of theorising. The theoretical sampling (Yin, 
2003) followed in this thesis means that although the selection of cases was not 
random, the researcher believes that the organisations studied provided an 
opportunity to extend the limited extant theory. By aiming for replication logic 
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(Yin, 2003), the author hoped to develop patterns that would, going forward, help 
predict either similar results (literal replication) or contrasting results for 
predictable reasons (theoretical replication). 
Following Remenyi et al. 's advice (1998), the researcher decided that 
participating firms should be good research sites and, if possible, have certain 
some similar criteria. Table 4-3 provides a list of these criterion and the reasons 
for them. 
4.5.5 Gaining Access 
This researcher's experiences confirms Okumus, Altinay and Roper's (2007) 
observation that gaining access is one of the most challenging aspects of 
conducting in-depth qualitative case study research In hospitality organisations. 
This is also one of the particular challenges associated with SasP research, such 
as this study, since it involves close and extended contact between researchers 
(Balogun et al., 2003) and may not necessarily offer any direct, obvious and 
immediate benefit to the participating firms (Langley, 1986). 
An effective study of tool use implies attending and/or participating in meetings 
and strategy workshops, and as Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007) Identified, such 
episodes are often off-limits to researchers due to the sensitivity of topics being 
discussed. Similarly, access to internal documents is also Important and 
sometimes difficult to access due to concerns of confidentiality. The above are 
perhaps reasons why many studies of strategy tools and practices have to date 
been conducted within academic institutions (e. g. Dyson, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 
2000; Jarzabkowski & Giulietta, 2007) or other public sector organisations (e. g. 
Chesley & Wenger, 1999; Langley, 1986,1989; Lozeau et al., 2002) where, as 
Johnson et al. (2007) note, there are less concerns about competitive positions 
and confidentiality and which Kaplan (2007) notes is one of the limitations in the 
extant empirical SasP research since there is little evidence that strategy 
practices in such industries are the same within the private sector. 
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Table 4-3 Company Criteria 
Issue Supporting Reasons 
Company's primary business is Researching within a single sector helps minimise any potential 
the operation of hotels variance due to cross-industry comparisons (Jarzabkowski, 2003) 
Responds to multiple calls in the S-A-P literature for single 
industry studies (e. g. Johnson et al, 2003) 
Most strategy tools were created for manufacturing and 
consumer goods industries; the applicability to the service sector 
has not been thoroughly investigated or proven (Becker & Olsen, 
1995; Okumus & Wong, 2005) 
The study's principle research questions concern the role and 
usefulness of generic strategy tools in the hotel industry 
Headquarters within close Geographic proximity to researcher can enhance quality of case 
geographic proximity study research work (Stake, 1994) 
Researcher is part-time student and full-time employee based in 
Switzerland and so geographic, time and cost constraints are 
relevant and of concern. 
Company's business, including Enhanced accuracy of data analysis due to a lack of need to 
meetings and documents, translate primary material (interviews, documents) 
should be conducted in English 
Time and/or cost spent on translation can be eliminated 
Company has a currently SasP studies should focus, if possible, on contemporary rather 
ongoing strategic issue for than historical phenomenon (Whittington, 2006) 
which generic strategic tools 
have been created by Practitioners will provide greater support if they help to identify 
academics and/or consultants what issues to examine; identifying which activity is strategic 
should be done with practitioner input; such involvement should 
Company helps to identify such likely help researcher develop understanding of micro-activities 
an issue and encourages the (Balogun et al, 2003) 
researcher to study it 
Company is large enough to Helps the researcher to respond to the call for studying strategy 
have a structure that includes practices (the use of tools) at multiple organisational levels and 
top and middle managers as organisational units (Johnson et al, 2003) as well as at different 
well as corporate and unit level sites for the same company (Balogun et al, 2003) 
staff 
Firm and its practitioners Practice based studies require close participation, and thus 
(participants In study) should be practitioners need to be Interested in project (Balogun et al, 
enthusiastic to participate in the 2003) 
study 
Qualitative research requires access to such materials and people 
Firm willing to grant researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) 
sufficient access to Its 
materials, meetings and 
employees 
As the number of hotel management companies with the desired characteristics 
(see Table 4-3 above) Is rather limited, and given the level of participation this 
studied required, securing the necessary involvement of multiple firms was not an 
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easy task. Through his role in creating and organising a distinguished lecture 
series at the hotel school where employed, the researcher is fortunate enough to 
have a good professional relationship with many top corporate managers in the 
hotel industry and was able to approach high-level executives in five firms and, 
through them, eventually secure their firms' commitment to participate in the 
research study. 
4.5.6 Participating Firms 
Stake (1994) has recommended choosing cases "from which we feel we can learn 
the most" (p. 243). This, he writes, includes considering which cases provide the 
best opportunities for the researcher to learn about the investigated 
phenomenon. With regards to SasP studies, Johnson et al. (2007) also suggest 
that because the sample size in such studies is necessarily small, there should be 
a conscious effort to "maximize the value of the information obtained in terms of 
the types of inferences or insights that can be drawn from it" (p61). The 
researcher attempted to do this when approaching and 'selecting' the firms within 
which to investigate the use of tools in this study. Based on the recommendation 
of the supervisors and other academics, the researcher eventually limited himself 
to data collection in three rather than five firms. 
After comparing the selected three firms, the researcher was confident that most 
of the issues identified in Table 4-2 were present in all of them and declined the 
offer of involvement of the two firms that seemed to at least meet the established 
criteria. The one exception was the recommendation for close proximity (both to 
one another and to the researcher's base of operations) which implied increased 
financial and time-related costs. While rendering the field work more difficult, 
and perhaps limiting some aspects of data collection as is discussed further 
below, the researcher accepted this as an unavoidable situation. Please see Table 
4-7 for a profile' of each firm. 
' In order to protect anonymity and respect confidentiality agreements, the author Is unable to provide more specific 
details and has altered some figures but believes the information provided conveys enough description to 
demonstrate that the contextual variables are present and to provide the reader with a clear picture of each firm's 
size, scope and history. 
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Table 4-4 Company Profiles 
Company BigCo MediumCo SmailCo 
Industry Hotel Hotel Hotel 
Principle Management and Management of hotels Management and 
business Franchising of Hotels ownership of hotels 
Headquarters USA Europe U. K 
Ownership Publicly Traded Firm Subsidiary of Publicly Privately held firm 
Structure Traded Firm 
Size 2,000 plus hotels Nearly 70 hotels Approximately 20 Hotels 
# properties managed and under and another 10 under 
development development 
Size # rooms Over 300,000 Over 10,000 Over 2,000 
Size # of Over 10 1 (then 2) 2 
Brands 
Size # of Over 50 Over 20 1 
countries 
Size Over 100,000 Over 10,000 Over 2,000 
# employees 
Age (years) Over 50 Over 50 Over 10 
Initial Contact Executive Vice President Chief Executive Officer Chief Executive Officer; 
Person(s) of International Group Director for People 
Development, EMEA Development 
Assigned Gate Senior Vice-President Special Assistant to Group Director for People 
Keeper(s) Business Intelligence; Chief Executive Officer Development 
(Stage 1) ; Chief 
SVP Brand Management Executive Officer of 
Subsidiary JV company 
(Stage 2) 
compuea rrom company inrormation, annual reports and individual research (all tigures as of January 
2009) 
4.5.7 Unit of Analysis 
A unit of analysis refers to the research study's precise object about which one 
hopes to draw conclusions (Yin, 2003) and SasP researchers are recommended to 
identify "particular units of analysis that can contribute to the more general" 
(Johnson et al., 2003, p. 17). Whittington (2006) notes that although many 
strategy practices are unique to organisations (e. g. specific planning routines), 
many other strategy practices, such as away days or the choice of a specific tool, 
are common across organisations. He thus says that from a practice perspective, 
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it is advisable that these "common practices become the units of analysis and it is 
their performance, rather than that of particular organizations, that needs to be 
explained" (p. 629). 
For Johnson et al. (2007) Identifying such units of analysis is particularly difficult 
in SasP studies since it is difficult to `draw boundaries' around strategising 
incidents (p. 58). They state that this is even more difficult when a study's 
perspective assumes that both top managers and other organisational members 
contribute to the strategising efforts since the concept of strategising is then even 
more open-ended. In other words, research design in micro-studies can be 
challenging since the scope and units of analysis must be constrained (Johnson et 
al., 2003) and because even after the main unit of analysis has been chosen, it is 
difficult to sufficiently bound it in order to permit systematic empirical research 
(Johnson et al., 2007). 
In order to manage these difficulties, Johnson et al. (2007) suggest that when 
adopting an interpretive perspective, as is the case of this study, one may need 
to deliberately maintain a sense of ambiguity with regards to the unit of analysis. 
They state that "the research itself must reflect the ambiguity present in the 
empirical situation, even including the ambiguity in its object" (p. 60). At the 
same time, they suggest that at times it is necessary to take a more 'reductionist' 
approach by employing "isolation tactics characterised by a focus on narrowly 
defined objects that exclude ambiguities" (p. 60). They argue that a useful tactic 
may be one that is `middle range' whereby the research explicitly admits variation 
and mobilizes this within the research design. Yin (2003) similarly states that 
with the case study method the researcher can revisit the unit of analysis, 
modifying It as a result of findings the researcher makes during the data 
collection. The researcher's definition of a unit of analysis reflected these 
challenges and certain suggestions to slightly modify the unit of analysis were 
adopted as is explained below. 
Following the different advice and recommendations cited above, this thesis' unit 
of analysis was slightly modified during the research study in as far as the 
conceptualisation of 'tool' was bound. The concept of tool was slightly modified 
and `opened' due to early discoveries during the research process. For example, 
the term remained ambiguous to the first interviewees who, even though 
provided a definition of the term during the interview when it was requested, 
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interpreted it to include other types of tools than conceptual frameworks (i. e. 
financial models, spreadsheets, software). Similarly, many documents also 
contained reference to these kinds of tools that did not fit the research objectives. 
The researcher dealt with this ambiguity of the term `tool' by creating a list of 
exclusion criteria that helped him to avoid focusing on or collecting excessive 
information on other types of tools (e. g. financial ratios, operational tools and 
computerised decision support systems) while at the same time accepting that 
variation in the nature of different sources of data (e. g. interviewees and 
documents) would not always see or refer to conceptual frameworks identically. 
The study's practice perspective means that it is not the tools themselves but 
rather their use by practitioners that is of interest, and the determination of unit 
of analysis reflects this. The choice of tools-in-use as the unit of analysis follows 
Jarzabkowski's (2005) suggestion that 'practices-in-use' can be considered as 
valid units of analysis for strategy as practice studies and reflects Orlikowski's 
(2000) rationale and approach for studying technologies-in-use. As Kaplan 
(2007) notes is generally the case in SasP, the level of analysis is the actor and 
not the firm itself. 
4.5.8 Strategic Issue Focus 
Yin (2003) notes that regardless of the specific topic that is studied, the 
researcher must establish boundaries to define the case. In order to focus the 
research the researcher decided to limit the investigation to the use of strategy 
tools as they relate to one specific strategic initiative within each firm. A focus on 
one specific project was also requested by two of the three firms so that they 
could better manage the researcher's access to sensitive information and secure 
their participation. Following Langley (1986), the terms `issue' and `initiative' 
rather than 'decision' were used as the latter connotes a deliberate (rather than 
possibly emergent) process and also implies a closure (i. e. a made decision) and 
as the different projects had not yet been completed, it was important not to 
insinuate that any decision would be made or implemented, nor that any realised 
action would be the result of a deliberate process. 
The choice of Issue was decided upon together with the contact person(s) at each 
firm it was hoped that this would help guarantee an enthusiastic and supportive 
assistance from the firm (Balogun et at., 2003; ]arzabkowski, 2005; Langley, 
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1989). In all three companies the researcher asked the principal contact to 
identify an ongoing and important strategic issue (Langley, 1986) with which s/he 
was familiar, that involved the work of multiple individuals from across 
hierarchical levels, and to which the firm was dedicating substantial resources. 
Please see Table 4-5 for an explanation of the criteria and rationales used for 
deciding upon the specific strategic issues(s). 
Table 4-5 Strategic Issue Criteria 
Criteria Reason 
Strategic issue (case) is Balogun et al. (2003) suggest that a research agenda which is 
recommended by company jointly set by researchers and practitioners - as opposed to one 
set by the researcher alone -- will likely create a greater sense of 
importance about the research project within the firm which will in 
turn help facilitate the researcher's understandings of the firm's 
micro activities. 
Strategic topic that is discussed Increases the likelihood that practitioners will use - or consider 
in academic literature and for using - established tools. Similarly, allows for such tools to be 
which tools have been adapted rather than simply created, meaning justification for the 
recommended latter would a reasonable topic to also investigate. 
The issue is a current and The SasP literature recommends studying contemporary rather 
important topic of concern within than historical topics (Johnson et al, 2003). 
firm The more important the topic is to the firm, the more likely 
resources (people, time, materials) will be dedicated to it, thereby 
increasing the material for the researcher to examine. 
Involves a variety of persons at One of the objectives of the study is to study tool use by people at 
different organisational levels multiple levels in the firm. 
Similarity across firms Comparison of tool use across firms will be easier and more valid 
if the strategic issue they are (or are not) applied to is similar. 
After the first firm (MediumCo) identified a new brand concept that it was 
currently developing and which involved the work of multiple individuals (both 
inside and outside the firm due its creation as a joint venture), the researcher 
asked the other firms about similar topics and each identified a key, similar issue 
which also met the above criteria. It should be noted that the scope of the study 
at BigCo and SmallCo were slightly modified as is discussed later in Chapter 5, 
and the issue at MediumCo was eventually replaced with another per the 
company's request. Please see Table 4-6 for a description of the strategic issues 
that eventually helped bound the case studies. 
Table 4-6 Strategic Issues 
Company BigCo MediumCo Smal1Co 
Strategic European Growth New Concept / Brand Repositioning Strategy 
Issue Strategy Development Strategy for a 
New International Market 
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4.6 Data Collection 
This section explains how within each of these organisations the researcher 
operationalised the data collection through various instruments and processes in 
order to triangulate the data and thus improve the study's design, validity and 
reliability. 
4.6.1 Multiple methods 
By building on a variety of empirical resources, methods, participants and 
perspectives, the case study researcher can access more sources of evidence and 
thus reveal greater depth of analysis within the phenomenon being studied 
(Stake, 1994). The resulting triangulation, or converging lines of enquiry, can 
help produce rigorous, meaningful results that add credibility to the findings of 
case study work (Eisenhardt, 1989). Multiple methods help provide the 
necessary breath of information which can produce a holistic picture of both 
strategy process (Pettigrew, 1997) and practice (Jarzabkowski, 2000). As this 
thesis' topic is very contemporary there is no precedence for the most 
appropriate, specific data collection tools for its specific focus. Johnson et al. 
(2007), however, recommend that because it is imperative to get close to the 
phenomena under investigation, researching SasP: 
Implies doing observations in organizations to capture the in- 
vivo experience of doing strategy, conducting interviews and 
other forms of Interaction with organization members to 
understand the interpretations that people place on these 
activities, and collecting the artefacts of strategizing such as 
minutes of meetings, reports, slide presentations, objects, etc 
(p. 52, italics added). 
The decision was made to rely on documents, interviews and observations since, 
in part, these are the methods most often employed in strategy as practice 
studies (Balogun et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2007). 
4.6.2 Documentary Evidence 
Company documents, as material traces, are particularly important in sociological 
studies (and thus SasP studies) because "`what people say' is often very different 
from 'what people do"' (Hodder, 1994, p. 395). In this regard they help primarily 
to confirm, support, verify, clarify or contextualise evidence acquired from other 
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means, such as observations or informants' verbal accounts and personal 
recollections (Hodder, 1994; Remenyi et al., 1998). Johnson et al. (2007) note 
that there has not been much attention paid to the role and use of documents In 
studies of strategy practices, and they suggest that such artefacts should not only 
be used as a peripheral data source but should play a fundamental role in 
understanding strategising. 
For this thesis documents such as internal memos, meeting minutes, company 
reports and presentations provided a pragmatic solution (Mason, 1996) because 
evidence of some aspects of strategy tool use was not otherwise available. That 
is, these documents provided access to (and information about) certain episodes 
and processes which the researcher could not observe and for which he would, if 
not, have had to rely only on oral reconstructions. This is particularly important 
in this study which looks at tool use across multiple levels within organisations 
since "many areas of experience are hidden from language, particularly 
subordinate experience" (Hodder, 1994, p. 395). 
Company documents are in themselves literal evidence of practitioners' use of 
tools, as they include (and, for that matter, do not include) allusions or specific 
reference to strategy tools and their use. Furthermore, when `read' (Mason, 
1996), the texts could be interpreted to reveal something deeper about the 
organisation and its practitioners' use of strategy tools. More importantly perhaps 
is the fact that the study's central interest in the practice of strategy and use of 
tools means that a relevant question concerns the processes and practices by 
which these documents are produced and consumed, and through these 
documents the researcher could infer something about the underling practices 
and norms (Mason, 1996) related to the use of tools. For example, by following 
different drafts of strategic plans one may be able to see how workable strategy 
documents are generated through the involvement of multiple participants and 
how the meaning of emerging strategies can change to become either more or 
less focused, as well as more or less ambiguous, as the related texts are written 
and rewritten (Johnson et al., 2007). From an epistemological stance, therefore, 
documents and texts both are and provide evidence of the above ontological 
properties as they provide information that simply could not be 'known' or 
captured in other ways or mediums (Hodder, 1994). 
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Documents were collected throughout the research process. This included 
documents that had been identified through preliminary interviews and which 
helped set the context for subsequent discussions and interviews within each 
organisation (Remenyl et al., 1998). By whenever possible identifying, obtaining 
and reviewing documents before conducting interviews with key personnel, the 
researcher was better able to identify when and where key tools were or were not 
used and thus better focus the interview questions. Given the above, some 
questions that the researcher posed (to the practitioners and/or himself) about 
each document (and its tools) can be found in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7 Sample Questions about Documents 
Question Examples of where answers 
might be found 
What kinds of documents related to the Business Plan 
strategic issue exist? Annual Reports 
Corporate publicity material 
10K Report and Quarterly Filings 
Evaluation Analyses/Reports & Internal strategy 
documents (reviews, analyses) 
Marketing Plan 
Status Reports 
Working Papers 
Emails/Memos (between company employees) 
Emails/Memos (between company and externals) 
Internal Presentations (i. e. PowerPoint) 
External presentations 
Meeting minutes 
Proposals to external parties 
Personal correspondence between informants 
(emails, memos) 
Externally Generated Reports (i. e. consultants) 
What level of detail do they provide and how Document analysis and cross-document analysis 
complete an account/perspective do they 
provide? 
What other types of data are necessary in Organisational charts 
order to make sense of them? Job descriptions 
Working drafts and comments 
What contextual information is necessary in Organisational Structure 
order to make sense of them? Company information 
Dates 
People Involved 
Why were they prepared? Interviews 
Documents 
How many copies were distributed? Who Interviews 
received them? Memos 
Why and how were they used? Interviews 
Observations 
Data analysis 
When were they used? Interviews 
Observations 
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Memos 
For whom were they made (i. e. intended Interviews 
users)? Who has actually used them? Record of who received copies 
By whom were they made (original request, Interviews 
actual creation) Names on documents 
Under what conditions were they made and Interviews 
according to what rules and conventions? 
What have they been used for? How is this Interviews 
different from their original intentions Data analysis 
Are they authentic, genuine, reliable and Interviews 
accurate? Cross-document analysis 
Do different drafts exist? What is the Interviews 
review/edit process like (who is involved, why, Cross-document analysis 
why are changes made, what kind of changes, 
etc) 
What are the visual layout and design Cross-document analysis 
elements? How do these affect their use? Interviews 
(Adapted from: Hodder, 1994; Mason, 1996; Remenyi et al., 1998; Silverman, 2001) 
The researcher was unable to access as many documents as he had hoped for 
due to some bureaucratic obstacles and privacy concerns on the part of some 
organisational members. He was also not permitted to keep copies of most 
documents and/or permitted to copy only non-sensitive parts. Nevertheless he 
did manage to source documents that were both publicly available (secondary 
sources) and also private to the firm (primary sources). See Table 4-8 for a list of 
these documents per firm. 
Table 4-8 Documents per Company 
Document Type BigCo MediumCo SmaliCo 
Internal strategy documents Y Y Y 
Business Plan Y Y Y 
Annual Reports Y N/A Y 
Corporate publicity material Y Y Y 
Marketing Plan N N Y 
Project Status Reports Y Y Y 
Emails/Memos (between company 
employees) 
Y Y N 
Emails/Memos (between company and 
externals) 
N N N 
Internal Presentations Y Y N 
External presentations Y Y Y 
106 
Meeting minutes y y y 
Proposals to external parties y Y N 
Job Descriptions N N/A Y 
Reports from Consultants Y N Y 
Newspaper and magazine articles y Y Y 
While many of the primary sources were very useful for uncovering aspects of the 
use of tools, the secondary sources were generally only beneficial for providing 
information about the firm and, at times, the strategic issues being studied as 
part of the cases. Some documents were collected during and after interviews as 
the researcher was only then made aware of them by interviewees. Other 
documents were collected since they were mentioned in previous ones. These 
documents proved useful for modifying future Interviews as well as for shedding 
light on earlier ones. 
4.6.3 Interviews 
Most previous qualitative research on SasP has made extensive use of Interviews 
as the principle data source since these are a fundamental source for collecting 
practitioners' feelings about events (Johnson et al., 2007). Worren et al. (2002) 
similarly suggest that asking tool users about their opinions is a valid approach 
for investigating their perceptions about the pragmatic validity of tools and their 
use. 
From this researcher's ontological stance, interviews are a critical data collection 
method since practitioners' experiences, knowledge, views, understandings, 
interpretations, and interactions are important clues to how and why strategy's 
tools are actually used when strategising, and, as such, epistemologically, 
interaction with practitioners, including talking and listening to them, Is necessary 
in order to gain access to their accounts and expressions (Mason, 1996). This 
research project's interpretive and constructivist epistemological paradigm Implies 
that its interview questions were intended to help uncover the Interviewees' own 
experiences in a story-telling fashion through open-ended and semi-structured 
interviews during which the researcher sought facts and insights Into certain 
occurrences (Remenyi et al., 1998) about how and why strategy tools are and are 
not used. 
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While structured interviews attempt to capture precise data that can help explain 
behaviour within pre-established categories, unstructured interviews are used 
when a researcher wants to understand more complex behaviour without 
imposing limitations through a priori categories (Fontana & Frey, 1994). In 
between these two poles are semi-structured interviews which were deemed to 
be the most appropriate interview method for this study given the epistemological 
assumptions the researcher made about his relationship with the interviewees. 
For example, the contextual and situational nature of the evidence provided by 
each person meant that the interviews needed to be somewhat flexible and 
sensitive to the specific dynamics of each interview (Fontana & Frey, 1994) while 
still attempting to gather information about the same topic and to answer the 
same questions. Similarly, because the phenomena being studied is somewhat 
complex, and was probably not too clearly formulated in the minds of the 
interviewees, short standardised questions were not appropriate (Mason, 1996). 
In addition, as an important part of the interview is to see how practitioners work 
out and articulate their understandings and responses, the researcher needed to 
take cues from them about what to ask, and when, so as to build on their 
responses and follow their narrative (Fontana & Frey, 1994; Mason, 1996). 
The researcher pre-tested the questions and question-asking style by 
interviewing several former students and colleagues who worked with firms not 
associated with the empirical research in this thesis. These individuals not only 
made suggestions about the interview style (for example, to smile more often 
and nod less often), but also provided information about how they 
understood/misunderstood the questions (e. g. needing a clearer definition of 
'tool' and examples as well as not providing a definition of 'strategy' or 
'strategic'). This allowed the researcher to better ensure that the interview 
questions and style would in fact solicit the appropriate type of information and 
response. 
The researcher also attempted to ensure the success of his interviews by limiting 
as much as possible the use of technical or academic jargon that would perhaps 
be misconstrued or misunderstood by the interviewees (Fontana & Frey, 1994). 
At the same time, due to his own professional experience in the hotel Industry, he 
was able to 'speak the same language' and refer to his own experiences when 
necessary (for example, during casual conversation at the opening of the 
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interview) and this is thought to have played a positive role during the interview 
process. The researcher considers that this sense of `shared experiences' also 
served to help gain the interviewee's respect and trust which are critical for 
ensuring an interviewer's success (Kwortnik, 2003). This trust was also reinforced 
through the use of confidentiality agreements with each firm and through a 
`Participant Information Sheet that required each respondent's informed consent 
and which demonstrated concern for their rights to privacy, including the promise 
to provide them with anonymity, as well as through a document from the 
researcher's university testifying to the fact that the researchers project had been 
subject to an ethical review policy and had received approval from the University 
Research Ethics Committee. (Please see Appendices A and B for copies of these 
documents as well as the Consent Form the interviewees were requested to sign). 
For each interview the researcher followed a similar though not identical format, 
which is consistent with the advice on semi-structured interviews. Within each 
organisation the latter interviews tended to have a few more specific questions 
based on documents the researcher had acquired following previous interviews. 
Getting the respondent to answer questions honestly and freely is fundamental to 
the interviewer's success (Kwortnik, 2003), thus the researcher attempted to 
build a rapport with each respondent so that they would not feel the need to offer 
socially desirable answers to please him, nor to omit relevant information in order 
to hide something (Fontana & Frey, 1994). The advice of Fontana and Frey 
(1994) to conduct the interviews like an informal conversation was followed. 
Thus, the tone of the interviews was similar to a 'friendly chat' but without 
entering into a conversation where the researcher answered his own questions or 
offered opinions. The researcher began the interviews with some background 
information about himself and the general focus and purpose of the research and 
at this time requested permission to audio record the interviewt. He then moved 
on to three sets of questions. First some general ones about the firm which 
helped 'break the ice' and then more specific questions focused on the topic of 
inquiry. In order not to seem Intrusive the researcher withheld biographical 
questions until the end when Kwortnik (2003) suggests they are likely to be 
more comfortably accepted as the encounter comes to a close. A summary of the 
2 Permission was only denied three times during the course of the field work, and in several other Instances 
Interviews were arranged spontaneously when the Interviewer did not have his recording device with him. In these 
Instances the researcher took more copious notes and then wrote additional ones as soon as possible after the 
Interview. 
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Interview topics can be found in Table 4-9, while a sample interview transcription 
can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 4-9 Sample Interview Topics 
Topic Sample Interview Topics 
Company Information Organisational culture: Values and Norms 
Organisational Structure 
Strategic issue Explanation 
Documents involved before, during, after 
People involved 
Role played 
Tools used 
Thoughts about the strategic issue 
Company Strategy-Making Definition and explanation 
Process 
Tools Identified as used Explanation of tool 
Purpose for using tool 
Who was involved in using It 
Why it was used 
How it was perceived (document, tool) 
History of personally using it 
History of its use in company 
Who created it and why (if internal) 
How the tool has been changed (if external) 
Perceived benefits and weaknesses from using it 
Tools not used Knowledge of tool 
Reasons for not using it 
Benefits/weaknesses from not using it 
Interview Participant Information regarding position(s) held, time spent with company, 
education background, job description 
Thoughts about strategy tools in general 
Role played in strategic issue development 
(Aaaptea from: Fontana & Frey, 1994; Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 2007; Langley, 1986; Mason, 1996; 
Remenyi et al., 1998; Silverman, 2001) 
Even though strategy processes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Westley, 1990) and 
strategising practices (Johnson et al., 2003; Regner, 2003) increasingly involve 
more people from different organisational levels than ever before, previous 
practice-based doctoral thesis' have focused on top managers (e. g. Jarzabkowski, 
2000; Stenfors, 2007). Similarly, as demonstrated above in Table 4-9, the 
limited empirical work on strategy tools has also focused on questions directed at 
top managers. Since this thesis sought to examine the use of strategy tools 
related to one strategic issue within each firm, it was important to be as thorough 
with this as possible, and as such it was necessary to involve people across 
multiple organisational levels and departments in order to provide a variety of 
perspectives and a greater breadth and depth of information. The researcher, 
following Langley's advice (1986,1988), not only interviewed pre-determined 
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persons but also, when permitted, `tracked down' employees and managers 
Identified through other interviews and documents as being involved in any 
capacity related to the strategic issue discussion and development. Such roles 
included requesting Information or analysis, gathering or providing the 
information, undertaking the analysis or related research, creating documents, 
reviewing the work, decision making involvement, and, at times, implementation. 
The targeted participants included Board members, top executives, senior and 
mid-level managers and their staff analysts/assistants. In addition, as the hotel 
industry Is a multi-business industry, this also Included hotel General Managers 
(GMs) as another example of middle-management personnel. Corporate interns 
and management trainees were also interviewed when appropriate. The selection 
of interviewees was thus not driven by any attempts at generalisability. 
Following Kwortnik's (2003) advice, the decision about the number of informants 
needed within each case was not predetermined but Instead was based on the 
research process whereby new interviews were conducted until a level of 
redundancy, also known as theoretical saturation (Yin, 2003), was reached. The 
number of face-to-face interviews was subject to time and space constraints. 
Some limitations were due to issues of accessibility to potential informants since 
in some cases certain Informants were not available for interviews during the 
researcher's field visits (though some were later Interviewed by phone or 
answered emailed questions). Interviews took, on average, 50 to 60 minutes, 
and though a few lasted only 30 minutes and others lasted up to 90 minutes. 
The researcher took notes during and after the interviews so as to take note of 
the Interviewee's non-verbal messages as well as to remind him of follow-up 
questions that came to mind during the interview. 'Contact summary' forms 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) of approximately one-half page were produced for 
many interviews. A sample copy of such a form can be found in Appendix D. 
Several persons were Interviewed more than once with the additional Interviews 
generally conducted by phone though several persons were interviewed multiple 
times in person. 
A list of interviewees conducted by firm can be found in Table 4-10. In order to 
protect anonymity, the researcher has, whenever possible, slightly modified or 
disguised the exact organisational department for each the interviewee. For 
example, while the code for several BigCo interviewees suggests that they work 
within the Finance Department, their actual titles refer to sub-departments. 
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Table 4- 10 List of Interviews BigCo 
Title and Department Code Academic 
Background 
Years with 
firm 
Chief Financial Officer CFO Business Law 
(M) 
10+ 
Executive Vice-President, Development EVP-D Hotel (BA) 20+ 
Executive Vice-President, Development EVP2-D Business (B) 30+ 
Executive Vice-President, Development EVP3-D Business (B) 30+ 
Senior Vice-President , Development SVP-D Law 
(M) 5+ 
Vice-President, Development VP-D Hotel (B) 5+ 
Executive Vice-President, Marketing EVP-M Business (M) 20+ 
Senior Vice-President, Marketing SVP-M Business (M) 10+ 
Vice-President, Marketing VP-M Business (B) 5+ 
Vice-President, Marketing VP2-M Business (M) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Finance SVP-F Hotel (M) 10+ 
Vice-President, Finance VP-F Business (M) 1+ 
Vice-President, Finance VP2-F N/A 5+ 
Senior Vice-President, Operations SVP-O Hotel (B) 10+ 
Senior Vice-President, Business Intelligence SVP-BI Business (M) 15+ 
Director, Business Intelligence D-BI Business (M) 10+ 
Senior Vice-President, Investor Relations SVP-IR Business (B) 20+ 
(M) Indicates Masters or other graduate degree; (B) indicates Bacneiors aegree 
Table 4- 11 List of Interviews MediumCo 
Title and Department Code Academic 
Background 
Years with 
firm 
Chief Executive Officer CEO Hotel (B) 10 
Chief Financial Officer CFO Business (M) 5+ 
Chief Executive Officer (JV) JVCEO Business (M) 5+ 
Chief Operating Officer COO Hotel (B) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Strategic Planning SVP-SP Hotel (M) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Human Resources SVP-HR Psychology (B) 1+ 
Senior Vice-President Development SVP-D Hotel (M) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Marketing SVP-M Liberal Arts (B) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Information 
Technology 
SVP-IT Engineering (B) 5+ 
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Senior Vice-President Operations SVP1-O Hotel (B) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President Operations SVP2-O Hotel (M) 5+ 
Special Assistant to CEO SA-CEO Business (M) 5+ 
General Manager GM Hotel (M) 5+ 
Assistant General Manager AGM Hotel (M) 5+ 
Management Trainee MT Hotel (B) 1 
Personal Assistant to CEO PA Hotel (M) 1+ 
Corporate Intern CI Hotel (B) 1 
(M) Indicates Masters or other graduate degree; (B) indicates Bachelors degree 
Table 4- 12 List of Interviews SmaliCo 
Job Title Code Academic 
Background 
Years with 
firm 
Chief Executive Officer CEO Hotel (B) 10+ 
Chief Financial Officer CFO Business (M) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President, Brand Management SVP-BM Business (B) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President, Human Resources SVP-HR n/a 5+ 
Senior Vice-President, Operations SVP-O Hotel (B) 5+ 
Senior Vice-President, Food and Beverage SVP-FB n/a 5+ 
Executive Chef EC Culinary Arts 10+ 
Vice-President, Project Management VP-PM Engineering (B) 5+ 
Director, Revenue Management D-RM Liberal Arts (B) 5+ 
Director, Marketing D-M Business (B) 5+ 
Director, Marketing D2-M Business (B) 5+ 
Director, Marketing D3-M Business (B) 1+ 
Director, Design DD Art/Design (B) 5+ 
General Manager GM1 Hotel (B) 1+ 
General Manager GM2 Hotel (B) 3+ 
General Manager GM3 Hotel (B) 5+ 
Management Trainee MT1 Hotel (B) 1 
Management Trainee MT2 Hotel (B) 1 
(M) Indicates Masters or other graduate degree; (s) indicates Bachelors degree 
While this detail is not shared with the reader, the researcher believes he retains 
the important issue with regards to the overall department and that this is a 
suitable compromise between his ethical and legal responsibilities and the 
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Importance of providing the reader with important information. This modification 
was also necessary in light of the fact that the researcher refers to their exact 
hierarchical position for each interviewee since this is a critical issue for this 
study. That is, how are tools used by organisational members of different 
hierarchical levels. Due to the different titles used in the different countries, the 
researcher has used commonly accepted terms from the United States for all 
three firms. He verified with the individuals from the other countries to ensure 
that the translation was appropriate. In some cases positions did not exist or their 
functions were part of another's responsibility. The researcher has also withheld 
some other personal information, such as gender, and provided an approximate 
rather than exact number of years each interviewee has spent with the firm so as 
to better protect their anonymity. 
To the extent possible the researcher attempted to conduct as many of the 
Interviews on-site (i. e. company headquarters and hotel properties) and with a 
specific focus on the practitioners' everyday strategising activities (albeit with as 
much reference to the specific strategic issue that focused the data collection) 
since, as Balogun et al. (2003) point out, people can generally better describe 
what they do in detail when they are in their work context. 
4.6.4 Observation 
From the very beginnings of SasP Whittington (1996) argued that for researchers 
to better understand strategising they would need "close observation of 
strategists as they work their way through their strategy making routines" (p. 
734). To date, however, in-vivo observations are said to be an underused data 
source in SasP studies even though they are considered a particularly important 
method for studying and understanding strategising (Johnson et al., 2007). Close 
observation is beneficial because in order to discover and understand the micro- 
activities involved in strategy practices one cannot rely only on what practitioners 
think (or say) they do as this might be very different from what they actually do 
(Hodder, 1994). For this study this can be extended to the fact that they may 
not even be aware of which tools they employ. 
In observations of strategy tools-in-practice, the researcher worked from the idea 
that because he was interested in qualitative information, he needed to try and 
uncover large trends, patterns and behavioural styles (Johnson et al., 2007) In 
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the way tools are and are not used. Observation, because it was used in 
conjunction with in-depth interviews, was meant to not only help produce 
particularly strong rigour but also enhance consistency and validity through 
triangulation (Denzin, 1989). Thus, rather than rely on it as the only or primary 
method, the researcher integrated it with other methods, which has been 
suggested as an appropriate use and one that provides a powerful means of 
validation (Adler & Adler, 1994). 
By spending time within the organisations in an observer capacity, the 
researcher's primary goal was to better understand the organisations and their 
behavioural processes and contexts (Remenyi et al., 1998). Qualitative 
observation takes place within natural contexts of occurrence, and with the 
people who would normally be involved in whatever is being witnessed, and as a 
result, it "enjoys the advantage of drawing the observer into the 
phenomenological complexity of the world, where connections, correlations, and 
causes can be witnessed as and how they unfold" (Adler & Adler, 1994, p. 378). 
In other words, through observation the researcher attempted to access the 
phenomena of tool use, and as much of its complexity as possible, in the most 
natural, rich manner available. 
Ontologically speaking, from an interpretivist position observation was an 
important data collection method for this thesis since interactions, actions and 
behaviours, and the way these are interpreted and acted upon by people (Mason, 
1996), are all central to understanding how people use strategy tools. Observing 
presentations and conversations in certain settings and contexts, for example, 
provided valuable empirical evidence. Similarly, the researcher's epistemological 
position posits that settings, situations and interactions helped reveal data that 
the researcher could not only interpret but also know since he himself had 
experienced (observed) the event or moment (Mason, 1996). Furthermore, 
observation also allowed empirical evidence to be generated with the researcher 
present, rather than only gathered through retrospective accounts (interviews) of 
such interactions. 
Mason (1996) points out that the researcher planning on conducting observations 
must prepare not only for the process and technique of observation, but also for 
social interaction. She suggests that the settings, situation and interactions 
involved in observations make the task complicated and messy due to the 
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numerous different things that can be happening at the same time. Following her 
advice, therefore, the researcher considered numerous questions about 
observation and his use of it. Please see Table 4-11 for a list of some of these 
questions and the researcher's theoretical and operationalised solutions. 
The researcher was, unfortunately, not able to attend as many formal meetings 
and strategy workshops as he had hoped. This was due to two fundamental 
reasons: (1) The reluctance on the part of some informants to permit his 
participation even though this had originally been agreed upon with the 
gatekeeper. In order not to alienate the informants, and because access to 
people and documents had, in most cases, been very generous, the researcher 
was unable to press the issue further. (2) Logistically, since the researcher had to 
travel internationally for much of the field work, and was thus required time off 
from his full-time job for the site visits, he was unable to increase the 
opportunities for attending additional meetings. Nevertheless he did observe 
some formal meetings and workshops as well as ad-hoc meetings and 
presentations (both on and off-site), and these are listed in Table 4-12. For each 
formal meeting or workshop observed the researcher: 
" Determined which meetings would most likely be valuable and feasible and 
which he could attend due to the schedule limitations 
" Gained access through gatekeeper authorisation 
" Recorded observations in a free-association form, making explicit 
reference to participants and interactions (Denzin, 1989) 
Whenever possible before these meetings and presentations, the researcher 
attempted to secure the relevant documents and other materials that could help 
him to better understand the context behind the planned meetings. When 
permitted, he took notes during the meeting or presentation that he then 
transformed into a condensed version of the actual meeting/presentation and its 
discussion topics. A copy of the handwritten notes from one workshop can be 
found in Appendix E. In some instances copies of the PowerPoint presentations 
were obtained and treated as documents by the researcher. 
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Table 4- 14 Observed Meetings and Presentations 
Observed Sessions BigCo MediumCo Sma11Co 
Strategy Off-site Workshops 0 1 0 
Executive Team Meetings 
0 1 1 
Ad hoc meetings 3 2 2 
Presentations 2 3 1 
Total 5 7 4 
4.6.5 Operationalisation of the Data Collection 
The case study method's research design is very interactive and flexible. It is an 
iterative process, and as such the researcher made use of new knowledge 
acquired during the process and modified the data collection instruments early on 
during the research process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Such modifications 
permitted the researcher to seize opportunities and examine new, emerging 
themes that revealed themselves in a given situation, and thus he hoped to be 
able to continue to improve the validity of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989). While 
some researchers question any modification of the data collection instruments or 
processes while a research study is underway, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that 
such changes to the research design are acceptable if they are consistent with the 
study's purpose and objectives. Given the exploratory nature of this study, being 
flexible proved to be a necessary and valuable option for the researcher. 
The nature of the study's unit of analysis, tools-in-use, Implies action, and thus 
the researcher intended and attempted to witness tools being (and, as a 
corollary, not being) used. Similar to Johnson et al. 's (2007) view that SasP 
studies need evidence and reflection on `actions' such as people working and 
meeting together, regardless of whether or not their interaction was successful, 
the ideal situation would have been to report on as many real-time observations 
of specific or sequenced episodes as possible in order to demonstrate what 
difference strategy tools make in practice. However, as discussed above, this 
was not as feasible as he had wished, and thus the researcher relied more than 
expected on what Johnson et al. (2007) consider the next best option, which Is 
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tightly focused interviews with multiple participants and which are substantiated 
with support from documentary evidence. 
The researcher did not'complete' one case before moving on to the next, but did, 
whenever possible, focus his efforts on one particular case at a time. However, 
given the schedules of the participants and researcher, as well as the fact that 
because neither the researcher's process, nor for that matter the topic he was 
studying, were necessarily linear, researcher flexibility was required. For 
example, after he had thought that his data collection was complete, the 
researcher was invited by the CEO of MediumCo to attend another meeting and 
witness a presentation about the company's growth strategy. Since attending 
these could increase knowledge about the strategic issue being studied, as well as 
the study's specific topic, the invitation was accepted. Flexibility also allowed the 
researcher, take advantage of a 'snowball sampling' technique with interviews 
that Oakes et al. (1998) used in a study of the use of business plans. 
In his fieldwork, the researcher thus followed leads to additional documents and 
informants based on the advice and comments from original and/or scheduled 
respondents (i. e. interviewees, participants in meetings). This was also 
particularly important since, throughout the data collection, the researcher 
worked iteratively looking for common themes through the documentary material 
collected, the observations turned into field notes, and the interviews transcribed, 
in order to better focus data collection efforts. At times it was noted that 
interviewee comments, written documentation and certain observations either 
contradicted other comments or materials already collected, or raised questions 
about the initial thoughts tentatively forming about the material being collected. 
Thus, this `serpentine' process of data collection permitted not only more 
Information to be gathered, but important evidence which helped to corroborate 
or identify inconsistencies in how tools were and were not used in the three 
organisations and In how the researcher was interpreting the empirical evidence. 
A visual representation of how the data collection was operationalised for each 
case can be found in Figures 4-1 through 4-3. 
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4.7 Data analysis 
Sandiford and Seymour (2007) reference an Economic and Social Research 
Council report that found that the management research literature emphasises 
the methods used to collect and/or create data but not as much focus on the 
analytical techniques used to interpret the data. They similarly point to the fact 
that the hospitality management research literature generally provides limited 
discussions of the analytical techniques and approaches used in its qualitative 
studies. This situation may be due to the fact that there are not explicit and 
easy-to-follow rules one can follow for analysing qualitative data. While the 
objective of this section is not to provide an overview of different techniques 
possible for analysing qualitative data, it does set out to explain the process used 
in this particular research study. 
The data analysis phase of a case study is not only very iterative but also requires 
that the researcher `play' with the data (Yin, 2003). The data analysis objectives 
are to provide convincing conclusions and, if possible, to eliminate other 
explanations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Miles and Huberman (1994) have 
identified that there are three important processes for qualitative data analysis: 
data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification. The 
researcher undertook these activities as part of his data analysis and these are 
now briefly explained. 
4.7.1 Data Reduction 
Data reduction is a necessary step in qualitative data analysis because of the 
large quantities of data that are generated through the studies' open-ended 
questions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Through data reduction the researcher cannot only 
protect him/herself from data overload, but also ensure that important pieces of 
data are not disregarded or lost. An Important element that contributes to 
success in data analysis is the ability for the researcher to store and retrieve the 
data In a systematic fashion. The researcher did this by inputting interview 
transcriptions, field notes and collected documents into NVivo which is a 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software programme (CAQDAS). This 
facilitated the ability to follow Yin's (2003) advice by being able to carefully 
manipulate the case data while making sure that they maintained their original 
meanings and context. Here the researcher chose, focused, simplified, condensed 
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and/or structured the data into more easily manageable units for later analysis as 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
As with Jarzabkowski's (2000) doctoral thesis on putting strategy into practice, 
and Langley's (1986) doctoral thesis about the roles of formal analysis In 
strategic decision making, the data collected for this thesis was reduced and 
coded using a method of thematic categorisation (King, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). This is also sometimes referred to as `codebook analysis' and 
`template analysis. ' King (1998) argues that qualitative researchers who take a 
phenomenological stance are sceptical that 'real' internal states exist and that 
they can be discovered through empirical research, and because of this they often 
opt for a template analysis as it is more conducive to this position. The 
approach's essence is one where the researcher creates a list of codes that 
represent different themes Identified in the data. Given the precedence for using 
this approach in SasP studies, and its applicability to the researcher's research 
philosophy, template analysis was employed. 
Some codes were identified a priori (with some later modified), while others were 
added as the researcher read, reread and interpreted the texts (King, 1998). 
King (1998) suggests that this method falls between content analysis which 
requires predetermination of all codes, and grounded theory where no codes are 
identified a priori. Due to its middle ground, he suggests that the ensuing 
template, which started with only a few defined codes, can be used in a very 
flexible way in order to interpret the texts. 
The researcher's work here was informed by the practice perspective of strategy 
while remaining open and alert to other emerging ideas. Through this approach 
the researcher was able to work Inductively with the data, and as such was able 
to slowly and gradually Identify different conceptual categories by systematically 
searching for correlations, links and patterns between the different pieces of 
code. This systematic coding was developed gradually as the researcher 
immersed himself in the data through repeated readings of documents, field 
notes and interview transcriptions. 
The researcher used NVivo for storing, sorting and coding the data. Here a code 
is understood to be a label given to a piece of text (i. e. interview, document, 
field note) that corresponds to a particular theme or issue the researcher believes 
was important for his analysis. According to Kwortnik (2003) the process is one 
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where the researcher begins by "deconstructing the text line by line, and in some 
instances word by word by word, to `mine the data' for concepts that will form 
theoretical categories and relationships" (p. 125). 
Following King's (1998) advice, many of the codes were primarily descriptive 
while other codes were more interpretive. The researcher began by descriptively 
coding the data using the themes he had previously identified through the 
literature, including the different variables he had identified as potentially 
important. Codes were then added that emerged from the data but which had 
not previously been identified in the literature. For example, some documents 
referred to an intended audience of `investor relations' and thus the researcher 
added this code. 
The researcher then engaged in interpretive coding whereby he further coded the 
data according to concepts and themes that emerged from both his and his 
informants' views about the topic under investigation. For example, some early 
interviews suggested that the interviewees believed that the large amounts of 
work they had, and the need for fast decision making, meant were both reasons 
that tools were not used, and thus the researcher coded some data with the 
terms `workload' and `speed'. 
As the coding progressed the process gradually shifted from one of open coding 
to a more iterative process of "constant comparative analysis" (Kwortnik, 2003, 
p. 127) as `new' data was compared and corresponded with similar and previously 
coded data. While the researcher created and kept the data and codes for each 
case separate, he did work in an iterative fashion by returning to each case 
periodically to look for data that corresponded to codes that emerged within the 
other 'later' cases. 
At this stage the researcher was working with what NVivo terms 'free nodes' as 
they are not linked to other nodes and because they correspond to individual 
cases. The researcher here established a description of each node in order to 
make sure that the code remained consistent over time and across cases. An 
example of such a free node In this study is a participant's educational 
background since it corresponds to each informant but does not relate to any 
other free node. 
The researcher also used NVivo to create `tree nodes' in order to help identify 
emerging themes within and across the codes and to create a hierarchy of 
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Interrelated nodes. The constant comparison of data and codes facilitated the 
researcher's efforts to group concepts into more abstract categories which are 
meant to help result in a more profound understanding of the issues (Kwortnik, 
2003). Here the researcher combined codes by collapsing some themes (or 
nodes) into common ones that described the same types of data while making 
sure that any subtle differences were not lost. For example, references to 
Innovation, differentiation and creativity were grouped together. The researcher 
also discarded some codes that were deemed unnecessary (Walsh, 2003) such as 
'computer' and `office space' since they were only mentioned once and did not 
resonate with either the literature or other sources of empirical evidence. The 
resulting codes were then later used to create the `overarching themes' that 
helped guide the researcher's conclusion drawing and discussion. 
4.7.2 Data Display 
Data display is the system by which data are presented and communicated. A 
challenge, once again, is for the researcher to preserve the data's original 
meaning and context. The presentation of the data must be done in a manner by 
which not only the researcher but other readers can see the information in a clear 
and concise manner so that they can then draw valid conclusions from it. Such 
data displays are useful for within and across-case analyses since there is a 
cyclical relationship between the display and analysis processes. That is, data 
display can suggest further analysis which can then lead back to even more data 
displays (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Tables, charts and lists are often 
recommended and used to display the data. 
Force field analysis is an example of one type of tool for displaying data. In it one 
presents the forces for and against an issue, such as, in this case, the use of 
strategy tools. In this study the force field analyses allowed the researcher to 
effectively document and communicate the factors that favour and disadvantage 
the use of strategy tools within each firm, including the characteristics of each 
organisation and their environments that support and allow for the use of 
strategy tools. It also helped identify any 'negative' attributes that served as 
obstacles to the use of strategy tools within the firms which helped restrict their 
use or larger adoption. The researcher first did this for each interviewee and 
observation and then for each firm using all the themes and codes that emerged 
from the data reduction. An example of the force field analysis table used by this 
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researcher at the firm-level can be found in Table 4-13 and a completed table for 
one firm can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 4- 15 Strategy Tool Force Field Analysis 
Forces Supporting and 
Encouraging the Use of Strategy 
Tools 
Obstacles Limiting and Preventing the 
Use of Strategy Tools 
Smal1Co 
MediumCo 
BigCo 
This procedure allowed the researcher to compare and contrast findings across 
individuals within a firm, across individuals with similar backgrounds (e. g. 
hierarchical position) in and across firms, and across the three firms themselves. 
By comparing the similarities and differences across all three firms the researcher 
was more easily able to later draw some conclusions at the industry level. This 
approach also helped to ensure that the data was as exhausted as possible and to 
increase the reliability and validity of the findings. The tables also helped the 
researcher to avoid being overly influenced by any particular data or informant 
(such as those interviewees who were more loquacious or adamant in their 
ideas), of ignoring contradictory data, and of first impression biases. Once these 
tables had been completed and reviewed several times for missing or mistaken 
data, the researcher reached closure with the data display and believed that there 
would only be very minimal improvements or additions if he continued with the 
process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). 
4.7.3 Conclusion Drawing and Verification 
Conclusion drawing and verification is the final step in the data analysis and it is 
one where the researcher interprets the data displays and induces meaning while 
protecting himself from any threats to analytical validity (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Although there is no one ideal method for analysing qualitative data and 
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drawing and verifying conclusions from case study data, some of the more 
common and useful ones involve comparison/contrast analysis, pattern matching 
and thematic analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). 
Due to its qualitative nature, the researcher used inductive analysis not only to 
develop themes, patterns and categories from the data, but also to interpret the 
data. Janesick's (1994) suggestion to locate key phrases and statements within 
the data that address the phenomenon in question was followed. This then 
helped to create and substantiate the themes that emerged from the researcher's 
interpretation of the empirical evidence. 
During this stage of the data analysis the researcher did not rely on NVivo but 
instead analysed tables manually. Here he was guided by several criticisms about 
the use of computer progammes for this stage of the research endeavour. For 
example, in the 1991 edition of their book Easterby-Smith et al. were: 
sceptical of many of the computer packages available for 
qualitative research; and there is no package that can 
substitute for the interpretive skills of the researcher. Many of 
them can alleviate much of the clerical task of sorting words, 
concepts and passages contained in transcripts; but the 
identification of significant themes, patterns and categories still 
has to be done by the researcher (p. 113). 
With their 2002 edition Easterby-Smith et al. 's view has changed slightly as they 
now recognise some of the benefits of using computer progammes for the data 
analysis, yet they still have their reservations. They point out that such 
progammes cannot replace the researcher's judgement, that it may be easier to 
analyse data by hand, and that such progammes tend to emphasise the 
quantification of categories' frequencies rather than understanding the quality of 
the different ideas and experiences contained in the data (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). Yin (2003) similarly suggests that these tools are generally useful for 
helping to find meaning and insights from quantified word usage and frequencies, 
which was not the approach taken by in this study. As such, the researcher, as 
previously mentioned, use the software NVivo to help store, manage, and retrieve 
the raw and coded data, but his conclusion drawing and verification was done 
manually. 
The researcher's use of thematic analysis was realised by creating lists of 
emerging themes and foci for each person and firm (the latter being an example 
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of Yin's (2003) "within-case" analysis) and by comparing the themes within and 
across the firms (`between-case" analysis) in order to achieve further 
triangulation and validation. The cross-case analysis helped force the researcher 
to develop a more robust understanding of the phenomenon being studied 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Thus, from the different within-case and cross- 
case analysis, the researcher identified a variety of themes, patterns, concepts, 
relationships and overall impressions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Rather than breaking 
down the qualitative data to find underlying meanings as was the case during the 
coding phase, the Interpretation process here was one of combining the data in 
emergent categories and mapping these the relationships across these different 
abstractions in order to arrive at an understanding of the topic (Kwortnik, 2003). 
For example, the interpretation helped to find the patterns and themes that 
described, explained and unified the informants' experiences (Kwortnik, 2003) 
with strategy tools. During the Iterative process followed during this stage of 
verifying conclusions, the researcher followed recommendations to, as far as 
possible, triangulate findings (as well as the data) by relying on multiple sources 
of evidence, to search for negative cases, and to investigate any potential 
inconsistencies and unsubstantiated evidence (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Once the above was (initially) completed researcher was able to return to the 
literature and compare findings and search for agreement, contradictions and 
validation. Creating links to the literature to confirm and/or contradict his 
findings provided an important way for raising theoretical levels and drawing 
valid conclusions from the research (Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with Johnson et 
al. 's (2007) recommendations about SasP studies, for example, the researcher 
contrasted findings in his descriptive narrative account of the use of strategy 
tools with the "'received view', i. e. with the normative accounts promulgated in 
practitioner sources and business school teaching" (p. 72). The researcher thus 
attempted to balance description with interpretation (Janesick, 1994) and 
analysed the data until he believed he reached a point of saturation (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
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4.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter explained and justified the research design, methods and analysis 
methods employed within the study. It argued that a qualitative and inductive 
approach was the most appropriate in order to identify the dimensions and 
variables associated with strategy tool use so that the research aims and 
objectives could best be accomplished. It also presented the specific research 
methods used during the operationalisation of the research. The collected 
empirical evidence is based on: 
" 35 documents analysed 
" 53 interviews conducted 
0 16 meetings and/or presentations observed 
The chapter also justified why a thematic analysis was an appropriate choice. The 
following chapter presents the findings for each of the three case studies based 
on the above research methods. 
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Chapter 5 Research Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the three case studies. Section 1.2 
presents the findings from BigCo, and sections 1.3 and 1.4 present the findings 
from MediumCo and SmailCo respectively. Within each section the background 
information for each firm and the specific strategic initiative is first introduced. 
Whittington (2006) has suggested that SasP research should focus on the 
interrelationship between practices, praxis and practitioners. As such, the 
findings about the practices (use of tools) are provided according to the strategy 
praxis (i. e. meetings, workshops) and according to the practitioners (i. e. 
interviewees) and in light of the organisational context given the role it is 
assumed to play in determining how tools are used (Johnson et al., 2007). 
5.2 Case 1: BigCo 
This section provides background information on BigCo, the strategic initiative 
studied, and findings related to the use of strategy tools during the initiative and 
more generally within the firm. 
5.2.1 Company and Project Background 
BigCo is headquartered In the United States where the vast majority of its more 
than 2000 hotels are located. It is one of the world's largest hotel companies In 
terms of number of rooms, properties, revenue, and market capitalisation'. Its 
portfolio of owned, managed and franchised hotels currently is distributed across 
more than a dozen brands, ranging from the luxury to the economy segments, in 
nearly 100 countries. Although the company has, at times, diversified into 
related hospitality industry businesses, such as contract catering, restaurants and 
senior living, it has over the past 20 years shed its non-lodging businesses. Like 
many of its competitors, BigCo has recently divested itself of most of its owned 
properties and has focused instead on managing and franchising hotels. In the 
3 Due to confidentiality agreements, the author has been required to not present fully accurate numbers and details 
about each organisation. The figures and information presented, however, are accurate enough to present each 
company's situation and particularities as close as possible and thus do not affect their overall presentation. 
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words of its SVP-IR 4, because the company is publicly traded, "The (Wall) Street 
rewards us for not being in the real estate business and for only focusing on 
running hotels. " 
Beginning in the spring of 2006 BigCo initiated several projects aimed at 
identifying and developing strategic initiatives to exponentially expand the 
number of affiliated hotels so as to meet its promise to Investors of double-digit 
earnings growth. With thousands of hotels in the United States, but only a few 
hundred Internationally, the company's top management determined that its 
current international development plan was not producing the expected and 
necessary growth. This was especially troublesome as an ever Increasing 
percentage of BigCo's expansion would need to come from International areas, 
including Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), if it was to maintain its 
recent historical growth levels (EVP-D; CFO). 
To revise its European growth strategy, BigCo Initiated an internal project called 
the European Strategy Project (ESP)5. The project was meant to produce specific 
action plans for increasing the company's market share and growth rate In Europe 
(SVP-BI; ESP Workplan), and its formal objectives were to: 
" examine the company's current status In Europe 
" review Its current action plans for the region 
" study the European hotel market and macro-environmental situation 
" determine the firm's opportunities In Europe 
" develop an action plan for expanding In Europe (ESP Workplan) 
The project managers (PM) and chairperson agreed that based on previous 
experience it would be hard to organise and execute the work if the core team 
was composed primarily of `seconds In command' or their delegates. Instead, 
they needed to have "thought leaders and change agents" (SVP-BI) working on 
the project in the same room. The project's members and their roles are 
identified in Table 5-1. 
Please see Table 4-10 for the explanation of each title's abbreviation. 
s The project was later renamed 'European Development Strategy (EDS)" to 'reflect (the) modified focus on growth 
and development action plans for the European Region" (ESP September 12 Recap of ESP September 5"' meeting). 
For the sake of simplicity, the project will continue to be referred to as ESP throughout the study. 
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Table 5-1 ESP Members and Roles 
Project Members' Titles of Function/ Responsibility 
Roles Project 
Members 
Sponsors CFO; Mandated project for their use in `decision-making discussions' 
COO; with company Chairman and, perhaps, BOD 
EVP2-D 
Chairperson EVP-D Responsibility to oversee project and deliver study to sponsors 
Managers SVP-BI Responsible for determining and overseeing the specific 
D-BI processes and practices used during the project 
Team Members 19 members Intentionally created as cross-functional team of department 
from 7 heads and `change agents' to represent diverse views and 
departments improve later execution of strategy that would affect most 
company areas (SVP-BI). 
Rather than have weekly meetings, which would likely never achieve a full 
turnout due to the number of people needed to represent the different 
departments, their geographic dispersion and their `day job' workloads, they 
planned a few full-day meetings and several shorter `virtual meetings' using 
teleconference technology. Please see Table 5-2 for a synthesis of each stage of 
the project as identified through documents, interviews and observations of 
presentations about the firm's international growth strategy. 
134 
a) 
c 
a) 
E 
F 
a 
CL 
U) 
w 
N 
N 
72 
F- 
c° Tit wm 
m 
'^ va 
öö -a i - DCO. 
£° c ýý ° 
it s EmE 
cu r- 12 99-° 
°U) rnaci °i i-oo 
du 
u CL 9) cn L .. C 
N 
(L) NL in L 
W 73 L s+ ÜE 
N 'O + vl x 
C- 
O lL 
O OOv 
a° " 10 ,., ýo 
7 . i ua> aý v 
N +' U E 
4- o 
E tn 0- (A 0 O v C 
41 mc >` N 
W 
Ö r0 3 ýO 'O w dp - E E 
92 
NE7CCC 
t 
m 6) (U 
OO CO CN 10 u- m Ev W -0 O `° 41 ° a ä C 
UI 
O 
- L 
v° 
O Q 
= 
, o ýn 2cu s, vc mc u 0) q) 
C 
j+ m m 
nö öv O 
O 
F' 
O0CC 
-O y0, ß OLL a. + 
WCLC 
4-.. 
NO 10 
y 
aL-" 
_ Cl. W " ö o v, yCC L U) Oä ýp 
p 
oo O m E .2 °ß0 `E ý 0 Cö v 
> w° W 
ä0E_. U) viü u Em EE -96 )1NC>> o G. 
CW 
>" 
O 
°LLÖOO 
Z 3. o,., a.. 3 Z ýo a 
7 
ýO 
O 
`ý 
>C 
0' u" ma _ ao" 
41 e ý. u 3 e ö 
O 
vgL t ö V Mate. oy+; 
%A 
Y 
p 
(° 
N-LC3OOO Ü 
.ÖC '°Nip- E ä O3 3 ýýu ýoýy 
c tnal 
f. c v) c 0vc CO 
;g0. 
- o, 
L °i" c am" °mcvoa° m c v> ° 
a) 
v y- 
v 
oý y3 '" °3 0 
VI 
2 E 
0. ON 
tu OO0E002 
O OE .O OO.. aOW i2 4' 
ECm 
Y w 3övc ýiE, °nä jr- ý°ý 
O 
O in c 
yC0 
a ý° "ö N 
m. vCv 
LcEm ý0 
0C = 
vi ý(4 
ýp Ev 
> +. uEc, 2ty Em'°^ «a ° fCv 
a +. = (n - 
0(u gmm-. u=c r: ýa aC m° E0 2' E wä3,, r. - 
(n 
C 
o, 
yo 
COhO NC 
M W: 
ya 
m0 W .Cj 
Yl 
ar 
LM> 4) Cj 
+ý c0 
"O^ C1 
O1 7 
Cc in a >CO v° 
yC 
R0aCi> 
x 
U d3W 
U) 
O7N UI 
Cn 
< °; (p c "äY sv- °E (0U) 
e VI 0C ION 
,-amo, (U 
c oC aaý3 ýr 
?"c 
(+ 10 En0v ma Ea 
O ýo Lug .n°oo c+ý^c c cv Om vro C w .-w w` c 
0 
rc 
ü- . r- cö 
19 NMOEb `/ 
O 
<ßO of y0. ß N O- 
L 
O CC 
._ °> d Qi E°>o O 
y 
c O1M v 
c- vo a n 
.ö 
0 
mM WL. 
_ o o c10 mm (4 üý av 
O v10ýn .a > IL, 
Vuöääy0.0ä0Q, 
E o c° 
M r- 
o0E äv Ov-0 ý Vcv ä 
'-°' E ° 
Va uiEwwlO(mw'mE 
+°ö ýE 
OLL" "- 20 O 
i0 Uc 
d 
10 C jLC 
0) 
C 
{A 
l 
+' y °ýcY v 
N OO 
VVL. 0 N U 
iLfäJ: y E 
s + 9) O 
c Eý: 
0 t 
ö ö 
N 
N 
I- rÖ da 
vT 
v= LA 
.0w 
Nd 
NC 
>C 
NW 
YE 
0 
c 
Ny 
Ya 
w 
wu 
Ly 
yL 
0y 00 
W 
a3 
d> 
p 
ým 
ON 
c 
N 
n 
Ny 
pw 
Olý 
CO 
4! n 
ýN 
Ev 
NE LO 
H Vl 
.on 
M 
r-I 
T 
2 s: M 
Va 
C 
> 
7 m 
0 
OC O 
Z 
Z 
. j2 G) u c 0y 
0 
v v O vE C O ö :3 V) 
c ' O u + 
c 
vY 
0 
ý 
uý i 
y 
C 
v 
7 
c ä 
a) -be 
ý 
E ` Ear v ýo Eß O- E 3 
o 
.. m m 
v r- c 
+'' c 
C 
. 
u 
-0 ` C1 
.O L c 
3u uý-. p, jaý 
o tö c 
0G 
äo 
w 
3 
yo 
`y L i ýo v. (0ä rn> a `v WX 
3C LOO vl 7 > >. 
ß y C 
L 
++ ' 1p 
3 > C) Ea i EE 
ö 
.J 
`. äa i E c 
äü 
b is ° 
a ° xv 
7 1`C 
vo 
u O ! %1 
Z 
Ea NO E °O 95 a CEE °J 7 vda O 
w v m, r U UE iL as m Zo 
CN 
Y v 
W 
> 
E 
E 
v 
a. D OC y (M: 2 m0 
C 
11)iä 
rya ° Q) CL, Ein a>tu U)`3 E Z > 
E 3Eoö u. 
D (V (O 
0 O >. -v 
c 
0 (n u O 
'j il 
Y 
yam' 
}' N "ý 
2 a) m c to OOCC 
n 
Z 
(U 0 oo 
E _ Zý ä cm y 3(9 CD. 
U "V) 0 0 Ln wy 
(Z U)0p-m Eömow 
c 
tuO 
y 0) e 
In E 
u 
:3 ° 
'O pý 
Öo 
(n v 
ýý 
cc c 
ol 
p 
EY 3 . ý ' ° ! 
jc 
E0 7EO° 2 d - ZoE u 
w. Üv 
41 
0) 
0v o a 
vOi 
3 0C! Z 
Q' a 10 aE )n 
O 
a W°. 
< .C ai c 
>0m Ci Q. 
ä 
rn v c C y y 
° 
C ýA pi 
r_ A 0 r- 
to 
_v a 0 M' 
Oö Id E 
0, 
°n 
n ýw 
E 
m 3r me 
v c) 
'0a 
'^ 
o vö 
° w c E . 
ö 
uý 
3 
o - 
r_ In - - oEm 
4) >' 
Zr_ 
tu (4 cm °M 
° E 
(L) Yaci 
ý '0 
cn (M CZ m° M- ä M Eo ö v 
t . "rn m C» cY> E ä "a 
.2 iv 
M 0 o, 
E m y (0 c m Q) -0 0 
0 Gi U) V C Lý C O= y % C 
4 2 
y 
y ýF W C 
O VI y iJ Q y C 
U) ` 
y7d 
y 
Cä w1 
0% 
u Ecw 
O 
r'°2° o vt E y C)° ä E 
° 
0 O O. 
ö 
tO ENa .. " e', 
° 
c 
E E. n° 
aW n "oý 
v E 
° 
UC C 
c, ý? c 
u(o m 
wM ým 
y+ +ý 
ýy E °C cc u °ný ý ä mE m ö 
üö 
0, ' 
O= 0 M 
ý m ;5 ;6 
m 
Dr 01 Qc 3 -ffi 
Eö 
ý = w 
2E E'er 
>c a) 
ö ý EE tu o 
'- WJ E !O O 
i0 
. - 
1 
uwO 
(4 ß da m ++ G) 
Ey 
G) 10 E ý f 
Ca 
mi _ 0.12ý: Ö in """" O'0 
>. 
U) Uda a 
u ei 0 c' G0 Vw U' G 
O av I rn Eo, Eo, C) V c c mc 
v N i 2y ý"" O 'C C 
iv f W c E° 3 E °1 rýý 
°' 
ý 
v° c 
v a .. f ýo 
o 
ö o+ ¢ . 
o 
N 0 E N 
v 
.0 
w 
4 
oto (U is 
0 
0 E WO c 
Z 
co 
N n 
ao 
0 0 CD ý + V)N z 
M 
A procedural and practical challenge for the ESP PMs was that BigCo does not 
have an established, formal or deliberate process for working on strategy-related 
projects ever since the Chairman/CEO eliminated (for the second time) the firm's 
centralised Strategy Department and instead made functional executive vice- 
presidents responsible for their departmental strategies. This led to many 
planning challenges within the firm and for projects like the ESP since "there are 
some strongly different opinions throughout the company about how we should 
do this kind of strategy work" (SVP-M). For example, while he acknowledged his 
support for the Chairman, the CFO also believed that within the top management 
team: 
We're schizophrenic, because there are other folks here in the 
company who would say we really need to be deliberate about 
having strategic thought, and having strategic plans, and go 
through strategic exercises. 
External consultants were not contracted for any strategic analysis since the 
company had had many negative experiences with external strategy consultants, 
and within BigCo these firms and their tools had: 
A bad reputation from a lot of the 70's and 80's McKinsey kind 
of engagements that were all these, you know, big pie-in-the- 
sky stuff, and that didn't ultimately resonate with operations 
(SVP-BI). 
The SVP-BI described the overall ESP process as: 
Basic and classic strategy development ... We start 
broadly with 
what we think the market conditions are, and sort of the 
environmental situation. `What's the opportunity? ' and then 
`what's BigCo's opportunity within that? ' ... to `okay, what are 
the obstacles' and' what's it going to take to succeed', and then 
following that up with a punch line of `now, show us the 
financial projection', and then `how are you going to actually 
achieve those results? ' But I don't think it's - it's nothing 
magic. It's just a style of order, if you want, that we're used to 
looking at things in. 
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5.2.2 The Role of Strategy Tools during the ESP 
This section discusses the role of tools outside of official meetings, then during 
such meetings and then as a communication tool for the ESP as these are 
different aspects of the strategy praxis. 
Outside of Meetings 
In between meetings the PM tried, whenever possible, to work directly with the 
team members and not their direct reports. 
Some people really couldn't get started until (we) created 
frameworks - fairly straightforward strategy frameworks and 
matrices - for them to either fill out or pass onto others in their 
areas to fill out, and then we kind of pull them back together 
and massage (the results) as a group ... We kind of worked 
around people's operating styles, (SVP-BI). 
The D-BI referred to the tools used during the ESP as "formal recording and 
analytical tools" Intended to help the team members "frame their thinking and 
exploration and data collection efforts ... completely a means of organising 
people's thoughts and works". The need for these frameworks was especially 
important to the PM given the amount of information, the number of persons 
involved in the project, and the variety of departments they represented: 
I needed to have (these) frameworks, because how could I 
possibly communicate to all these people what information I 
needed and how can they put it in the context of the overall 
project unless we have that kind of structure? (SVP-BI). 
The frameworks were generally used by the PM or their direct reports who met 
individually with the team members to gather their information and explore their 
views since the latter preferred talking to writing and they did not like to fill In 
boxes since there was not "an interest in being dragged through the mud about 
it. These people would rather be interviewed" (SVP-BI). The process was 
described more fully as follows: 
What I do is just get them when they have a few minutes and 
interview them and then later fill out the template according to 
what they said ... 
(or they) would give me a call, or send me 
an email, with their thoughts and then I'd transfer them to the 
framework as best I could (D-BI). 
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While these. templates concerned very specific issues, such as the competition, 
brand strength and different business model questions, the PM kept them rather 
"open" in terms of specific criteria and "sub questions" as they strongly believed 
in not using: 
A canned framework, because then it's just too restrictive ... if 
you want people to talk ... and you want them to think out of the box, or discuss what's really on their minds. So, if you say, 
ok, we're going to get to that when we talk about, you know, I 
don't know, positioning. And then they're like, stifled ... It's better to just let people talk ... and how they want to (D-BI). 
The purpose of using these kinds of "open but specific" tools at this point was 
so that: 
We could draw inferences from a broad range of data, but yet 
be very specific about what that means for specific brands and 
properties over there (Europe). So the templates were 
organising, but yet not so directive that it limited creative 
thought (SVP-BI). 
The PM and their direct reports then synthesised the different templates into a 
single-page version that "best represented the different data and (team 
members') views" (D-BI) while addressing the key project objectives. The PM 
also left specific boxes empty when they did not believe there to be a dominant 
view on any topic or where large differences of opinion existed. Condensing the 
information without losing the different meanings or opinions was not an easy 
task: 
It was clear that there were a lot of different opinions and 
information ... some of them thought there was a 
lot of 
opportunity with certain brands and others completely 
disagreed ... The thing is, and maybe this won't seem so 
strange, was that none of this came up in the meetings we held 
(D-BI). 
During Meetings 
The PM had considered spending the first meeting(s) comparing the team 
members' views on the organisation's current status. The tool they sometimes 
use for this is similar to a SWOT analysis but one that breaks down the different 
SWOT elements into smaller more precise categories related to the company's 
particularities. "This is one (tool) that (names of certain EVPs) like, especially 
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when they don't know the current situation" (SVP-BI). However, they rejected 
this idea because: 
Our experience has been, especially in major projects, if you 
use all your energy on defining current states, at the end of 
three months, you know, basically everybody's sick of the 
project, or they're like, great, we know how it operates (SVP- 
BI). 
Instead, they structured meeting discussions around the tools but without having 
people explicitly filling in boxes (such as with flip charts) as this helped them to 
ensure that everyone was talking about the same issues without taking as much 
time. The PM's assistant took notes and the ideas were later put into a table 
since: 
It's helpful to sort of just let people talk about what they view 
the strategy as ... And then to put it in a framework, 
bring it 
back to them and play it back to them. Then they can say, 
well, `no, that's not what I want at all' or `wow, you're right, we 
didn't think about this' (D-BI). 
This was seen as particularly important with the ESP since the project was highly 
cross-functional, involved people from various hierarchical levels, and because 
the meetings usually had a large number of participants. Without these tools as a 
structuring device they often found that discussion go off in many directions with 
certain individuals dominating the meeting and taking the conversation in 
directions that they want. 
The D-BI agreed that by structuring the discussions around what was in the 
frameworks, she: 
Got a lot of clarifications from people, especially when I 
facilitated the larger meetings and you say, okay, well, here's 
how we are today ... here's what is going on around us, and 
you actually see a lot of faces go, oh, really? And through that 
process, I was able to help them set a better future direction 
because they were on the same page. 
By sending them the completed frameworks and templates ahead of meetings, 
the PM intended to give the team members the opportunity to review the work 
that had already been done so that when they came together at the work session 
they could: 
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As a participant, jump in quickly and react to work that's been 
done by others by seeing how the work was done and how it 
was organised. And ... to then react to the content in a way that's parsible [sic]" (SVP-BI). 
Some of the team members confirmed this benefit, as for them it was because of 
the tools that the information could be put "into a format and circulated amongst 
all the various constituents internally to begin the discussion on what it is that we 
(were) going to initiate (SVP-O). For the PM, this use of the tools "really helped ... 
organise and prepare for the discussions that we had and as a result our 
discussions were much richer and organised and frankly, didn't take on too many 
tangents" (SVP-BI). 
One of the senior management members on the team noted that during his time 
at the company he had realised that "If you're going to do something that gets 
people from across functional areas to focus on something that's not their daily 
job, you have to have tools ... to have a regular communication" 
(SVP-D). 
Similarly, others thought that tools were important since they helped the different 
team members to work together. The tools "(gave us) a foundation to say, "ok, 
but why are you doing that' ... a 
foundation for having dialogue about what's 
being done and are we really all working in alignment? " (SVP-M). 
Similarly, the use of completed templates was said to be useful in focusing 
dialogues with the senior management on strategic rather than just financial 
issues. According to the SVP-IR: 
It's a way of getting management to think about the future and 
where we're going ... to get management focused on what 
matters ... Management 
has a tendency to run the numbers 
rather than think about strategy and to run to things that are 
easy to fix, rather than things that are hard to fix. 
After the team members had read the final document that was over 200 pages 
long and contained dozens of appendices, the team members gathered to discuss 
the final conclusions they had drawn. Here the conversation focused primarily on 
what was conveyed in the tools. According to the VP-F: 
We have a lot of stuff in this binder, yet most (of) the 
discussion in the meeting was on these couple pages ... So the fact that we spent a bunch of hours on a couple of fairly simple 
looking matrices tells you something, and it really, I think, did 
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a very good job of helping communicate and align people's 
perspective. 
For the project manager, the tools, while useful in many ways, were not really 
used or intended to lead to specific decisions in and of themselves. "We never 
really presented the work in any framework and said `ok, this is what it means we 
should do"' (SVP-BI). Her colleague affirmed this. "I wouldn't say we used the 
tools for much analytical purpose (D-BI). 
Communication of the ESP 
For many of the staff members and directors, as well as some vice-presidents, 
using the tools helped individuals to prepare for presentations to the BOD by 
helping them to anticipate tough questions and provide supporting evidence for 
when that was requested. Although no presentations to the BOD contained 
evidence of the tools, interviewees said that visual templates were used to 
prepare for the presentations so that they person presenting could "walk in with a 
lot of back pocket items, in case they (the board) want to delve into a certain 
area" (D-BI). 
While a review of the ESP report confirms that the document contains various 
filled-in templates as appendices, most interviewees agreed that this report was 
never read by anyone and that only a few copies were printed and bound. 
Instead, the 5-page executive report, without these appendices, was more widely 
circulated since there was little interest in spending time reading the entire 
document. The larger document was, however "there if we need it ... if someone 
wants to see the evidence" (EVP-D). 
5.2.3 Organisational Context and Tool Use 
This section first discusses the use of tools according to the type of practitioner. 
This Includes discussions based on different groups of individuals depending on 
their horizontal and hierarchical categorisation and individual backgrounds. It 
then discusses tool use in light of leadership, organisational culture, ownership 
structure and the perception of the Industry. 
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Practitioners 
Departmental Differences 
While some interviewees acknowledged that tools had been used during the ESP, 
most did not. Similarly, many interviewees stated that conceptual tools were not 
regularly used in their departments. Within other specific departments, however, 
interviewees confirmed that such tools were used (i. e. Marketing, Ecommerce, 
and Customer Relationship Marketing). They are comfortable working with such 
tools as efficient means for gathering and thinking about the different criteria and 
ideas related to the questions they must answer. In Marketing, for example, 
various tools are used to segment the market and position the brands. "(These) 
frameworks are not overly restrictive, so there's still plenty of room, even when 
you have the frameworks. There was still a lot of room for discussion" (SVP-M). 
Tools here are seen as part of the "normal operating procedure" (EVP-M). 
Other departments (i. e. Finance, Development) are more numbers oriented and 
their work is less conceptual by nature and thus they did not rely as much on the 
matrices and frameworks provided by the PM, nor do they use such tools during 
their other activities. According to the VP-D: "I don't think that the key people in 
my area of the organisation consider that those sort of tools hold much merit in 
getting to a particular answer or conclusion. " For them, answers are dependent 
on the numbers associated with an initiative and not the conceptual aspects. "(It 
is) very much incumbent on discreet functions to determine whether there's an 
applicability and appetite (for formal strategic planning tools)" (SVP-F). The 
Development Department also used many tools but these were primarily 
"financial tools for evaluating the returns we could expect and for evaluating the 
investments we might be asked to make by owners ... not what you'd call 
'strategy tools' I'd say" (EVP3-D). 
Certain functional areas also created their own tools, or modified existing ones 
(i. e. Brand Management, Marketing, Customer Relationship Strategy). For 
example, within Marketing the team had created a 'Business Profile Framework'8 
which is used to gather and analyse information on competitor products and 
services and which has a team of 3 persons responsible for inputting and 
analysing the information. While results are shared throughout the organisation, 
° As this tool Is considered highly unique the researcher agreed to disguise Its name and not provide extensive 
details. 
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the tool remains largely within the control of only a few persons. Similarly, the 
Customer Relationship Strategy and E-commerce departments have 
departmental tools they use internally to visualise their process interfaces with 
customers and across departments, but these are not shared across the firm 
since "no one needs to know the details" (VP-M). However, while certain 
departments create their own tools, this is not true for most areas. "I don't think 
you're seeing all the functional areas coming up with their own qualitative tools. 
People aren't re-engineering them ... throughout the entire organisation" (VP2-F). 
While functional executive vice-presidents were supposed to set their 
departmental goals, the BI Department was created to help develop and execute 
these goals by "leading and organising and coordinating and establishing a 
framework for which the strategy is developed at the company" (SVP-BI). They 
considered themselves the "arms and legs" of top management who, because 
they are too busy with their "day jobs" require help when there is a "change of 
management, a new product or new thing they need to think about" (D-BI). As a 
department designated to help people establish goals and manage projects, they 
relied more heavily on tools for "helping the others to apply structure to the 
project through a set of analytical consulting skills" (SVP-BI). 
Individual Backgrounds 
The PMs recognise that their decision to use certain analytical tools resulted, in 
part, from their own interest and familiarity in them due to their educational and 
work backgrounds. "We absolutely used some of the BCG and the McKinsey stuff, 
because, frankly, that's where we all came from" (SVP-BI). Her assistant put It as 
follows: "I have an MBA, so I love frameworks, and I love to do cool looking 
pictures to represent ideas and paths" (D-BI). They explained that many of their 
superiors did not have the same kind of backgrounds but instead had worked 
their way up the industry from operations backgrounds, or had non-business 
degrees "and so they aren't as comfortable with these tools and techniques ... it 
probably explains their general reluctance to engage with them" (SVP-BI). 
Similarly, to use them correctly and comfortably it was thought that: 
You have to be able to be an abstract thinker ... and then bring it down to what you're doing, some people just aren't ... people 
who are more technical are not as able to do that, so you really 
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need to sort of hit them over the head ... they don't want to see 
a matrix because they're not going to grasp it (D-BI). 
Others also attributed affection for tools to the background of the persons 
working in and/or responsible for the departments. For them, it was because 
people within certain functional disciplines "have probably come up through their 
career using (certain) tools ... maybe that leads to the fact that it's the certain 
individuals within those functions, different skill sets, use them more regularly" 
(VP-D). 
Most interviewees agreed that the Executive Council and Board members would 
not expect or accept to see a conceptual explanation for the decisions the team 
had made, and this, they said, was partly due to their backgrounds. According to 
the SVP-BI: 
Our leaders, for the most part, either came up through 
operations or through their functional areas ... 
development, 
accounting, litigation, operations ... they're not ex-MBA types, Harvard professors. That's not (what) they want to see. 
Some saw this lack of familiarity and ability to use tools as a drawback for their 
departments and had taken action in this regard. One had recently hired some 
people who were "generally BCG kinds of background folks" (SVP-FPA) In order to 
facilitate a synthesis between the numbers and the strategic concepts that she 
thought should be driving forward projections. The SVP-M also hired people from 
outside the hotel industry as they brought with them different ideas and tools. 
Subordinates 
During the ESP, the PM generally worked with the team members' direct reports 
(lower-level associates) in order to compile and process the information in the 
different templates even though the task had been assigned to the higher-level 
managers. Most team members who were responsible for their department's 
representation on the team and therefore for their information "simply forwarded 
those (frameworks) to many other people within their operations and said, "Tell 
me about what these mean for you"' (SVP-BI). Others, especially those at the 
highest level, were known to have their executive assistants forward such 
requests for Information, sight unseen, directly on to their staff level employees. 
Her belief that "they may not know that this (use of tools) Is going on" (D-BI) 
was confirmed by the higher-level managers who maintained that the specific 
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tools mentioned and identified through draft documents and other interviews 
were not used during the project. 
Outside of the formal meetings the PM interfaced with many of the team 
members' direct reports in order to gather and process the information needed 
for the different frameworks. Relying on the staff level to work with the tools was 
also the norm at BigCo since the lower down in the organisation (director level 
and below), the more standardised was the work and more common the use of 
such tools. According to the SVP-BI, the staff level members "are totally into 
tools" and "at the staff level there's a huge amount of analysis going on with 
them ... it's part of the routine. " 
Working on the tool-related work with staff members was not, though, without its 
challenges. For one of the PM, when the work was particularly conceptual she 
had to acknowledge that she was "asking too much of this person ... and just kick 
it up to the next level" (D-BI). The PM often noticed that these employees 
withheld valuable information because they were concerned with sharing too 
much that was not valuable and being seen as unable to edit their information to 
provide only what was necessary for the project. Still, involving these staff 
members in the completion (filling in) of these frameworks was seen as a positive 
by some higher-level managers because as opposed to the heads of departments 
who are involved in the meetings, for example, "the people two and three levels 
down, they can then connect their work to the whole ... 
'I understand how my 
work drives and plays into the big picture"' (EVP-M). 
Some small and important modifications to the tools used at this stage came from 
these lower-level managers and professional staff members who would often: 
Say something like, 'hey, I wouldn't look at it like this ... I think it would be more important to look at it like that' so we add a 
column, so we add a box that's not filled out, so it's highly 
enabling to people to, first of all, communicate what work or 
data needs to be collected" (D-BI). 
Middle and Top Managers 
Passing the "first layer of analysis" on to subordinates was the common and 
accepted practice at BigCo during the ESP and other projects. The view was that 
individuals at the middle and top layers of corporate management (i. e. SVPs and 
EVPs) are not the people gathering the data and doing the analysis "since they're 
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not going to do a lot of homework" (SVP-BI), and so not the people generally 
using any tools for such purposes. 
In fact, most interviewees stated that the top management were not familiar at 
all with which tools were used in such projects as "they engage people who have 
the background and the tools and technologies to answer their questions, but 
they not may be that familiar with what they are using" (SVP-BI). The D-BI once 
presented some work done in a "2x2 BCG framework and months later, you 
know, they just said, `Hey, you know that grid you did. ' You know, so they don't 
really know what it Is. " She also points out that some top executives do not know 
that during the project (and other projects) the teams go through such a formal 
analytical process involving strategy tools. As such, she wonders "how do they 
think we got to the place we got then if not with these tools? " 
Board of Directors and Executive Team 
This view about the role and use of tools also extends to the firm's highest 
levels. According to the CFO, for example, there was never any thought about 
providing the BOD with the details about the analytical process the team went 
through or the frameworks and templates that had been used by the team, nor 
any justification for the choice of tools or explanation of their origins since "It just 
doesn't interest them, nor hold any relevance for them. " The very limited use of 
analytical models above a certain level was considered normal because it was not 
the job of these people to work with such tools since the issues they faced were 
less structured and because their experience allowed them to grasp issues 
without the use of tools, especially since the issues usually repeated themselves 
over the years. With the ESP not only much of the conclusions of the use of tools 
and early analysis that the team engaged in were never presented to the BOD 
since the top managers see many strategy projects and from many different 
departments and they do not want to have to spend time reviewing what they 
believe they already know: 
It's the same guys, going over the same thing year after year, 
they've started rolling their eyes because it is all academic ... (they say) `let's not validate what we know' (SVP-M). 
Past experience had also shown many of the SVPs who report to the Executive 
Team that there was little point of presenting their ideas or findings in conceptual 
frameworks since in the end their work is evaluated from a much more practical 
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business perspective and based primarily on financial projections and not 
conceptual reasoning. According to the EVP-F for example: 
If you were to go in there with a narrative description ... you'd 
get your lunch handed to you because they don't necessarily 
care about the words ... there are certain things they want to look at. Numbers. 
For his own presentations, including that related to the ESP, the EVP-M tells his 
team that prepares the presentations to: 
Take the jargon out. Take the agency speak out ... the strategy 
conversation, take that out. Put this in general business terms. 
Make the same points, but don't use all the terms that the 
consultants (are using). 
The ESP presentation was, like many others, based around bullet points rather 
than any matrices since as the project: 
Moves up the organisation (it) turns into some sort of summary 
just with bullet points (and) there is still an emphasis that 
lower down the chains detail analysis using the best tools has 
been done to come to these conclusions (EVP-M). 
A two page executive summary was prepared for the executive council and the 
chairperson's presentation was short as is often the case at BigCo, even for 
important initiatives, because for the senior executives "it better be in 20 pages 
or less and you better go fast because you have an hour and we're going to start 
asking questions in 15 minutes" (CFO). 
Owners, Operators and General Managers 
Often the resulting analysis gathered from tools are shared with owners and 
franchisees since they are often interested in what the company is doing and why 
BigCo thinks it is important, and thus the company is "constantly having to 
validate to our owners why we're doing one thing or another" (SVP-BI). The 
results of the brand segmentation tools that had been used In the ESP, for 
example, were shared with key owners and though "they may not get it in as 
much detail ... I think it definitely helps them move with us" (SVP-M). This was 
seen as being especially critical for BigCo as its stakeholders are largely third 
parties who own the real estate that BigCo manages, and the process of getting 
the company to move is unison is not simply a directive that BigCo can give. "It's 
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(about) selling the idea, the concept to third parties who need to come along with 
you in order to execute (because BigCo), on its own, cannot execute anything" 
(SVP-D). The EVP-M also confirmed that all third party owners are provided with 
analytical outcomes so that those that operate the hotels can also follow the 
decision-making down to their unit level. For him, it is about "communication and 
getting that world of people on board in terms of what we want to (accomplish) 
and what the implications are for their individual asset. " He emphasised that, 
however, he was often reluctant to share the tools that since the same owners 
also owned hotels that were affiliated with other companies. 
The SVP-O occasionally used basic tools (i. e. SWOT, positioning charts) when 
working with hotel GMs because he found them to generally be interested in what 
these tools conveyed. It also helped build relationships of trust since they felt 
they were being Included in the decision-making process even though often times 
it was more for validation than input. He also found that presentations built 
around the tools that he was able to share with people in the field were generally 
quite effective. The information in such tools, and their visually simple way of 
presenting the key issues, helped these constituents to understand what the 
implications were for individual properties. 
Similarly, the VP2-F used basic tools to gather information from the external 
communities of owners, and franchisee advisory councils, and also to feed back to 
them the company's decisions and rationales. The tools are primarily used only to 
convey decisions and information. However, they are also used, less often, to 
collect information from owners and operators, including their advisory councils. 
The owners "know that at least 10,15,20% of their time is going to be involved 
in helping us make the right decisions as to where our future units are" (VP2-F). 
Similarly, analytical techniques are used at GM meetings as a training element 
because it helps the corporate office to say to the hotelier "Let's start thinking 
about everything we do in this box in a whole new way" (SVP-M). 
Another significant use of the templates and their information is with the 
developers who sign up hotels to the system, either for franchising or 
management. Since a developer may represent a variety of the brands, and 
because each brand is going through periodic and important transformations, 
sharing the information helps them to: 
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Be informed and knowledgeable and to be able to convey a 
persuasive business case to a prospective owner in particular ... We have dozens and dozens of developers throughout the 
world and it's important that they're conveying the same 
message (VP2-F). 
Analysts 
Presentations and conversations with stock analysts often draw on the 
information communicated through the analytical tools, and the expectations 
were that this would also be the case with the ESP even if the tools themselves 
were not discussed or presented. For example: 
(These analysts) have certain conceptions about how they 
think that the company delivers value, and so they'll want to 
know how this (ESP outcomes) fits into our delivery of value ... 
and I can ... get a good explanation from looking at these (tools) in the appendices" (SVP-D). 
According to the SVP-FPA, the analysts are not "clamouring for information that 
would be communicated readily through these types of tools" and may even 
negatively see attempts to present critical strategic information through such 
tools if there is not a financial, numerical component to them. For the SVP-IR, 
whose job it is to communicate with these external analysts, the tools and the 
methodology behind them help her explain that "this is a company that has 
thought out the strategy and the process has shown us what the opportunity is 
and how we're going to get there. " Because she "get(s) asked all the time, what 
do you look at? " when it comes to what is behind the strategy, in her 
presentations she often summarises what she finds in these matrices but as she 
is never asked to explain the process or the specifics, she does not explicitly use 
them in formal communications. She pointed out, however, that were BigCo to 
stray from its current strategy, diversify, or venture in a direction that was new 
for the industry (rather than just for the firm), then she would get asked a lot of 
questions and likely be asked to demonstrate the rational through conceptual and 
data-heavy frameworks and models. 
Leadership 
Many interviewees stated that the firm did not rely on many standard strategy 
processes or tools because of the Chairman's views. According to one, the 
Chairman's "knee will sort of jerk when he sees `Strategy' written large with a big 
capital `S' (CFO). The common consensus was that for the chairman strategic 
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planning was "a distraction and big waste of time" (D-BI) since it was too often 
focused on formulation and not implementation, and this had been made clear to 
the organisation since twice over the past 15 years a centralised Strategy 
Department had been eliminated and many persons from this department had 
been made redundant; ever since "There's probably a bit of gun shyness about 
being known as the strategy person or people" (SVP-D). Many interviewees 
agreed that people within the firm tended to avoid using the word 'Strategy' and 
that while there was still a company strategy and strategies were formulated and 
implemented, "we don't call it strategic planning. It's almost a word that we don't 
like to say here" (SVP-F). 
The chairman's views were interpreted within the firm to explicitly extend to the 
role of conceptual strategy tools. For example, the chairman is said to "not 
attribute a high value to strategic planning and therefore the tools which are 
traditionally thought of as strategic planning tools" (SVP-F). Many respondents 
who had been at the firm before the elimination of the Strategy Department 
noted that they had not seen as many (or any) strategy tools being used over 
the past years ten years though further in the past these had been more popular. 
The consensus was that the elimination of the Strategy Department had led 
people and departments to infer that the formal use of strategy tools to 
formulate strategy was frowned upon. 
The EVP-M explained, however, that while terms `strategy' and `strategic 
planning' were not part of the company's language, this did not mean that the 
firm did not engage in such work: 
What we use brand management for is strategic planning really 
... other companies would say to me `oh, you're in strategic 
planning. ' But we call it brand management because (the 
chairman) doesn't want me to be just the ideas. 
Interestingly, during the latter part of researcher's field work within BigCo the 
Brand Management and Brand Marketing Departments were reorganised and a 
new, smaller Brand Strategy (BS) Department was configured and asked to play 
the "lead role" in shaping the future of each brand, with Brand Management 
tasked with Implementing these decisions in the field. 
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Organisational Culture 
The chairman's mandate that each functional executive vice-president "own the 
strategy for his department" and be "less theoretical and more athletic" (SVP, M) 
meant for many respondents that the company values action. "Similar 
organisations might value coming up with the great thing. This organisation 
values implementing the great thing" (VP2-M). The department heads were told 
by the chairman to focus on specific deliverables rather than broader issues, and 
thus emphasised that people in their areas were supposed to focus on 
implementing Ideas rather than coming up with them, and thus there was not 
much use of tools since "People here want to be seen as executors, and they 
don't want to be seen as'temp! atisers [sic]" (VP-M). That is, the tools were often 
associated with idea generation and this was not the behaviour that was valued 
or rewarded in general. When the SVP-F who had been recruited a few years 
back "with a mandate to challenge conventional thinking" suggested that the firm 
change the planning process to include more formal procedures and tools to 
synthesise strategic and financial concepts, "the people just gagged. Gagged! 
And not only that, almost said `What the hell are you thinking? We don't do that 
here. "' 
When tools were used they were often not called this or recognised as such. For 
example, the PM confirmed that they didn't refer to the environmental scanning 
frameworks they used during the early stages of the ESP as a PEST analyses. "I 
don't think we name things a lot. I think we have an aversion to it" (SVP-BI). 
For them, providing a name or rationale for using the tool and technique would 
not have added any credibility since "We've gotten past the point where we need 
to justify the way we do things ... people just accept that we know what we are 
doing and trust us" (SVP-BI). Most ESP team members did not acknowledge that 
a specific tool had been used when gathering the relevant macro-environmental 
information even though a PEST framework had been used to structure the data 
collection and presentation, evidence of the latter available in the final ESP 
report. For them this was just a "common sense approach to identifying what was 
relevant information. " 
Due to the aversion of the academic connotations of using tools, certain 
respondents explained that the tools and techniques they used and had learned in 
business school were often times `disguised' and no reference to a tool's 
academic background was made. Instead, academic tools were used but it was 
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understandable that many co-workers would not recognise them since the 
academic context was removed and only the business implications that emerged 
from the tools was used in formal reports or presentations. 
In order to implement tools (e. g. PEST, SWOT, value chain), or parts of these 
tools, it was extremely important for the PM to find a way to "make the academic 
practical" (SVP-BI) as, within BigCo there is little acceptance of or value placed on 
the purely academic or theoretical. Instead, when the strategy tools thought to 
be academic ones were used they were often placed in the background of a more 
practical and numerical analysis. For example: 
I needed to validate my academic framework with business, 
real business metrics, when working on the strategy by putting 
together a business case ... If I were to come in and say ... 
you've got to build all these hotels in (a certain country), and 
here's a SWOT analysis of why. And I don't come in and talk to 
him about the economies of each country and what kind of pro- 
formas we could be bringing in each of these countries, then he 
is just going to laugh in my face (D-BI). 
The top managers (EVP and above) believe that while BigCo does not explicitly 
value conceptual or analytical frameworks, or the idea of strategic planning, that 
it is still very strategic in that it conducts extensive amounts of formal analysis. 
The ESP was, from the start, expected to rely very heavily on formal data analysis 
since at BigCo "We just don't go out on instinct" (SVP-IR). This was not unique 
to the project since BigCo has a "very healthy appetite for information" (SVP-BI) 
and is "totally data driven" (SVP-M), since "the chairman is just maniacal about 
numbers and obsessed with figures and data and evidence" (SVP-IR). 
Ownership-Management Structure 
According to many Interviewees, it was BigCo's relationship with property owners 
and franchisees that meant certain well-known tools were not applicable since 
these tools necessitated certain assumptions about the organisation or Industry. 
For example, referring to the BCG Matrix: 
Because we work with owner partners, and we have a fiduciary 
responsibility to our owners to help them maximise their return 
on their assets that we manage, it just isn't viable for us to be 
thinking about a certain brand as being a brand that we're 
cashing out on ... If we owned (all of) them, I think we would have more freedom to look at it differently (SVP-M). 
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Perception of Industry 
Generic strategy tools were rejected for an analysis of the brands in Europe since 
in the past the Brand Management team had not found these tools to be 
applicable or particularly useful since there was a "huge difference" between the 
"complex and multi-faceted"" hotel industry and the "packaged goods" industry 
which was thought to be the basis for most tools (EVP-M). For them, these tools 
did not apply to the lodging industry, and not just BigCo, because of the well- 
known particularities of the hotel and service sectors such as manufacturing 
service in front of guests, doing so with the lowest paid employees, and doing so 
globally at thousands of points of contact. For them this meant that: 
The theories don't apply ... there's something fundamentally different about what it is we sell and how we compete, which ... 
suggest to me that we would think about our products, what 
we sell in different ways and would use different tools just for 
that reason alone ... That alone suggests that we would have to have different frameworks and different approaches to how we 
think about our business strategy (SVP-M). 
The industry' differences were also used to explain why specific generic tools like 
the BCG growth-share matrix were not used to evaluate which of the brands the 
company was considering eliminating as part of the ESP recommendations. 
Unlike with product portfolios for which consumer goods firms can introduce and 
eliminate brands quite easily, this was thought to not be possible in the hotel 
industry because here the brands were tied to hard assets. 
When a lot of your equity is tied to specific locations and hard 
physical assets that are going to be there, in many cases for 
hundreds of years, I think there's something that adds another 
dimension that's quite different than when you're working with 
packaged goods (SVP-M). 
The firm's respondents also noted that within the industry most competitors were 
using the tools that they had been taught in schools, which were based on 
packaged goods, since there were not any hotel-specific tools. The existing 
frameworks for Industry segmentation, for example, were described as "very 
rudimentary" as they focused primarily on price points and Industry standard 
terms such as luxury and full-service, and: 
That is a joke. That has nothing to do with segmentation... we 
find that segmentation has many horizontal opportunities. At 
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the same price and for the same demographic customer, there 
are three different types of travellers, or four or five (EVP-M). 
As a result of these differences and lack of industry-specific tools, BigCo had 
spent considerable resources to create what it considered a unique way of 
looking at segmentation. These views, and studies, resulted in a set of 
frameworks for segmenting the markets that he believed to be unique in the 
industry and which have been "of immeasurable value" to the firm in projects 
such as ESP where understanding customers and less-well known competitors In 
foreign markets was essential. 
Much of the need to change and regularly update tools was associated with the 
fact that the hotel industry is perceived as being too dynamic for static models. 
"Our industry is in a state of change. There's so much change going on that if we 
were constantly bound by the same ones (the tools) I think we would be doing 
ourselves a disservice" (SVP-M). 
While many in the brand management and business Intelligence areas relied on 
their own tools, and thought that tools from outside the industry were not as 
applicable, others on the ESP team disagreed about the industry's differences 
and the implications for the use of strategy tools. 
The lodging industry thinks that it's something special and 
different from other industries, so perhaps tools that, let's say, 
a management consultant in the telecom industry uses, we in 
the lodging industry think that they're not relevant because 
they're being used for other industries, and that we're different 
and we're special - which isn't actually the case (VP-D). 
5.2.4 BigCo Case Summary 
The findings from this case study suggest that strategy tools are often rejected by 
the higher levels of management. At the same time, however, lower-level 
managers use strategy tools as part of their regular strategising activities. 
Similarly, while tools are not used in certain departments they are part of the 
normal strategising practices in other areas of the company. 
The findings with regards to MediumCo are presented in this next section. 
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5.3 Case 2: MediumCo 
This section provides background information on MediumCo, the strategic 
initiative studied, and findings related to the use of strategy tools during the 
initiative and more generally within the firm. 
5.3.1 Company and Project Background 
MediumCo, one of Europe' oldest hotel companies, is best known for its five-star 
hotel brand (LUX). Over the past several years MediumCo has grown its portfolio 
of hotels from less than 40 to almost 70. As of August 2008 it had approximately 
another two dozen signed management contracts for properties currently under 
development. MediumCo owns and leases only a few hotels and it does not 
franchise. Its primary business is the management of hotels on behalf of third- 
party owners. During its history MediumCo has had various investors and owners 
and was at one time a public company. In the 1990s it was purchased and 
privatised by its current owners, a foreign Investment entity (FIE) which also 
invests in different businesses unrelated to the hotel industry. 
In 2005, MediumCo's CEO informed his Executive Committee (EC) that he would 
halt Lux's expansion at 100 hotels but that he wanted the company to explore 
new growth and diversification strategies (DGS). Although the EC explored some 
possibilities, no DGS were identified through a formal study or committee. 
However, a joint venture (]V) with a private equity group (PEG) was established 
in order to develop and operate a new regional 5-star brand (REG)9. 
The IV did not result by spotting an opportunity through any analytical or formal 
study. According to the CEO for this IV (JVCEO), who was formerly in MediumCo's 
Marketing Department, "It absolutely did not come out of our own analysis or 
initiative ... We 
hadn't seen the opportunity ourselves but maybe we should have. " 
Instead the PEG approached MediumCo and proposed a IV to create REG that 
would cater to one market segment with very specific but unmet needs. For 
MediumCo the proposal was "opportunistic as it came out of nowhere and it was 
put to us on a silver platter" (JVCEO). 
9 In order to protect the anonymity of the firms the researcher cannot divulge more information about this company, 
brand or PEG. 
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The EC members were surprised that MediumCo's CEO considered entering into 
the IV since he had repeatedly said that he did not want to enter into such 
arrangements. For one EC member1° who had been with the company for 10 
years this was because the CEO's "gut instinct was we don't do joint ventures 
because there's risk associated. Why? Because he got burned in a couple of joint 
ventures before so now he's like `let's stay from joint ventures. "' 
5.3.2 The role of Strategy Tools during the DGS (]V-REG) 
This section discusses the role of tools outside of official meetings, then during 
such meetings and then as a communication tool for the ESP as these are 
different aspects of the strategy praxis. 
Outside of Meetings 
Before a two-day offsite strategy session during which the CEO announced his 
100-unit limit for Lux and his DGS aspirations, the PA prepared a document that 
listed the company's strengths and opportunities. The PA asserted that the list 
was arrived at without the use of any tool or analytical technique. Instead 
"(Name of CEO) told me what he thought they (strengths and opportunities) were 
and I wrote them down ... like an interview. " The CEO preferred to work 
in an 
informal fashion and did not include other people's opinions when he presented 
his view of the firm or industry. For example, even though he had known the 
CEO wanted to discuss certain topics about Lux's current and future hotels, he 
had rejected the idea of using any kind of tool or technique to collect the opinions 
or information from his team. Similarly, the CEO had told the PA to remove the 
two-by-two matrices he had made about the hotel industry's luxury segment as 
part of a PowerPoint presentation. According to the PA, "(Name of CEO) said he 
didn't want people to think inside the box but to be creative and think big picture 
instead ... he 
likes to keep things real and practical. " 
Several members of the EC had prepared some documents and presentations for 
the strategy session in accordance with a memo that they received which 
suggested that each would have the opportunity to present their own analysis of 
their department's strategy and how it fit into that of the company as a whole. 
'o Some respondents requested that their views and actions not be attributed to them in any way and as such the 
researcher Is In certain Instances unable to provide more Information about their position or department. 
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For example, the SVP-HR, who had only been at the company for a few months, 
had worked alone on a "sort of SWOT analysis" for the meeting since "They told 
us to come prepared to talk about the company and the future ... So I thought we 
had to prepare something. " 
During the strategy session the COO requested that two EC members begin to 
develop a `matrix' for comparing the hotels in their system so that the company 
could better evaluate which properties should be eliminated in accordance with 
the CEO's directive that for every three new properties added to the system, they 
should eliminate one less valuable hotel in order to Improve the brand's overall 
profile. These EC members later told the researcher that they felt that the matrix 
would not in fact be used to help eliminate hotels since as long as a management 
contract seemed profitable the CEO would not forgo its revenue and because, 
"strategically we still need to have the name out there in as many places as 
possible. " 
One interviewee who worked closely with the CEO also did not think that this 
matrix would ever be used to make decisions, though he did think that the CEO 
would eventually use it to evaluate the Development Department's work. He 
hinted that he doubted that the Development team would really want such a tool 
to exist. Others also did not think that the matrix was particularly strategic and 
were uncomfortable with the term 'tool'. Instead they referred to it as a grid or 
template, and often times as operational or developmental, but not as strategic. 
They suggested that for it to be strategic it would have to be linked to more 
questions about the company and the industry and would have to help them to 
make strategic decisions, and this was not the case. Instead they said that its 
primary purpose would be to help collect and condense information about the 
different hotels and contracts. Several months later in interviews several 
respondents could not remember that such a matrix had been suggested during 
the strategy session while those designated to work on it said they had submitted 
a draft to the COO but they then never received feedback on it and that the idea 
of dropping hotels from the system had not been pursued. 
The general consensus was that the CEO did not think that such tools were 
needed. From past experience they had seen such types of ideas to structure the 
firm's decision-making around concrete issues and criteria as never being fulfilled. 
When similar Ideas about applying tools and structured thinking to strategic issues 
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had been suggested, the CEO would "get all cynical and say `it's all bollocks. You 
can tell me whatever you want. I'm still going to make own mind up at the end"' 
(SVP-M). 
During Meetings/Workshops 
The two-day strategy session's stated purpose was to "understand the company 
and Its strategy and future" (SA email to researcher). The CEO Informed the 
researcher this was a particularly important event since he wanted to increase the 
involvement of the EC In setting the direction of the company's strategy by 
getting them to grow from a collection of individuals into a team that could work 
together on strategic Issues. Though there was no written agenda outlining the 
specific topics, the EC members had been told to come prepared to demonstrate 
how their specific departments' strategies fit into that of the company itself since 
the CEO "is determined that they begin to focus on the big picture rather than 
only on their departments" (SA email to EC). 
The CEO began the meeting by using a PowerPoint presentation (Presentation 1) 
to explain the company's history which focused primarily on the 10 years since he 
had assumed the CEO position, on the firm's current status, and LUX's then- 
current development strategy. " The CEO's explanations for why the company 
had encountered difficult times, and how it had survived, repeatedly made implicit 
references to the competition, macro-environmental forces, industry-specific 
challenges, and the company's own internal weaknesses, but these sections were 
not presented using technical terms or any tools, and the CEO and PA confirmed 
that none had been used to prepare the presentation. The company's position, for 
example, was stated, but it was not presented visually via a positioning chart. 
Similarly no tool was used to compare the competitors. According to the CEO, he 
was familiar enough with each firm and brand to not need notes or research and 
he expected his EC to be so as well. 
The CEO explained to the EC that when he took over the company it was near 
bankruptcy and "there was not time for strategy. " The owners had given him 
time, but not money, to turn the company around and so "I created my five year 
" Understandably over the two days many different topics were discussed but due to space limitations the 
researcher has not described many of these conversations. Instead he has selected those that he was able to follow 
up on with later Interviews, observations and documentation. None of the other topics demonstrated any use of 
strategy tools or were particularly revealing about the company's position regarding them. 
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plan. " He explained that because of its financial history and his strategic solution, 
MediumCo had had to grow quickly and as a result it had had to do so "chaotically 
and without order. " Now, he said, was the time to correct this situation and take 
the firm forward in "a more productive way. " 
The CEO asked the team to think about the question of "What business are we 
in? " Much of this conversation was spent debating the difference between the 
terms "5 star" and "luxury. " A key point that the CEO raised concerned the 
maximum number of hotels that could carry the name Lux without threatening its 
sense of luxury and uniqueness. He referred to several competitors and the 
number of hotels in their systems and development pipeline, and several EC 
members discussed that they believed these brands were no longer providing a 
sense of luxury. The CEO said that these brands had grown too big and then he 
announced that he had decided to "cap the number of hotels in our system at 
100. " There were no questions about how the CEO had arrived at this decision. 
The ensuing short discussion largely focused on some operational concerns and 
implications this decision might have. A few EC members and the CEO began to 
discuss the hotels that were currently in the system, including a sporadic review 
of which ones should be slowly removed for not meeting brand standards. Others 
offered their opinions about specific properties that they had visited. 
The CEO expressed his desire for the development team to "sign better deals" 
and there was quite a bit of discussion about what was meant by `better deals' 
and what constituted a `poor' deal. The EC members offered different opinions 
and the discussion spanned a variety of topics, such as how long the hotel had 
been branded by Lux, how big the hotel was, where it was located, and whether 
the owner made his management fee payments regularly and on time. The CEO 
ended this conversation by telling the SVP-D that he should switch from the 
former growth policy of signing `any deal' in order to generate volume to one of 
being more selective. The CEO then suggested that the development team 
should try to "drop poor hotels from the system in order to fix the portfolio's 
quality problem. " He stated that as the firm's objective was to reach and remain 
at 100 hotels, the development team should work to make sure that these were 
the best hotels it could possibly add to the system. He stated that the idea for 
the next few years was to sign 50 to 60 new management agreements and 
eliminate 20 to 30 current contracts ("up 3, down 1"). 
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At this point the SVP-M and SVP-D asked questions about the implications of the 
100-hotel limit and if this had been thought through carefully. The CEO explained 
that they would create a strategy for what to do at that point in time once they 
had reached that situation. He then added that they should strive for "30 resorts, 
60 business and 10 other. " The COO suggested that the development team create 
a "matrix" that that would, for each hotel, explain it's (a) fit with luxury concept, 
(b) relationship with owner, and (c) yield, and then decisions could be taken for 
each property based on that. The CEO accepted this idea and told the SVP-D and 
SVP-M to create this "tool. " "With this common understanding of our business 
concept, we can go forward and grow" (CEO). 
During discussions about other growth vehicles, such as spas and private 
residences, there was quite a bit of difference in terms of what different members 
of the EC meant by `competitor'. Some of the associates were referring only to 
hotel properties, others to companies that owned/managed/ hotels that were 
directly competing in the same markets as MediumCo, while others referred to all 
large hotel companies, including those that did not have hotels in the same 
markets or market segment as MediumCo. No one pointed out this discrepancy. 
Much of this was conversational anecdotes about the strengths and weaknesses of 
the competitors and MediumCo related to these two businesses. 
During the meeting there was no use of any tools to help guide or structure the 
conversation or record and make sense of the ideas offered by the different 
members. Several EC members, meanwhile, had at times referred to some of the 
documents they had prepared for the meeting, however each time the SA and/or 
CEO said that the meeting was to discuss the issues and not make formal 
presentations. Similarly, two SVPs (M, D) had prepared presentations but were 
not asked to present their work. (Later the SA told the researcher that he felt 
this would hinder the team's ability to bond and openly discuss the issues. ) 
The SVP-HR said he had also remained largely silent during the two days because 
he was not from a hotel background and was not always certain about some of 
the terminology used. He cited the issue of competitors as an example where he 
did not know all the companies very well and so he had little to offer with regards 
to them. He felt uncomfortable stopping the flow of the meeting for clarifications. 
He did not present the SWOT analysis he had prepared for the meeting because: 
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It was pretty clear from the start that no one was any way 
prepared with anything more than what they had thought 
about on the drive over to the hotel ... It was clear that this didn't matter ... (Name of CEO) didn't seem very interested in it 
either. 
Communication of the JV-REG 
The IV concept was presented differently to various stakeholders due to their 
particular interests in the project. According to the JVCEO: 
Everyone has different requirements in this area. If you're (the 
PEG) here, you want obviously this result to look positive ... You've got to make it sound sexy. 
Referring to the templates and charts used in the strategic plan shared with 
certain investors, the JVCEO said "I think the more you have there, the more 
credible you look. I mean, this is a credible document. " The JVCEO believed that 
in addition to supporting him with the necessary numbers and analysis to believe 
in the project's future, the tools also helped him to sell the project to potential 
investors because of the credibility inherent in having provided detailed thinking 
and analysis. He believes that: 
There's no doubt that the better you can justify assumptions, 
because we're always talking assumptions, the more credibility 
you have. And that may be the small print in the back that 
says we came to this number by doing this, this, this, and we 
weighted on these, these, these things. We feel that the 
biggest risk is ... It's not that thorough, but I can show 
considerations. 
He acknowledged that though such supporting evidence and reasoning were 
present, the JV document had often had mixed results since some investors "look 
at it and say I'm sorry, you haven't answered enough of my questions. Others will 
not even read it. " Those working on signing development deals for REG suggest 
that while certain potential investors do care about how MediumCo arrived at its 
conclusions "some investors just go by the guts almost. " Still, having a supporting 
strategy document that demonstrated careful analysis, thinking and research was 
important for ensuring that such investors could be more easily convinced to 
enter into the project as it often would help them get to the point where they 
would say: 
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I think hospitality is great, and these guys seem like they know 
what they're talking about ... (others are) far more diligent as to really looking into what you're doing ... what's the exit 
strategy and long term plans. 
5.3.3 Organisational Context and Tool Use 
This section first discusses the use of tools according to the type of practitioner. 
This includes discussions based on different groups of individuals depending on 
their horizontal and hierarchical categorisation and individual backgrounds. It 
then discusses tool use in light of leadership, organisational culture, ownership- 
management structure and the perception of the industry. 
Practitioners 
Consultants 
Consultants were not used by MediumCo or with the JV. "I don't want to pay 
$50,000 to be told something that I probably could do myself, or I can work out 
myself" (JVCEO). Within MediumCo there was a general hesitancy towards using 
consultants for strategy development which was, according to the SA, because: 
Before him (the CEO) the owners had hired some consultants 
and they had provided a very in-depth strategic plan of action 
that relied on a lot of formal analyses, and their ideas nearly 
bankrupted the company before (the CEO) arrived and turned 
things around. 
The PEG, on the other hand, had hired external firms to conduct much of the 
work behind the JV In order to provide investors into their fund with added 
assurances and legitimisation. "They want to be able to say to the investors I 
took a professional organisation and they've done this analysis in this way" 
(JVCEO). The PEG's own JV documents contained specific uses of strategy tools 
such as SWOT and competitor analysis matrices for several markets. 
Board of Directors (BOD) 
In its discussions with the BOD, MediumCo explained that the region they would 
expand in with the IV needed a brand like REG and that the ]V agreement was 
the right way to do this. These discussions did not involve any formal conceptual 
analyses but were heavily reliant on the data about the market. This was not 
atypical as the board was described as one that relied primarily on the CEO's 
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vision and their own experience. "We have a board that doesn't study either" 
(SVP-D). 
Instead of a formal strategic analysis, the BOD was primarily interested in seeing 
if "'there was an opportunity there, and that it would benefit MediumCo and LUX 
ultimately and we were able to convince them of this" (JVCEO). He 
acknowledged that the BOD perhaps thought that more strategic analysis had 
taken place than in fact had, but that this was probably because they thought 
that MediumCo's EC routinely did more strategic analysis than they actually did. 
Top and Middle Managers 
One EC member told the researcher that he found it "unprofessional" that the CEO 
would make important strategic decisions without more analysis, input from his EC 
or by using some proven strategy model to at least confirm his intuition: 
(He) said we're going to limit ourselves to 100 hotels. I mean, 
that's the most crazy statement any businessman can make. 
You don't limit yourself in business to anything unless there's a 
very, very clear, clearly strategic or financial objective and 
process behind it (SVP-M). 
There was a general consensus that though they had been asked to participate in 
strategy discussions, and that though it may have seemed to the researcher that 
their views were important to the CEO, they did not feel that this was necessarily 
the case. "It's always the same thing. We all talk, some of it gets written down, 
and then we do what (the CEO) wants us to" (SVP-D). 
Most respondents suggested that there was not much buy-in on their part 
regarding the CEO's idea to limit the number of LUX hotels since he had not 
explored the idea with them or provided any analysis that showed this to make 
the most sense. A common view here was that the CEO did not like to have his 
ideas challenged and that by not providing any reasoning behind his ideas, other 
than his thoughts, he helped limit their ability to argue points against his views. 
Subordinates 
The JVCEO explained that he had not personally conducted the different parts of 
the JV strategic plan but had provided some guidance as from his previous 
experiences with formal plans "I know how to look at them, and I know what 
questions to ask. " Instead, junior level staff members and corporate interns had 
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done most of the work, including the competitor analysis, market studies and 
development plan recommendations. One corporate intern explained that she 
had thought there would be more of "what we've seen in school" but that she 
hadn't seen much use or talk of the concepts she had learned. "I guess there just 
isn't time for that" she said, noting that it seemed that everyone was constantly 
"running around late with something. " 
General Managers 
The SVP1-O and SVP2-O who were most often in contact with the hotel GMS 
maintain that the GMS are not involved in strategic-planning for MediumCo or 
Lux. They also explained the GMS generally have not historically used, or been 
asked to use, any strategy tools and, until recently, "didn't really do much 
besides budgeting" (SVP1-O) when it came to anything strategic. This had 
recently begun to change, however, as most GMs were now being required to 
enrol In the company-sponsored MBA programme. They were being asked to now 
think like "businesspeople" rather than "hotel managers" when it came to their 
investment decisions, and for this the CEO was requiring them to begin preparing 
business plans based on their operating performances and market conditions. 
The GM interviewed, however, was finding it difficult to do this, and said that his 
peers were also similarly challenged and frustrated and that this had been a topic 
at the last annual GM meeting. They were supposed to provide the expected 
economic return for every investment they made in the property or services and 
could no longer simply say it was important or that the customer wanted such 
improvements. Instead, the cash-flow impact of every investment needed to be 
proven. They had been given a "strategy-model" by their instructor which was 
meant to help them determine the external changes that necessitate their 
investments, and the means for determining how this would impact their financial 
returns, but most were simply "faking it" (GM) since for them it was more 
intangible than tangible or explicit reasons for their decisions. He also suggested 
that he had yet to see proof that the corporate headquarters were using similar 
methods and tools and that this was discouraging. 
Partners (PEG) 
As opposed to the CEO who had not requested any formal analysis about the JV 
and who relied mostly on his own intuition, the JVCEO was pleased that strategy 
process that he engaged in with the PEG was done "very slowly, very diligently 
165 
without the typical rush of 'okay, we've got an idea. Let's do it tomorrow" Instead 
he was able to insist on "numbers and analysis for me as I was about to become 
CEO of that brand that I wanted to be successful. "' 
The strategic analysis conducted by the PEG was useful but perceived as limited 
since it did not address many possibly contentious issues related to the potential 
markets, economics of the region, its political risks, customers and competitors. 
For the JVCEO their strategic analysis: 
Didn't provide what I would call conclusive evidence that this 
would work... So there was potential to do more research, and 
I think if we were 100% thorough you could have gone down 
that avenue, but it may have raised questions you didn't like 
the answer to anyway. It could actually have slowed the 
process down and then ended up making us doubt ourselves. 
We all felt that it was a risk worth taking, that even if the 
answers would mean that we wouldn't do this, the answer was 
we'll do it anyway because the potential upside is too great ... 
and the risk minimum. 
Individual Backgrounds 
Over the past few years the company had also made major changes in its HR 
recruitment and selection strategy. One major project had been to identify and 
then train its future managers and executives. As part of this, the company had 
begun to send these persons to various MBA progammes. This included GMs and 
EC members, and for them having decided to invest substantial resources in 
these progammes was proof that the CEO had made a personal decision to shift 
some of the responsibility to his staff. "He sends us all on MBAs, so that we can 
sit and make a decision about this business, and him knowing that those 
decisions are good decisions that are being taken" (SVP-D). For the JVCEO this 
process: 
Means if your new MBA comes in and does some kind of 
strategic analysis using tools he learned in school, maybe even 
in a programme you sent him to, its about having the guts to 
say if this guy that I hired has done this, and I read it, and I 
think what he says makes sense, then I should take his 
recommendation, of course, with a little bit of my own 
judgment thrown in. 
The CEO also created a new position in the firm, Director of Strategic planning 
(DSP) whose job was to monitor implementation of the CEO's strategies, not to 
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create them. Many members of the EC this position demonstrated changes within 
the firm. The SVP-M explained: 
Things are staring to change, and he's (CEO) starting to get 
people behind him that are saying you've got to apply more 
tools and structure, so I think he's starting to change, but his 
way of running the business is basically gut instinct. 
Another EC member suggested that. "I think bringing in people like (D-SP) on 
board helped him achieve that because he came with those skills and tools. " For 
the JVCEO it was that the CEO had "started to trust and know that behind him 
there are people and they have tools and abilities and systems in place. " 
Alongside this person the CEO had also made major a series of major changes to 
the EC by recruiting persons from outside the hotel industry and who had more 
experience in growing and managing larger businesses. The ]VCEO states that: 
If you look today at our senior management, they have more 
and more business managers ... For 
(name of CEO) to change 
(name of old CFO) was a major thing to do (they were old 
friends) but he knew deep down that that's what needed to be 
done to professionalise the company. 
A greater introduction of strategy tools and processes was mentioned by several 
interviewees as directly resulting from the changes in personnel and types of 
backgrounds these persons had. "Tools and models are becoming a bit more of 
the culture, but not though him (CEO) driving that, but by the fact that he's 
recruiting people that have better trained to do that. " 
Leadership 
In the past (pre-2007), most decisions were based almost exclusively on the 
CEO's intuition and were taken with little or no formal analysis. In 2005 the CEO 
stated to the researcher that he wanted his Executive Committee (EC) to take a 
bigger role in determining the firm's strategy. Members of the firm's EC 
acknowledge that there has recently (2007 to 2008) been some movement 
towards this more inclusive approach. In addition they cite, for example, that 
they have begun to conduct more analytical studies, many of which include the 
use of strategy tools, before pursuing new strategic and development projects. 
The interviewees, meanwhile, agree that the CEO continues to be personally 
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Involved in all strategic decisions and that while he does gather more opinions 
from his EC than in the past, he continues to take the final decisions himself. 
The firm's strategy and strategy process were both said to be results of the CEO's 
intuition and strong personality, and not of formal analytical studies. MediumCo 
was, according to the PA, "the wrong company to study if you want to see how 
strategy gets made In the industry ... It's just (name of CEO) and his ideas that 
we have to accept and implement. " The process was described as the CEO 
thinking about an idea and then saying to himself "do I like it or not? " (SVP-HR). 
Similarly, the CEO claimed that for him no strategy tool or analytical technique 
would or could have replaced or aided his personal understanding of what the 
company had needed over the previous 10 years. He explained that not only did 
he not use such tools and techniques himself, but also believed that too often this 
type of approach to making strategy was too far removed from the realities of 
running a struggling business. He suggested that it was naive to believe that 
"academic concepts get used in the real world. " Instead, he relied on his 
knowledge, experience and understanding of the company for the reasoning 
behind his strategic decisions. 
According to the SVP-D, this: 
Is a leadership thing and it's a cultural thing. .. A new idea 
comes out and he says "Good idea" or "No. " He's (CEO) not 
going to ask for any backup as to the reasoning ... he doesn't 
operate that way at all. He feels that, he's got a quite rude 
expression to describe this sort of strategising and that's been 
picked up on by [names of other EC members]. 
For some on his EC this was more than appropriate as they recognised that his 
ideas had been instrumental in saving and shaping the company. "(His) 
experience is tremendous and he has an incredible vision for the company. He 
saved the company from bankruptcy" (CFO). The CEO's SA further clarified this: 
We are not using strategic or academic concepts or tools ... 
when no strategic model is telling you how to come back from 
hell, how can you structure your vision and What management 
style can you adopt to make people believe in you and 
subsequently in the company? (Email to researcher) 
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When the researcher later asked him about this five year plan the CEO clarified 
that this was not a written plan that laid out specific steps and timelines about 
how the company would need to change. "It was more of a vision than anything 
else" (CEO). He also suggested that the EC did not need to know that he had not 
actually formalised his vision into a written document. He explained to the 
researcher that when he had taken over the leadership of MediumCo he had 
already worked his way up through the hotel industry for over 25 years and had 
been the CEO of several companies. This experience was enough for him to have 
intuitively understood the company's situation and the industry without the use of 
any strategy tool to guide his thinking. He explained that the strategy he 
initiated wasn't based on any strategy tool or technique, but on the 
understanding of the industry and its leading firms that he had gained from his 
experience. "I am very much In tune with what is going on around the world and 
in the hotel industry. " 
This view was corroborated by other EC members, most of whom had never seen 
a formal strategy document during their time at MediumCo. Similarly, they had 
never attended any kind of strategy discussion where tools or documents were 
used or where such items were produced as tangible outcomes. "He (the CEO) 
likes strategy meetings but only talking strategy meetings. He hates written 
strategy meetings" (EC Member). The SVP-M felt the same way: 
If I gave him a strategic plan he would never read it. I've done 
strategic plans for different businesses we're in or looked at, 
like this, and he's never read it. He's got better things to do, in 
his mind. 
Organisational Culture 
The PA, who had recently finished his MBA (unaffiliated to MediumCo) at a hotel 
school was not very surprised that he had yet to see anyone at the company 
apply any of the strategy tools he had encountered in his studies. He believed 
that these were not used in the company at all and, most likely, in the industry as 
they were too academic: It is just not the way people work here. " What was 
valued, according to most interviewees, was making sure that the company was 
thought of as hoteliers and not just a hotel company. "He (CEO) wants everyone 
to think like hoteliers, like people who care about service and experiences, and 
not just about money and returns" (SVP-HR). 
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This view had begun to change and this was attributed more often than not to the 
fact that the company had been growing, diversifying and entering into new 
markets with not only LUX hotels, but also through the several new joint ventures 
they had undertaken with different partners. Interviewees said that the company 
had become more complex and this had necessitated certain changes In what the 
CEO valued. For the JVCEO it was an issue of the CEO realising or accepting that 
"You can be an entrepreneur up to a point, but then you have to start doing 
things properly as the business grows. " He believes that previously the CEO 
vested most strategic thinking within himself because he: 
Wanted to have it as this small company that he could control 
himself in a way. But that's changed. I couldn't say what's 
changed him but perhaps the realisation that ... you don't need to control everything to be successful. I think in a funny way, 
maybe he even feared that if we grew too much he wouldn't 
have that control anymore. 
The EC members believed that there had been a fundamental change in the way 
the CEO approached strategic Initiatives and the concept of studying such Ideas 
since the company had grown. For one: 
The culture is now changing. I think (name of CEO) is starting 
to realise that he can't make, like God, all decisions ... he has 
to have business people on the ground making certain 
decisions in business units now that we've grown in numbers 
and areas. 
Much of this change In culture was attributed to the fact that the company was 
growing In size and complexity as It entered new markets and Into new formal 
relationships with partners. For the JVCEO, part of the reason that he was using 
SWOT and positioning tools was that the JV was looking at many new and/or 
"risky" markets and doing so with a new brand. According to him: 
In an emerging market, and/or a market where you're a 
newcomer, you need to be very, very focused all of the time 
and do this much more often ... you look at your position and 
size and weaknesses and therefore your risks. 
For him it was largely the uncertainty of the whole venture and the fact that they 
had to launch a new brand that had a very particular differentiating factor about 
it. His strategic plan, for example, contained a positioning map for the luxury 
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brands in the region, and this, one intern (CI) said, had gone through various 
versions including different options for one of the axis. For the JVCEO this was a 
fundamental step in their process because "It comes back to your business school 
model again. You can have a perfectly positioned brand. You do all your 
research. But you've got to communicate it. " 
For him, such tools and studies that relied on them were not necessarily needed 
on a regular basis with well-known markets and the LUX brand because neither 
was changing very much. He states that: 
You just need to be aware of changes in the market, with 
customers, and how they impact you ... The reality is that when 
you're running a business and things are going okay, its like, 
why do I waste time doing this. I know my business I know my 
market. I know my customers. I know my risks. I just keep 
doing what I'm doing. 
This, he thought was one reason why at MediumCo that did not conduct 
regular studies on its properties and markets other than by looking at 
some data about occupancy and rates from third-party sources. Still, he 
thought that even though at such places this didn't need to be done more 
than once every five years and at MediumCo "we don't do it as often as we 
should because its time consuming. " 
Ownership-Management Structure 
For the JVCEO, MediumCo traditionally conducted limited formal since the CEO 
fundamentally looked at projects from the perspective that "this issue really is, is 
this going to cost us anything, and if not, then good, what can we make out of it? " 
He explained that as MediumCo had little if any financial risk In many projects 
since the money to develop hotels and, for example, the PEG, there burden was 
on them to do this. This was confirmed by the SVP-M who suggested that the lack 
of a more formal strategic approach to a project such as the ]V was not 
surprising: 
I think with (MediumCo) we tend to take the attitude we're not 
investing capital, so it doesn't matter what we do, which can 
have its merits as well, but can also have its downsides 
because you're in the dark all the time. " 
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The JVCEO explained that he had some arguments with the CEO about this issue 
as he felt that the project still needed to be examined strategically from various 
perspectives. He states that: 
My argument is you've got to assess it from the point of view of 
the cost involved in actually doing this project, and also brand 
dilution and credibility and all the other things that go with 
that. You can't just look at it from purely the numbers point of 
view ... someone should be doing this analysis. 
According to the ]VCEO, the CEO eventually "decided on a whim that we should 
do it. " The CEO, he said, was fond of saying that MediumCo was "in a simple 
business (of) providing management services. " And as such he said that for the 
CEO the decision really came down to a few simple questions and nothing more. 
"Is the brand one that we as a company can live with? Is it doing any harm to 
LUX? No. Does it bring us new management contracts? Yes. That's really the 
business decision. " 
Perception of Industry 
The interviewees remarked that since the strategy session there had been some 
changes in the way MediumCo approached the strategy process and strategic 
decisions. Previously there was no deliberate strategy process, no use of strategy 
tools, and the EC had not been much involved in discussing let alone deciding the 
company's strategic course. For them this used to be the norm in the industry 
(although they believed it was changing in many companies) and, for them, 
MediumCo - to a certain extent - continued to be "an old school hotel company" 
(CFO) that focused on operations and was made up largely of people who had 
spent their entire careers in the hotel industry. 
Others agreed that the company's "former" approach to strategy tools and 
deliberate processes was the norm in the industry as most hotels were small 
businesses. For the larger firm this, they thought, this had already changed 
years ago. According to the JVCO: 
As the hospitality industry continues to grow and develop are 
critical ... the hospitality industry has to wake up into the 21st 
century and realise this is not about good service. It's not 
about understanding luxury or understanding what kind of beds 
customers like. It's about understanding major macroeconomic 
factors that are going to affect on the ground the chance of 
success of your business and if you don't take it Into 
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consideration, lots of people will fail. In good years everyone 
gets lucky, but in the odd years, it's the ones who have done 
their research and through things through conceptually and 
strategically analytically that will succeed. 
One staff member explained that several EC members had, together, recently 
begun a project where they, the staff members, were busy preparing studies and 
written reports about each hotel property's situation, including a more thorough 
analysis of its market and changes there, as well as how it was positioned against 
the competition. According to the one of these EC members: 
We are trying to do it now with every single project and 
regularly because the shifting sand of why people travel, and 
what you're targeting, and the competition is doing, what 
you're going after is enormous ... We're using certain tools to look at the life cycle of the business, at what point can we 
achieve market share and what reasons do we think that, in 
each of the segments that we can achieve market share faster 
than our competitors can. And I think there you're going back a 
little bit to business school, where is my product position, how 
is my firm stacked up against the competition. 
He acknowledged, meanwhile, that while there had been no opposition to this the 
CEO's view continued, largely, to be one of "Don't give me all this analysis 
because you won't have been able to factor in that something can happen 
tomorrow and it's going to change. " 
The JVCEO said that for him: 
My own experience within MediumCo has taught me that you 
need to combine well-researched strategic analysis and 
information with a bit of gut instinct, and a bit of an 
entrepreneurial spirit. I would, going forward like to think that 
with all new projects, we will have this sort of assessment ... I 
see the tools that we've been discussing as more and more 
important for my decision making, and I've said to the people 
around me I don't want to sign deals unless we do these kinds 
of thinking exercises. Will MediumCo move in that direction? It 
has to. It will, definitely. 
5.3.4 MediumCo Case Summary 
Within MediumCo strategy tools are rarely used and the CEO is quite firm about 
the lack of value of such tools. His top managers also suggest that they do not 
use these tools and that strategy is not practiced according to academic theories. 
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This seems to be changing, however, as the.. CEO has begun to recruit top 
executives from outside the industry with other views on strategy-making. The 
notable example is the JVCEO who, in the context of the JV, has begun to use 
such tools. Much of this tool work is delegated to his lower-level associates. 
The following section presents the findings from SmaliCo. 
5.4 Case 3: SmallCo 
This section provides background information on SmaliCo, the strategic initiative 
studied, and findings related to the use of strategy tools during the initiative and 
more generally within the firm. 
5.4.1 Company and Project Background 
SmaliCo, a UK-based hotel company, was founded in the early 1990s with the 
opening of a single hotel. Over the next few years the hotel's owner opened 
several more similarly branded (BrandA) properties. The company has since 
been sold numerous times is currently owned by a UK investment firm (IF). 
SmallCo now consists of two brands as the IF purchased a second small hotel 
company (BrandB) several years ago. Both brands are the responsibility of a 
single CEO and most management team members are responsible for their 
functional areas within both brands. After nearly doubling the number of 
properties under each brand in the past five years, SmallCo now comprises 
approximately 20 properties and 2,000 rooms. All properties are located In the 
United Kingdom and except for a few that are held on long-term leases, all are 
owned and managed by SmailCo. The company does not franchise or manage 
hotels for third-party owners. 
In 2007 the company was investigating and implementing several important 
strategic initiatives. 
(1) The IF intended to sell SmallCo, Including both brands and the related 
real estate, by the end of 2008. 
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(2) SmaliCo's CEO began examining the viability of different international 
expansion possibilities for BrandA since the growth opportunity within the 
UK was very limited and it was assumed that any new owner would want 
to expand the brands internationally. 
(3), A current repositioning (RWRI) of BrandA from being known, like most 
hotels companies, as hotels with restaurants, to a brand that is better 
known as one of "restaurants with rooms. " 
The CEO considered all three Ideas to be essential for the company's long-term 
success and referred to them as the three parts of the firm's current and overall 
Growth Initiative. He also noted that the first two initiatives had just begun and 
were still considered highly confidential, and that as the third Initiative was 
imperative for either of the first two to succeed, it would be a more appropriate 
area on which the researcher should focus his empirical investigation. 
The decision to reposition BrandA from one known for its "hotels with great food 
and beverage" to one that was "food and beverage led" (D-D) emerged from a 
casual dinner discussion between the CEO and members of his management team 
(MTM). They discussed that SmailCo's hotels were still regularly outperforming 
their rivals In most towns, and that while BrandA was achieving occupancy and 
rates well above its competitors, it would be difficult to improve these figures. 
The SVP-FB mentioned how a few years back when he was a restaurant manager 
in a BrandA hotel: 
I had a guest that came and ate with us, week In, week out. 
And when I was leaving to say I was moving to (other city) to 
open the property, he asked `why' and I said, `well, I was going 
to a bigger hotel with more bedrooms', and this guest didn't 
realise that we have 100 bedrooms above our restaurant. For 
me, that was just incredible. Fifty, sixty percent of our guests 
were exclusively diners, and we were known as a good 
restaurant within the business. It wasn't just a hotel. 
No one suggested that the company should reposition BrandA. They simply 
discussed "how great our food offering was and that we needed to refocus our 
efforts on pushing that a bit more" (SVP-FB). The CEO states that while there 
was no formal suggestion that focusing even more on F&B would helps solve 
SmaliCo's search for increased revenue, he did see the opportunity. 
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Less than a month later the CEO announced to MTM that "we were going to 
immediately reposition (BrandA) as restaurants with rooms and no longer as 
hotels with great F&B. " Within a few days he initiated the RWRI (though at no 
time was this or any other specific project name used). No formal committee was 
established to oversee the initiative, nor was any deliberate plan established to 
implement it. Similarly, no formal study of the company's current position, 
competition or growth prospects was commissioned. Instead, the CEO and some 
MTM (SVP-HR; SVP-FB, EC, SVP-O, SVP-BM, D3-M) oversaw the evolution of the 
RWRI and its eventual implementation. For the next two months there were 
occasional meetings to discuss the RWRI, though these were not organised 
according to any pre-established schedule. 
That the decision was made by the CEO and without a formal study or the 
Involvement of a team is not unusual at the company where most strategic 
decisions are either initiated or approved by the CEO himself or, at times, with his 
CFO. For many MTM it was appropriate that an important strategic decision be 
made by "The people running the business and wanting to expand the business, 
the people that know the business" (VP-PM). As such, the company is thought to 
be: 
A bit different from other companies where everything has to 
go to a committee, and everything has to be discussed to 
death. We're very much, not seat of the pants, but we are 
very entrepreneurial (CFO). 
5.4.2 The Role of Strategy Tools during the RWRI 
This section discusses the role of tools outside of official meetings, then during 
such meetings and then as a communication tool for the ESP as these are 
different aspects of the strategy praxis. 
Between Meetings 
As part of their RWRI work SmaliCo's management felt it important to understand 
consumer trends and market developments. The SVP-BM noted that the market: 
Is very important to assess. We cannot ... be strategic in a blind 
manner, thinking that the market is built around us. Arrogance 
like that leads to collapse. So what we have to do is we assess 
what's currently going on. 
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This assessment consisted of informal and constant monitoring "through constant 
talking ... Just chatting to people about what they want" (SVP-FB). By spending 
time in other companies' hotels and paying attention to their marketing 
campaigns the CEO recognised that BrandA's current position and marketing 
focus "weren't that different anymore, because there were a lot of `me toos' that 
had come along. " The common consensus was that the hotels' F&B business was 
not as strong a selling point as it had been. "There was no formal analysis in 
terms of us knowing that food and beverage was becoming a slightly weak point 
for us" (D3-M). Instead, this view was based primarily on their own 
understanding of their hotels and restaurants that from their observations many 
competitors had been making successful improvements to their own F&B 
offerings. 
The MTM said that much of their RWRI work and discussions were very relaxed 
and productive since they were a small group of people who knew each other 
well, trusted one another, and did not feel the need to document all of their work 
and decisions to protect themselves or justify their ideas or contributions. 
According to the D-D: 
We work very closely together, we know each other personally 
... and we have direct access to each other all the time, that 
I 
think people do understand what goes on without documenting 
everything. 
Respondents also pointed to the fact that their RWRI was relatively easy since 
they did not need to do much additional research since they were very familiar 
with the company, including its customers and brands, and because they all knew 
the UK market well and this was the only region where SmailCo had its hotels. 
They thus felt very comfortable not using formal analysis or studies to help them 
have confidence in their views, or to make sense of them. 
During Meetings 
That a critical strategic Initiative emerged from such a casual dinner conversation 
rather than a formal purposeful meeting is not atypical at SmallCo. Future 
discussions about the RWRI were also conducted through casual conversations 
between the CEO and MTM, including dinners like this one that the CEO held 
about every few weeks with them since: 
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I think, as a company, we might be slightly unique in that we 
do have these informal discussions and (name of CEO) very 
often will get the management team together like that so we 
can just chat ... That's about it as far as how formal our 
strategy process is, if we have one at all (D-D). 
A few days after the dinner the CEO spoke with his CFO about the idea that they 
should "really put them [restaurants] out in front of the business. " Exploring the 
idea alone with his CFO rather than with a larger committee, whether formal or 
informal, was the standard procedure at SmailCo: 
It's very clear that we don't run by committee. To be honest 
with you, [name of CEO] and I will chew the fat over most 
things, and then the likes of (name of director of operations), 
and the exec team will come in and we'll have an open 
conversation about things and it kind of builds itself from there 
... But at the end of the 
day it's us who decides, and more often 
than not it's [name of CEO] who makes these kinds of decisions 
alone (CFO). 
To discuss the idea in more detail, the CFO and CEO had another discussion with 
their SVP-FB that "was a couple of glasses of wine, some notes taken on the back 
of a packet of fags, and that was that" (SVP-FB). The CEO also discussed the 
idea with the SVP-BM who proceeded to develop a new slogan and marketing 
campaign for BrandA that clearly suggested that it was primarily focused on 
eating and drinking and then rooms. The CEO "thought it was just perfect. 
Perfect ... It really captures who I want us to 
be. " For him, this slogan, rather 
than any analytical study, became the prime catalyst for many later specific 
developments with the RWRI. 
The RWRI process and its related meetings were seen as neither formal nor rigid 
and as more about "getting things done" then about "wasting endless hours in 
meetings like at other places, doing countless studies that wouldn't really add 
anything that we didn't already know" (SVP-HR). For them this is one reason 
that strategy tools were not only not used, but never even discussed. "I don't 
like to use the term `parochial' but (we are) very much low key and not very 
corporate ... (With) none of those corporate tools you see elsewhere" (D-D). 
During the management team meetings the discussions were not about whether 
they should refocus the brand as "everyone had bought into the idea from the 
start ... We all understood the reasoning and the reasons for it right away" (SVP- 
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O). Instead the meetings were focused on outcomes and actions. The minutes 
from this group's meetings demonstrate that from the first meeting the topics 
discussed were concentrated on outcomes and deliverables, actions that the 
company could take to implement the idea. No frameworks or matrices of any 
kind were used to structure the conversations or analyse their work. "We didn't 
do any kind of SWOT analysis or positioning graphs, nothing like that" (SVP-FB). 
Their task was not to evaluate the idea but to "make it happen" (SVP-HR). 
Communication of the RWRI 
Once the CEO and his MTM decided how the concept would be realised in the 
hotels, the CEO communicated the final RWRI plan orally to each functional 
department head and to many GMs. He did this within the context of the 
conversations they had with him on a weekly basis. "[Name of CEO] shared the 
idea with us casually and on an individual basis whenever we were meeting to 
discuss something, whatever, and just asked us what we thought" (GM1). 
Sometimes this was in person and other times by telephone. 
In order to get persons from different disciplines and hotel properties to have a 
common understanding of the strategy and the reasons for it, the RWRI, like 
most Important communications "are very much done on a people basis at 
SmaliCo ... You get it through taking the word to the people, almost 
like a 
pilgrimage" (SVP-BM). Department heads and GMs were expected to pass the 
message down through their departments or hotels. For example, the EC met 
with every chef individually to explain the concept to them, and believed that this 
helped them to fully commit to it. As with most changes to the brand, the SVP-BM 
did a rollout presentation where he and his top assistant: 
Went around and talked to the heads of departments and 
talked to them about the past, present and future of BrandA - 
where it's going, and what the future is for it, in an attempt to 
educate them better (D3-M). 
To be effective and gain their buy-in, as well as to make sure that persons of all 
backgrounds understood the concept and reasons behind it, they made this 
presentation (like most others) orally, not in writing, and without technical 
marketing concepts or terminology. For the SVP-BM there was no need to explain 
the reasoning behind the initiative through any tools or documents because "in 
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terms of the brand, there is only one sounding point - me. " The SVP-BM and his 
marketing team did not use any positioning charts or SWOT analyses to 
communicate the changes or the rationale behind them since, in part they were: 
Dealing with people who aren't marketing based, who are 
experts in their own field, but don't want to be told that they 
know nothing. So what you do is you take that message in a 
people sense, and you go and talk to people about it, and you 
present it in that manner. 
One of his colleagues explained that they: 
Felt the need particularly, to go into the hotels and explain to 
them why there's a refocus. And as soon as you break it down 
into really simple terms why it's emerged in this way, they 
completely understand It and their buy-in has been great (D3- 
M). 
5.4.3 Organisational Context and Tool Use 
This section first discusses the use of tools according to the type of practitioner. 
This includes discussions based on different groups of Individuals depending on 
their horizontal and hierarchical categorisation and individual backgrounds. It 
then discusses tool use in light of leadership, organisational culture, ownership 
structure and the perception of the industry. 
Practitioners 
Departmental Differences 
SmailCo does not customarily hold cross-departmental meetings to discuss 
strategic Initiatives, and several respondents said that as a result they were not 
as familiar with the terminology, concepts and techniques used In other 
departments. Instead, some respondents believed that the departments worked 
with their own concepts and then, when working with members of other areas, 
held more general conversations "without any academic or technical talk" (SVP- 
HR). Most respondents suggested that conceptual tools were not used in any 
area, and that this ranged from the company's top level (CEO) down through 
functional areas and to the hotels themselves. Interviews across departments 
confirmed that most areas did not use any strategy tools regardless of the 
department in which they worked. "There's just no need or desire for us to work 
that way anywhere in the group" (SVP-HR). 
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Individual Backgrounds 
A common view was that the hotel staff, including the GMs, would not appreciate 
or even perhaps understand the repositioning rationale if it were conveyed 
through frameworks or matrices. For others who are formally educated in their 
disciplines and with backgrounds in other firms, this makes some aspects of their 
work, especially the communication of it, difficult. For example: 
I can't even talk brand touch points to a member of sales. You 
can't get stuck in your own language and believe that you can 
do that ... people will go, 'What on earth are they talking 
about? ' You have to translate, and you go to the people. You 
don't bring the people to you. It's hard work (SVP-BM). 
The operational backgrounds of the management and operational staff was often 
cited as a key reason why the company does not believe in formal tools. With 
regards to the RWRI, for example, many of the key persons necessary to 
implement it were chefs and those working in F&B, and they were not thought to 
be "equipped" for a more conceptual or formally analytical discussion of the 
RWRI. For the CFO, the fact that they were from different levels and types of 
backgrounds meant that the use of such tools would likely complicate and 
confuse, rather than clarify, the issue. "Certain of our team just don't have that 
skill set, and then certain other people do have that skill set. So you would think 
very differently in terms of what type of tool you would maybe use" (CFO). 
The operational background of the management staff was, however, also seen as 
a major benefit by the interviewees. For them, the fact that most had "come up 
through the ranks of working in a hotel" (D-D) meant that they not only 
understood each other better, but also the problems of implementing corporate- 
level decisions at the property level. More specifically for the RWRI, the team 
members believed that because they had all worked in hotels they were able to 
understand what the hotels and the brand needed from them to make the project 
easy to understand and implement. "There just wasn't any need to complicate 
things by presenting them, or doing them, with those tools. We just didn't need 
to do anything like that" (SVP-FB). 
The SVP-HR explained the company was hiring more people form more 
academically-oriented hotel management schools, and that: 
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These kids want to put to use what they learned in school, 
what they paid to learn, and if we want to keep them, which we 
do, we'll have to find the way to let them try out those 
concepts and tools they bring in their tool-kits. 
Owners/Board of Directors 
As with most of his ideas, the IF's BOD did not require the CEO to gather external 
validation for the RWRI, and he felt no need to engage the services of any 
external consultants since he did not believe they would offer him any insights. 
He noted, however, that in other projects involving greater cash investments and 
loan requirements, such as with the purchase of BrandB, they were required to 
prepare formal studies for BOD and the banks that would provide the lending. For 
that project the CEO and CFO worked with external consultancy firms that 
conducted research and "produced the document and actually did the whole 
research element to it, so they went through that and basically, by property, 
strengths and weaknesses. " These reports were, however, "mainly 
capital/structural plus financial. Not really conceptual, because (the BOD) know 
(the brands) and the market and don't need any confirmation about that other 
than from (CEO) and me" (CFO). For the CEO "these (analyses) were just really 
ticking the `do' exercises for us to be able to complete the deal and get the 
funding. We did not do any strategic or market analysis for anyone. " The 
researcher's review of documents related to these transactions revealed that 
while certain strategic issues were discussed, such as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the targeted company/property, and certain environmental issues 
such as demographic data and the competitive set, no analysis or presentation of 
these issues was made through any strategy tool. 
While the CEO sees such analysis as purely for banking purposes, the CFO does 
consider them as "useful for us to double check. " They and their support teams 
see these studies as serving to back up and justify their own ideas and 
suggestions and not ever as helping to arrive at their proposed strategic 
initiatives. With acquisitions and conversions of properties, they are "using the 
more formal analysis to back up or to reconfirm the initial management decisions" 
(VP-PM). For example, with the purchase of BrandB: 
We did all the strategy about where we wanted to go, how we 
wanted to get there, how it fit geographically, the reasons ... that set the scene strategy-wise, where we want to be 1 year, 
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3 years, 5 years ... and then brought them (the consultants) in to put it together with the market data (CFO). 
One reason the company's CEO, CFO and MTM did not use formal analytical tools 
and written documentation as part of the RWRI was because they were not 
expected to do so by the IF. Although they had monthly meetings with the IF's 
BOD who are "comfortable with us, providing we go through the logic of what 
we're trying to do, " such proof was rarely, if ever, demonstrated through the use 
of strategy tools or formal analytical studies. Instead, the BOD, which is also 
structured and managed as an entrepreneurial business (CFO), does not expect 
or want such a level of analytical Information in most cases. "As soon as I've 
started trying to go through lots of detail, they just switch off it and say `what do 
I need to know"' (CFO). Instead of using documents and strategy tools to 
present their arguments, SmaliCo's leaders and management team, who also 
frequently present updates on what their departments are doing, take a different 
approach. "If you want to talk to them about something, you can just go in and 
say, look, this is what we want to do, this is where we want to go on that, and 
you pretty much get decisions" (CFO). 
Consultants 
On the whole, both the CFO and CEO are reluctant to hire consultants for 
strategic studies as they don't believe that their Insights or research will provide 
much value, especially In a market (the UK) that they believe SmaliCo's 
management team already understands. For them, "a lot of people that come 
and tell you stuff ... all they're doing is writing up what you already know" (CEO). 
Instead, the CEO and CFO work through most of the strategic variables and 
questions themselves, including much of the RWRI. "Certainly we look at from, 
really strategically, what does it do for us as a business? ... Here's the risk and 
the opportunities"(CFO). 
Management Level 
The management team members noted that few, if any, strategic decisions are 
based on input from anyone other than the CFO and CEO who also confirmed that 
while the MTM's Input is sought on certain aspects of their strategic decisions, 
they are not consulted on the formation of a strategy, but only on its realisation. 
This work was generally thought of in terms of creativity and not analysis, and it 
was done by them rather than delegated. 
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Many interviewees acknowledged that while they were not involved in making key 
decisions that affected the company, they were given the freedom, trust and 
responsibility to oversee the work in their departments as they saw fit. As such, 
remaining outside or on the periphery of the strategic decision-making process 
was often interpreted by the department heads as a way for the leaders to keep 
them focused on their `day jobs, ' on running the hotels, and implementing key 
decisions like the RWRI. 
Subordinates 
Part of the RWRI action plan was given to a group of management trainees as 
part of their overall training. They were tasked with redeveloping the lunchtime 
concept to fit in with the repositioning strategy. This report was, In its first 
version, much more analytical and incorporated a SWOT analysis and positioning 
chart for the different items on the menu (Fast Lunch Document). The team was 
instructed to redo the document to be less academic and more "user-friendly ... 
not explain so much why, but more what and how" (SVP-HR). According to one 
management trainee, "They said that it wasn't that they didn't like what we had 
done ... I got the feeling that they weren't sure what to do with it 
"(MT1). 
Leadership 
As a student the CEO had attended a hotel school that, according to him, was 
more practical than academically focused, and as such he had never been 
"schooled In anything really analytical. " His operational background, including 
several stints as a GM, was, he said, probably one reason why he did not believe 
in strategy tools. His MTM believe that his instinctive style of management came 
"from him being a general manager because you have to think on your feet so 
much, and he's just brought that kind of thinking into this role, really" (D-D). For 
him, strategy tools were not at all about strategy but about a way of avoiding or 
justifying decisions and nothing more. 
His MTM and GMs see his insights as more important and more stimulating then 
any thinking that might come out of the use of tools or formal analysis. "(He) is 
very commercially aware In the whole marketing and brand management side of 
things, and that can help stimulate us and he can be ahead of the game in 
understanding trends and fashions and such" (SVP-FB). For example, the CEO 
explained that he had recently decided not to purchase and convert a building 
into a BrandA hotel even though an independent consultancy firm's feasibility 
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study had shown that a hotel would be successful and provide an acceptable 
return on investment. Instead, he says, he "walked away from the property 
because it just didn't feel right ... you could see it, smell it, feel that the building 
just wasn't right ... We just knew. We said no, and that's hard to do. " According 
to him, no amount of formal analysis would have persuaded him otherwise, and 
no strategy tool was necessary to make the decision. 
The reliance on intuition was, In many Instances, linked by the Interviewees to the 
fact that SmaliCo's leadership style Is entrepreneurial, and as such they have a 
higher propensity to take on risky decisions without formal studies. For example, 
rather than pre-study the possible value of their RWRI ideas, or test them in 
controlled settings, they took an approach where they "keep pushing things out 
and try and see which ones work and don't" (CFO). According to the CEO, this 
was possible because the company was small and he could personally observe 
and keep track of the new ideas as they were implemented. According to the 
GDRM, SmallCo is "largely intuitive. We're more of a ... (laughs), a shoot 
from 
the hip kind of company. " 
While the CEO's intuition was acknowledged and respected by the interviewees, 
many calling him a visionary, they also attributed much of the success of his 
intuitive decisions to his knowledge of every aspect of the company and his 
understanding of the UK hotel industry. According to the SVP-BM: 
The thing you should realise about (name of CEO) Is he comes 
across as a chap who is very intuitive. Everything seems like a 
gut reaction. A gut reaction, which we believe is doing very 
well so far, and will continue to. But he has his fingers in every 
pie, so to speak, and that's why a lot of it works in the end ... he is informed, but his opinion and his manner as such that 
might come out, is based upon `Yes, I love it, ' but don't think 
that he's not informed also. 
The CFO acknowledged that neither he nor the CEO believed that more formal 
strategic thinking process, or research and analysis, was necessary, because 
while the strategy was largely driven by "a gut feel ... and maybe that's wrong, 
but we've not really missed any numbers. We've not hit any major issues. " 
Though some MTMs were asked for their input and ideas, they do not believe that 
the RWRI decision was a result of their input. "The change in strategy came 
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about, came from (name of CEO) which was, 'I want us to be a restaurant with 
rooms" (SVP-BM). This is not atypical since decisions such as this are made "at 
the top ... They just tell me. It's an 'I say - you do' situation. I just get on and do 
it" (GDRM). For others it was quite clearly that the CEO "has the ultimate say in 
whatever we do" (EC). This was never interpreted as a negative by any of the 
department heads. Many believe that while they may not have certain skills or 
experience with formal concepts and tools, this did not matter to the CEO. They 
believe that they are very competent at their work and the CEO recognises and 
values their individual abilities. "That's probably part of the reason why we're so 
successful. You employ somebody who's good at their job and you just let them 
get on with it" (D-RM). 
Organisational Culture 
Casual conversation involving little or no formal analysis and tools is described as 
the norm due to SmailCo's informal management style, structure and CEO. As the 
D2-M explained: 
You know, if I need an answer on something, I'll just walk 
across the corridor to (CFO) office, or I'll go and see (CEO), 
and we'll talk it through and that's it ... it's quite informal. 
Other confirmed that they usually explore ideas individually with the CEO and not 
as part of larger cross-functional committees or even with other members of their 
department. For them their relationship with the CEO Is "A smaller, more 
entrepreneurial approach" (EC). 
This casual atmosphere was credited with helping get different persons from all 
company levels to feel involved in the company's progress and projects. Many 
suggested that the informal approaches at the headquarters also "come through 
in a more relaxed atmosphere when ... you're in the hotels you're In that kind of 
working environment" (D2-M). For the SVP-HR if at the headquarters they were 
to work more formally, or rely less on their feelings and more on formal analysis, 
then that would likely cascade down to the hotel GMs and their staffs. This would 
"destroy who we are as a company ... and what we're trying to achieve as a 
brand" (D-D). For the D2-M, meanwhile: 
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If you were the type of person who was very structured and 
very kind of dictated by lists and roles and models and tools 
than you probably would find it a little bit hard, because we are 
a little bit haphazard. 
This approach pervades the organisation as most interviewees believe that the 
key decisions In their own areas are also based on 'gut feelings' and 'instinct'. 
For example, when SmailCo acquired BrandB it was because the IF was "in a 
hurry to grow" and the decision to acquire BrandB was not based on any formal 
analytical tools or process but rather "based just on our gut feeling and how we 
felt the two could fit" (CEO). Others within the company recognised that the CEO 
believes it important to keep decisions and the decision-making process simple. 
The expanded use of formal research and tools is thought to be something that 
would likely contradict this edict and be viewed negatively. 
Being able to propose new idea and see them implemented was repeatedly cited 
as one reason why, even if they are not involved in the highest level of strategic 
decision making, working at the company did not become mundane or boring for 
the GMs. They appreciate being able to take initiative without having to present 
the idea in documents and with analytics and data to support their ideas. 
What keeps us going is we truthfully could come up with an 
idea that could be instilled tomorrow, if it was a good one, and 
that's exactly how you feel you could add value to the 
company, and you'd be given the opportunity to do so (GM2). 
There Is a strong belief that at SmaliCo It is by talking about the Initiative, rather 
than writing about It, that there is more "buy In" by the staff. They maintain that 
even though there is no written record of how the RWRI was arrived at, because 
of all the oral presentations and informal discussions, "there's complete 
transparency on why we're doing it, and how we came about the idea" (EC). 
Through oral presentations and discussions anyone can ask any question and get 
an immediate answer, and this is seen as more positive and encouraging than 
formalising the process through written documents that "people elsewhere use to 
cover their tracks ... for political power reasons" (CEO). This practice and belief 
was juxtaposed with those of the larger hotel firms that many of them had 
worked for and where "you just sit and write reports all day" (D2-M) because 
"they are much more strict and much more sort of bureaucratic" (D-D). The SVP- 
BM noted, for example, that while he did not produce a report about the change, 
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had this been for a firm where he previously worked "it would almost be deemed 
a suicide if you didn't have a report for it. " Others echoed this belief, arguing, 
for example, that such formal analytical studies were either so that employees of 
larger firms could "justify the reason they're there" (CEO) or "cover yourself" 
(CFO). At SmailCo, however, the top managers did not believe that the company 
had the time or money to afford having their staff or external teams study 
Important issues with the use of strategy tools and prepare what they thought 
would then likely be "so huge of a report" (CFO). 
Continued growth was thought to likely mean that the organisation would have to 
become more formal with how it shared information. The CFO noted that since it 
was acquired, BrandB had gone from "absolute total entrepreneurial, no 
structured documents of any kind, to more base formalisation" (CFO) and that 
this change would likely continue for both brands as they grew. For him the 
challenge and in risk in this was going to be: 
To keep the heart and soul ... (because) the general managers 
may end up just being paper pushers, which is so the big hotel 
kind of structure. You have to be able to cover yourself up. 
Everything has to have a memo. 
The CEO similarly suggested that though he would not want it to necessarily 
happen, they would likely have more analytical tools and techniques for analysing 
SmallCo when It grew because as a bigger company "we've got to do a lot more 
checking, a little bit more tick boxing with the checklists. " 
One reason for the lack of time spent analysing the RWRI concept with tools was 
the focus on "coming to market with the new position as soon as possible" (CEO). 
The RWRI decision took less than three months to go from the initial idea to the 
formal implementation and this was said to reflect the firm's value of making and 
implementing decisions quickly "without wasting a lot of time validating what we 
already know" (CEO) since they felt that they needed to always be making and 
implementing strategic decisions quicker than the competition. "We change the 
way we focus on things more quickly and often ... Probably what could take 
Marriott four years to make a decision, we'll jump in 24 hours, and say, oh, 
that's not working, let's change it" (CFO). 
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This decision-making speed was cited by many interviewees and each described 
similar instances in which they would discuss an idea they had related to the 
RWRI with the CEO and then "If he likes it, he will then ask me to cost it up and 
do feasibility - will it work? And then it's done" (EC). 
The issue of speed was, however, a relative one as there were different views 
within the team. For the CFO, for example, because "we haven't got 50 projects 
going at once ... at the end of the day, we're not running - we're walking. " On 
the other hand, many Interviewees stated that because SmailCo was in the midst 
of opening ten hotels in less than two years, there were far too many projects 
being managed for anyone to undertake thorough studies. With regards to tools, 
some thought that "there just isn't the time for that" (D2-M). 
As part of the RWRI the EC and SVP-FB suggested that BrandA launch an 
individual menu for each hotel that was built around locally grown and sourced 
foods. The fact that that they were able to propose and implement the idea in 
less than six weeks was considered critical: 
We were the first to commit to it (sourcing local foods) as a 
large group ... The press about it alone was worth the effort ... 
and that wouldn't have happened if we hadn't been ahead of 
the others ... (Who) are all starting to do it too now (SVP-FB). 
This speed with which the team worked to develop the idea and get it ready for 
implementation was also linked by many of the interviewees to the fact that the 
company prides itself on being innovative and the first to market with many ideas 
and thus the decision-making process needed to be quick and easy. According to 
the EC: 
BrandA is a constantly evolving concept. We're always looking 
for new initiatives, new ideas, and if we had to go through a lot 
of bureaucracy to get things done, our wheels would turn 
extremely slowly. 
The Importance of being different was seen by most interviewees as the 
company's main competitive advantage, and for them their jobs, and the mission 
of the brands, was always to be creative and Innovative in every way possible. 
The common perception of strategy tools that emanated from consulting or 
academia was that they were too restrictive for the type of creativity and 
innovation that SmaliCo and its management were seeking to achieve. For some 
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it was about being "a market leader in terms of trying to find innovative new 
touches ... anything that makes us think in the 
box or look at things from some 
pre-set manner isn't going to help come up with those" (D3-M). Others saw the 
use of such tools as approximating a "systematic structured approach" that would 
dictate to them how to do their work and how to think about the company and 
industry and as such is looked at negatively as "something that's not good for us 
... as a company and as individuals" (SVP-FB). Instead, the team members 
repeatedly stated that they were expected to think differently, to approach 
problems differently, and with regards to the company's leaders, to "demonstrate 
to them that we're doing something differently" (GDRM). 
For example, within the RWRI the SVP-BM did not rely on any conceptual tools or 
even basic templates for identifying current or future brand standards. "I don't 
need to go around with a tick box that says, 'does it need this, does it need this. '" 
Instead, his approach was more individual and experiential: 
I take it in. I see it. I work in the environment. I watch how 
people talk to staff. I see how the food is presented. I watch 
how people are checked in. I see how the rooms are 
presented, as a person who visits it. I live the brand, and 
therefore I will see how it can be improved. 
Others similarly agreed that the lack of tools was a positive part of the culture 
because it demonstrated faith In the ideas of the staff. For example: 
Personally, I see it (not advocating the use of tools) as a 
positive because I think that it's trusting. I think that it's 
trusting and allowing our freedom of imagination and creativity 
(SVP-FB). 
SmaliCo was described as "not a company that writes lots of reports or anything 
like that" (D2-M). This lack of formalisation with regards to written explanations 
and analysis was primarily seen as a positive aspect that was linked to their 
Individuality, creativity, and speed of decision making and implementation. As 
one director put it: 
If we wrote down and documented everything that we were 
wanting to put into a strategy, then you'd spend just as much 
time doing that as you do thinking, and then there's no 
implementation. Suddenly you then become quite, almost too 
structured, robotic (SVP-FB). 
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Ownership Structure 
The CEO noted that because SmaliCo owns and operates its hotels, it is able to 
try something unusual or what might be considered risky. If an initiative didn't 
work it was easy to cancel and, if it did work, it can easily be rolled out to all its 
properties. As the company owned the hotels and managed them, there was no 
fear of failing In the eyes of external hotel owners. As such, he said, there was 
less need to study every decision ahead of time with formal analytical tools. 
The CFO, meanwhile, also noted that at SmallCo it was easier to make and follow 
through on strategic decisions like RWRI than it is at larger hotel companies 
because the latter's organisational and management structures are comparatively 
complex. In those larger firms, he says, some hotels are owned and: 
Certain hotels work from management fees, or they're a 
franchise ... And then you start trying to 
look at what the cost 
comparisons are and these get very, very murky. And because 
of that scenario ... what you're analysing isn't going to 
help 
you. 
Perception of the Hotel Industry 
Within SmailCo there was the perception that within the hotel industry too many 
firms had begun to think that the answers to their strategic questions could be 
answered rationally like manufacturing firms, and that because the hotel industry 
was driven by the emotions of guests and employees, and not rational thinking, 
many firms had as a result suffered. For the CEO the fact that larger hotel 
companies tend to rely on formalised studies and strategy tools is a key reason 
why "I don't think that much creative juices go on In these companies. " For him, 
these larger hotel companies are wasting their employees' valuable time by 
having them produce their many detailed studies. He believes that these firms 
primarily use formal tools and procedures "because their internal process dictates 
it. " The time and energy spent on formally studying and documenting different 
options has, In his opinion, also detrimentally led "the big boys Into the trap of 
being quite blind. They're not opportunistic ... 
because the processes get In the 
way of function, and that is the problem with all of these (tools and techniques). " 
As an example he explained how one large International hotel firm had recently 
sent a team of seven persons to the UK for five days to examine the possibility of 
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purchasing all of SmaliCo as a means to expand in Europe with a new brand and 
segment. He states that: 
And I know that the people who looked at our business were 
absolutely all for it, and I've spoke with them since, and they 
just couldn't get it past [name of a top committee member] 
who was just putting it through the usual core brand tick box, 
and BrandA is not tick box in a core brand way ... they do that because they've always done it. It's been safe, and it works for 
them... The hardest thing to say in business is `no. ' By doing 
that they say that (no) a lot. 
While those working in the marketing of the brands appreciated that SmailCo was 
Informal with its brand audits, having never done an actual official one, they also 
pointed out that it was also understandable that the bigger hotel firms, due to the 
number of hotels and brands they have, must regularly audit their brands and 
clarify their positions in writing and with strategy tools. 
5.4.4 SmaIICo Case Summary 
Strategy tools are not used at SmallCo. The CEO rejects these tools as too 
academic and not practical enough for the strategy work that he undertakes. His 
top executives and other managers also do not use the tools as they are often not 
included in the strategising tasks which are generally conducted by only the CEO 
and his CFO. While some lower-level managers have attempted to use such 
tools, their efforts have been thwarted by the company's insistence on providing 
simple answers based on experience and intuition rather than theory. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented the research findings from each of the three case studies 
and focused on the use of strategy tools within their specific strategic initiatives 
as well as a more general overview according to the type of practitioner and 
influence of different contextual factors. The findings across the three cases 
suggest that several important issues are present in all the organisations. These 
include: 
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1. Strategy tools are often rejected not only by the companies' CEOs, but 
also by their top management team members. 
2. Lower-level practitioners often do use tools but this is not known to the 
top management. Similarly, tools are used within specific departments 
and/or by particular individuals, but this is also not widely known 
throughout the organisation. 
3. Organisational contextual issues, such as leadership, culture and accepted 
strategising practices influence the use and perception of strategy tools. 
4. The hotel industry context also influences the perceived value of tools and 
limits the ability to use certain generic strategy tools. 
The next chapter discusses these findings in relation to the research literature 
reviewed in chapters two and three. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings in relation to the extant literature and the 
study's objectives. Section 6.2 examines why strategy tools are not used within 
the three firms. Section 6.3 focuses more specifically on the use of strategy tools 
during the strategy-making processes. The chapter concludes in section 6.4 with 
a brief discussion of the interrelationship between the two themes and a chapter 
conclusion. 
6.2 The Rejection of Strategy Tools 
Strategy tools are created to assist with the strategic management process and 
most classical tools are intended for the processes' strategy analysis phase of 
strategy formulation. Past studies of tool use have found that it is here that more 
tools are more often used. This study found, however, that strategy tools are 
often rejected for use during strategy analysis and formulation for several 
reasons. These include the firms' approach to strategy formulation and strategy 
practices, the perception that most generic and industry tools lack legitimacy, and 
several specific industry characteristics. The following discussion is structured 
around these three areas. 
6.2.1 Strategy Formulation 
Top executives are often said to be the organisational members most likely to use 
strategy tools since they have more strategic responsibilities (see Hill & 
Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson et al., 2006). As such, studies about the use and 
perception of strategy tools have focused almost exclusively on this group (e. g. 
Rigby, 2001b; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005; Stenfors, 2007). This study's findings 
revealed, however, that the three firms' CEOs not only refrain from using any of 
the conceptual strategy tools commonly Identified as the most popular (see 
Rigby, 2001b, 2003; Rigby & Bilodeau, 2005), but that their views about 
strategy, strategy-making and strategy tools discourage the use of the latter 
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within their firms. Reasons why they reject tools for their strategy-making 
activities appear to centre around the issues of leadership and strategy-making, a 
focus on the short-term and practical, and the need for fast and creative strategic 
decisions. These are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Leadership and Strategy-Making 
Top strategists may use traditional strategy tools to help structure their thinking 
and guide their strategic decision-making process (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). 
This is not, however, the case at either of the two smaller firms studied12 where 
the CEOs consider the idea that conceptual tools can and/or do aid one's strategic 
thinking and strategy-making process as `silly' and `ridiculous'. They suggest 
that the term `strategy tool' is a misnomer since they doubt whether tools such as 
frameworks and matrices can actually help guide strategists to make the 'right' 
strategic decision. According to them, tools imply rules and structure but 'real 
strategic thinking' is about breaking rules and avoiding such structure. For them 
it Is unstructured thinking that separates strategic thinkers from those that are 
more symptom-oriented, and they thus see tools not only as unnecessary, but 
also as inconsistent with what it means to think strategically. 
According to the CEOs, strategy-making should be built around insights gathered 
from personal experience. They believe that formal tools, including models and 
frameworks, are more appropriate for, and perhaps more commonly used by, 
`novices' who lack professional experience and/or confidence In their experience. 
BigCo's CEO, for example, Instructs his top executives and their teams to create 
solutions based on their experiences In the industry and at the company, and not 
through tools, especially as most top executives have been with the firm for 
several decades. Similarly, at SmaliCo the CEO distrusts ideas that come 
through the use of formal tools as they do not incorporate the importance of 
industry experience and in-depth familiarity with the firm's unique characteristics. 
Such views are consistent with past research which has found that practitioners 
believe that the use of tools prevent them from deploying knowledge-based 
experience (Grant, 2003). Although Schön (1982) has noted that prescriptive 
theories may not convey the full complexity of a situation and that as such 
practitioners must combine strategic concepts with the practical knowledge they 
have gained from previous experiences, these CEOs see tools as rigid Instruments 
"As the CEO of BigCo was not interviewed or observed, the researcher refrains from attempting to 
interpret his personal use of tools, though his perception of tools and strategy, as gathered from 
documents and the views of others, is used when appropriate. 
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that either do not lend themselves to personal experience, or which restrict one 
from drawing on such knowledge. The CEOs perceive strategy models and 
frameworks as substitutes for experience rather than as complementary tools. 
Their rejection of tools thus suggests that Hayes and Abernathy's (1980) 
observation that due to the complexity of strategic decision-making, strategists 
may be better served through experience-based insights rather than technical 
formality and analytical detachment, is perhaps acknowledged in industry even if 
not yet in academia and consultancy where the analytical role of strategy tools 
are still popular in business school textbooks and courses (e. g. Mazza & Alvarez, 
2000). 
Valuing experience over formal analysis and tools influences the strategy 
creation process since such values affect a firm's thinking style and can lead to 
organisational paradigms about how strategy Is and should be made (Mintzberg 
et al., 1998). SmallCo and MediumCo were repeatedly described as 
entrepreneurial since their strategic management process and decision-making 
styles are predominantly based on the CEOs managing the process and making 
most strategic decisions themselves. Both CEOs describe their strategies as 
based on `vision' and `intuition'. For instance, while he cites the importance of 
financial models, SmallCo's CEO has rejected development projects where these 
models have suggested that a project will make valuable economic sense since to 
him they `just didn't feel right'. The CEOs see the use of tools as contradictory to 
how leaders should go about their strategy work and consider the use of tools as 
a distraction that prevents `real leaders' from engaging in `real strategy work'. 
The CEOs say that not only do they not need tools, but that using them would 
hinder their ability to have an overall vision for the company since for them tools 
are too simplistic to encompass the whole strategic situation their firms face. 
While this focused analytical characteristic that pinpoints specific Issues to be 
explored according to predetermined criteria is often cited as one benefit to many 
tools and their use (e. g. Hax & Majluf, 1983; Henderson, 1984; Knott, 2006; 
Learned et al., 1965), the CEOs do not perceive tools In this way. Instead they 
see the tools as inconsistent with their ability to understand the overall situation 
facing their firm since tools are not made for their thinking styles or their firm's 
particularities. This view is consistent with Sheth and Sisodia (1999) who posited 
that analytical frameworks may detract from the ability of top managers to `see 
the big picture' since most tools focus on narrow topics and that by using them 
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practitioners can be disconnected from other items not addressed within the tools 
themselves. 
The findings also confirm past research showing that entrepreneurial strategists 
often rely on vision and intuition rather than on rational thinking and analysis 
(see Mintzberg et al., 1998). The findings also extend these studies inasmuch as 
they illustrate that the use of strategy tools is considered contradictory to the 
visionary thinking that the CEOS believe is necessary in order to draw on their 
own mental representations of the strategic challenges facing their firms and the 
appropriate solutions. That Is, the CEOS do not use tools not only because 
entrepreneurial strategy-making rarely relies on rational thinking (Mintzberg et 
al., 1998), but because the tools associated with such a formal approach are 
perceived as detrimental to the ability to think intuitively and believe in one's 
vision. Their views can be understood through Mintzberg et al. 's (1998) 
explanation of the strategist as visionary whose strategy is built on a perspective 
based on judgement, experience and wisdom, rather than on the use of the 
conceptual frameworks and tools that are recommended as part of the more 
prescriptive planning, design and positioning schools. Their reluctance to use 
tools is also explained by Isenberg's (1984) findings that suggest that those who 
rely on experience, judgement and intuition do not use formal systems to lead 
their organisations. This study extends these findings, however, through its more 
narrow focus on conceptual tools and their use since the study's findings 
demonstrate that tools are often considered too formal for, and contradictory to, 
the Intuitive, experience-based knowledge that is required for strategic vision and 
leadership. Previous studies of hotel executives' strategic behaviours support 
this finding since these studies demonstrate that top executives in the hotel 
industry have not historically relied on formal approaches In the strategic 
management process (e. g. Olsen et al., 1994). 
Conversely, the above-mentioned entrepreneurial focus on initiative and intuition 
has been blamed for some of the hotel industry's ineffective strategy processes, 
including environmental scanning (Okumus, 2004) and strategic-decision making 
(Harrington & Ottenbacher, 2009). However, within the firms a rational 
approach to strategy formulation and decision-making based in part on 
conceptual tools is often seen as ineffective. For example, the use of extensive 
analysis and consultancy tools is blamed for the near bankruptcy at MediumCo, 
while the current CEO's vision is commonly cited as having saved the firm. 
197 
Similarly, a dedicated Strategy Department's extensive environmental scanning 
techniques and tools did not help BigCo to foresee the challenges they would face 
in the early 1990s. Their rejection of tools as analytical "crutches" (CEO, 
MediumCo ) that have often failed them and other firms is consistent with 
Whittington et al. 's (2006) suggestion that the traditional view of strategy has 
perhaps failed practitioners not because of the deliberateness, but because of its 
tendency to be overly detached and analytical. 
Although tools might be intended for rational thinking, for the CEOs strategy- 
making is not about "someone else's view of what's rational" (CEO, SmallCo) but 
their own. According to the literature, the rational model of strategy formulation 
tends to consist of extensive analysis Involving large amounts of data, the 
generation of alternative Ideas, and the valuation of each option's consequences 
before the selection of the best strategy (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Priem et 
al., 1995), and strategy tools have generally been created with this perspective In 
mind (Hill & Westbrook, 1997; Learned et al., 1965). While at BigCo there was 
extensive data collection, and the process used in the ESP followed what the 
project managers referred to as "classical strategy development, " there Is no 
evidence that the other firms engage in the rational model of strategy 
formulation. Rather than describing or demonstrating a formal process by which 
they consider specific issues in a linear fashion, as is recommended by the 
classical school of thought (e. g. Learned et al., 1965), the firms' strategy-making 
processes are instead seen to be based on the CEOs constant observation and 
discussion of the firm, its competitors, customers, Industry and environmental 
situation, and, based on this and their experiences, drawing conclusions about 
what strategies they should pursue. 
As with many of their firms' other strategies, both the RWRI (SmailCo) and the 
JV-REG (MediumCo) emerged (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) from casual 
conversations or external parties, and neither CEO had previously envisioned 
them as part of a deliberate (e. g. Ansoff, 1965) strategy. The Initiatives were 
neither conceived nor developed through a formal strategic planning process or 
tools and the CEOs did not require any confirmation of their decisions through 
any conceptual frameworks. While emergent strategies may be configured 
according to conceptual frameworks and the Implicit rules required for their use 
and Interpretation (Johnson, 1988), this study found that the two specific 
strategic Initiatives were not created or developed through any such tools. Even 
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though Mintzberg et al. (1998) have suggested that a strategy's origin can be 
emergent while its details are developed through specific plans, much as was the 
case here, the latter phases were also void of any conceptual tool. While 
McKiernan (1996b) suggests because they are useful for dealing with changes in 
the internal and external environments, both the planning and learning 
approaches to strategy creation use rational analysis techniques and tools to 
either lead or support the strategy process, this study did not confirm this. 
Instead, the findings are consistent with the notion that when strategy is seen or 
realised as an emergent phenomena, the field's tools may be rejected as 
inappropriate or unnecessary (Okumus & Wong, 2005b). 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) have shown that rational, deliberate thinking Is not 
necessary in order to create coherent patterns of strategic decisions and actions, 
and the findings of this study show that the CEOs do not believe they need this, 
or analytical tools, to develop specific strategic Initiatives or their overall 
strategies. For example, both projects were also described as experiments, with 
MediumCo's CEO exploring whether or not he should change his mind about joint 
ventures, and SmailCo's CEO referring to the RWRI as a "well-hedged gamble. " 
MediumCo's CEO rejected the use of tools during his presentations and strategy 
workshops, and at SmallCo the CEO requested that a document including a SWOT 
analysis be rewritten to exclude this. Both, meanwhile, explained that tools are 
not only not part of their standard procedures, but that they do not use them 
even on an occasional basis. Thus, while Regner (2003) found that the strategy- 
making process for the strategists at the centre of the organisations he studied 
were deductive In that they largely planned, analysed and engaged In standard 
routines, the hotel CEOs are, Instead, more inductive, like the practitioners 
Regner observed in his firms' periphery who were more experimental and relied 
more on trial-and-error approaches for their strategy-making. 
Short-term and Practical Focus 
That these CEOS (SmaliCo, MediumCo) prioritise their experiences rather than 
formal analysis when formulating strategy Is not surprising In light of the strategic 
hospitality management literature that suggests that hotel industry practitioners 
generally demonstrate a preference for a `hands on' management style as 
opposed to a more structured analysis (Okumus, 2004). The three CEOs are also 
found to be much more focused on Issues that are of immediate concern as 
opposed to long-term plans, and as such do not see the need for formal 
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strategising to create an overall direction for their firms. BigCo's CEO, for 
example, is described as a "highly tactical person" who believes that if "you take 
care of the short-term the long term falls into place" and that a focus on 
immediate concerns helps people to 'keep their eye on the ball'. This emphasis 
on short-term objectives Is consistent with previous strategic hospitality 
management research which has found it to generally be a greater concern than 
long-term planning for hospitality practitioners (Olsen et al., 1994; Teare et al., 
1998; West & Olsen, 1989). Similarly, the company's ESP focused on growth 
opportunities ("how many, where and when") as opposed to growth strategies. 
This focus was symbolised by the world 'plan' eventually replacing `strategy' In 
the project's official name since the project sponsors wanted the team to 
concentrate on concrete numerical projections rather than conceptual plans. 
Thus, and as is discussed in more detail further below, while many financial 
models and tools were explicitly used, conceptual frameworks were not. 
At all three firms the executives maintain that that their primary responsibility, 
and one which takes up most of their time, is to focus on their `day jobs' rather 
than to create long-range plans. At BigCo, the CEO has ordered that the 
functional EVPs need to be responsible for their departmental strategies, which he 
prefers to call action plans, rather than rely on a centralised Strategy department. 
For him, his top executives' focus must be on tangible outcomes rather than 
conceptual planning. Similarly, the CEO of MediumCo has, until recently, avoided 
Involving his department heads in any kind of strategic planning so as to keep 
them focused on the company's more immediate problems, especially since the 
company has only recently emerged from a situation of financial distress. At 
SmailCo, meanwhile, the practitioners maintain that their sole responsibility Is to 
take care of their functional departments and that the strategic approach Is "I say 
- you do" (D-RM). Olsen et al. (1992) explain that within the hotel industry the 
processes Involved In formal strategic management are seen as distractions from 
tangible pursuits, and this Is clearly evident at the three firms. Previous research 
has found, for example, that strategy tools are used at strategy workshops (e. g. 
Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Schwarz, 2004), but within the three firms cross- 
functional meetings are either largely episodes where the leader can 
communicate his strategies (MediumCo), tend not to Involve `Strategy" 
development (BigCo), or are eschewed in favour of informal and Impromptu 
conversations (SmaliCo). That strategising sessions are seen as formal and 
unnecessary Is consistent with previous research that has found strategy 
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workshops to most often be used as part of formal strategic planning and firm- 
wide direction setting rather than for concrete projects (Schwarz, 2004). 
Similarly, Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) note that tools are used to help 
workshop participants systematically Identify their firms' strategies and to 
develop and evaluate scenarios, neither of which were among the objectives for 
these firms during any of the strategic initiatives that form part of this study. The 
lack of strategy workshops, and corresponding limited tool use, can also be 
understood by the hospitality practitioners' general view that formal strategy 
exercises such as environmental scanning, which are a typical component of such 
episodes, are a waste of time (Olsen et al., 1992). The industry is said, because 
of its roots In entrepreneurialism, to be one where `doing' and active problem 
solving are valued and where `soft activities' such as scanning are seen as 
distractions from, rather than elements of, achieving tangible objectives (Olsen et 
al., 1992) Thus, formal meetings and workshops, as examples of `soft' activities, 
are rejected, which limits the possibility for tools to be used. 
While strategy tools are designed for analytical purposes, others suggest that 
they may provide other less well-known benefits during meetings and workshops. 
Knott (2006), for example, posits that they may facilitate dialogue and Stenfors 
et al. (2006) note that their Interviewees suggest that a main benefit from using 
tools In meetings is that they help surface contentious Issues and Improve 
communication. Similarly, Kaplan & Jarzabkowskl (2006) found that in meetings 
tools can act as boundary objects to Improve cross-departmental and hierarchical 
communication, while the use of a greater number of tools may help ensure 
different views of people considered during strategy formulation (Hussey, 1997). 
Thus, while tools are not used during strategising episodes such as meetings 
since these are rejected, and perhaps because a leader does not want alternative 
opinions to be raised as with MediumCo, the fact that they are not used In such 
activities is an Implicit reason for their overall rejection in the firm. That Is, since 
the use of tools may have social benefits, such as those mentioned above, and 
the practitioners are not familiar with these benefits or the social roles tools can 
play, their negative perception of tools as overly-analytical and formal 
instruments is not put Into question, and they continue to be rejected for all 
purposes. Thus, as they are less involved in strategic issues and formulation, and 
since there are few, if any, strategic-planning exercises in which tools may be 
utilised, there is little opportunity for these practitioners to experience the use of 
tools and evaluate their utility. This reinforces the perception that tools are only 
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for analytical purposes which, as discussed, have been found to be, frustrating 
and ineffective. 
Speed and Creativity 
According to Whittington et al. (2006), strategy formulation most often happens 
at a pace that precludes the analytical detachment required in order for 
practitioners to engage in the prescribed use of many tools. This is the case at 
both MediumCo and SmallCo where a formal strategy processes is seen as an 
obstacle to the fast decision-making that is required to remain competitive and 
proactive. This is important at both firms since they believe that their uniqueness 
comes from anticipating and creating customer preferences and market 
opportunities rather than from being seen as copying their competitors. This 
perspective supports Okumus' (2004) suggestion that firms may benefit more 
from learning to quickly adapt to changing environments rather than from 
analysing and trying to predict it, and helps explain why the formal use of tools is 
rejected. While it contradicts Stenfors et al. 's (2006) finding that many of their 
respondents thought that using tools sped up the strategy process through faster 
analysis and planning, it is consistent with the views of their other respondents 
who noted that there was little time to use tools efficiently and that the use of 
tools occupied time that could instead be spent on actual business problems. 
The extensive time that this study's participants perceived as necessary to 
conduct formal analysis using tools Is also explained by the fact that a strategy 
process that involves formal analysis is easily undermined by the time 
requirements to do It accurately (Mintzberg, 1994). For example, Harrington 
(2004) points out that an increased Involvement of organisational members In the 
strategy-making process is thought to slow down the decision-making process 
and cost the firm more In terms of employee time. Both of these Issues were 
clearly reasons why formal analyses, and the associated role of tools, are rejected 
at SmallCo. Furthermore, their focus on short-term objectives and solutions Is 
consistent with previous research that has found that hotel firms are committed 
to tangible, short-term goals (Costa & Teare, 2000), meaning that the time 
necessary to properly use tools for analytical and decision-making purposes 
would contradict such goals. Thus, contrary to Langley's (1990) finding that 
formal analysis Is often used to procrastinate strategic decision-making, this 
study found that tools were rejected for this very reason. 
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Most . strategy models and 
frameworks are specifically designed to be aids for 
rational and analytical thinking about strategic challenges (Jarzabkowski & 
Wilson, 2006). However, it is specifically this purported benefit that many of the 
practitioners, including the CEOs of the two smaller firms, perceive as an 
important weakness of tools since they believe that their successful strategies 
result from Innovative and creative thinking and not from traditional or 
standardised strategic planning exercises and tools. While one of BigCo's ESP 
project managers believes that the templates used are not so directive as to limit 
creative thinking, she is the anomaly. At SmailCo, for example, while the firm 
has never engaged in strategic analysis using tools, the fact that other firms are 
likely to use them is seen as a fundamental reason why the CEO avoids them 
since he wants his firm and hotel brands to be unlike any other. For him, this 
means not only that the hotels should be different but that the management style 
should also avoid any formality and bureaucracy, which he associates with the 
use of tools. He believes that such practices destroy the spirit of the hotel 
business at the top level and that this Is then transmitted to the hotels and their 
managers as well, a view supported by the view that formal management 
activities can eliminate creativity in the lower levels of organisations (Mintzberg, 
1994) and which might be one reason why hotel firms do not wish to formally 
scan the external environment (Okumus, 2004). The findings, therefore, largely 
contradict Knott's (2006) suggestion that the thinking associated with tool use 
can be expansive and creative and that this may be most appropriate when 
innovative and proactive solutions are required. Instead, the views of 
practitioners are supported by Mintzberg (1994) who notes that a systematic bias 
in formal planning techniques is that they involve 'narrow rationality' which leads 
one away from human expressions of creativity and Intuition and towards 
incremental rather than quantum changes. In other words, because formal 
strategic planning generally reinforces the status quo of established categories, 
rather than rearrange these categories as with creative thinking (Mintzberg, 
1994), the practitioners see the tools and techniques associated with strategic 
planning as unable to incorporate creative ideas. 
Similar to the view that frameworks can become paradigms that restrict creative 
and innovative thinking (Thomas, 1984), MediumCo and SmaliCo's managers 
believe that tools limit creativity by forcing thoughts into standard `boxes'. The 
visual diagrams associated with the tools (Eppler & Platts, 2009; Morecroft, 
1992; Whyte et al., 2008), rather than facilitate divergent thinking (Knott, 2006), 
203 
are instead seen to restrict it. Many of the practitioners see diagrams such as 
2x2 matrices as particularly dangerous since they do not want their strategies to 
fit pre-established models, especially since they think that many other firms use 
and are constrained by such tools and as a result have lost the ability to 
differentiate themselves. Mintzberg (1994) notes that analytical planning Is 
about thinking in terms of boxes and what fits In them, and the very nature of 
creative thinking as part of strategy formulation means that one must move 
beyond such boxes, and such views are clearly evident In the findings. Both 
MediumCo and SmaliCo's CEOs believe that because most firms rely on the same 
tools, they end up with the same strategies, brands and problems. They 
therefore see the use of strategy tools as counterproductive to creating the 
unique strategies and competitive methods that their firms require. These views 
can be understood by Cummings and Daellenbach's (2009, in press) view that 
academics are more likely to create and advocate prescriptive strategy tools and 
theories when they believe that organisations are more similar than different, and 
that seeing firms and their strategies as unique may make them less likely to 
advocate the power of tools and their general prescriptions. That Is, tools are 
seen as beneficial when firms are thought to be similar, and as the CEOs argue 
that their strategies are built on being different, they see tools as 
counterproductive to their objectives. 
6.2.2 Legitimisation 
Executives searching for personal or occupational legitimacy are often said to rely 
on tools and techniques deemed credible by their colleagues, organisational 
communities and superiors (Seidl, 2007), as these are recognised or perceived to 
be acceptable and/or appropriate means for evaluating strategic options and 
making strategic decisions (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). Within the three 
organisations, however, the opposite is true as the general consensus Is that 
there is more respect for strategic decisions that are based on personal 
experience and insights than for those based on formal tools or processes. Thus, 
instead of adding credibility to a strategist or strategic decision, the use of tools is 
seen as diminishing this since "gut feelings' and 'instinct' are often more valued 
than more formal and analytical methods. The use of formal tools and techniques 
is instead seen as an example of how executives find ways to rationalise their role 
in their firms' strategy process. Thus, although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
suggest that social pressures to conform often drives organisations to adopt 
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known and used management techniques, the opposite was found to be true in 
this study in relation to the use of formal strategy tools and techniques. Since 
practices that are institutionalised include those which firms are unlikely to 
abandon since they are integrally important to the firm's value and cognitive 
structure (Carter et al, 2000). The practitioners' rejection of tools can be seen as 
just such an institutionalised practice that is important to their firms' value 
systems, which is passed down by the CEOS, and which are unlikely to change. 
Reasons why tools are seen as lacking credibility and legitimacy are now 
discussed. 
Past failures 
This criticism of tools and formal analysis was found to be linked to past 
experiences the practitioners had with tools and that proved frustrating and 
ineffective. Rigby (2001b) found through his surveys that many practitioners 
believe that tools often do not deliver what they promise, and this is the case In 
all three firms where the CEOs associate the failure of some past strategies with 
the fact that those responsible for the strategy formulation had relied on tools to 
structure the process and deliver the results but were not critical enough of the 
ensuing recommended strategies. For example, at MediumCo, the failed strategy 
is described as the result of the employment of an expensive consultancy firm 
which facilitated the experience and `signed off' on the strategic plan, but which 
failed to consider the long term implications. SmallCo's CEO blames the use of 
strategy tools by a former owner as having nearly destroyed BrandA because: 
They tried to look at it like they look at their other brands, and 
tried to compare it along the same kind of criteria as other 
brands, when in reality what it needed was for the strategy 
behind It to be allowed to constantly evolve like it needed, 
rather than be pigeonholed into some model of how hotels 
should be and (should) compete. 
While tools may help practitioners to understand what is happening In their firms 
and environments, they are rarely designed to produce a right answer or 
miraculous solution (Ambrosini & Jenkins, 2007). However, within both BigCo 
and MediumCo the tools, and those responsible for using them on the failed 
projects, were blamed for not having come up with the right strategy. These 
unrealistic and exceedingly optimistic expectations of the usefulness of tools have 
thus served to create an almost-hostile environment where strategy tools are 
held in contempt by the top management. This finding, and Mintzberg's (1994) 
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suggestion that the limitations of some tools has as much to do with the short- 
sightedness of the people using them as with the tools themselves, therefore 
extends Rigby's (2001b) survey result by demonstrating that the notion that tools 
are thought have failed to meet their promises may be a result of practitioners 
having too-high of expectations. These expectations are perhaps falsely raised 
by the tool's proponents, including academics, consultants and fellow 
practitioners. 
The management at both MediumCo and BigCo also reject strategy tools because 
they believe that the academics and consultants who create and recommend their 
tools underestimate the complexity involved In strategy formulation and 
implementation. Their views are consistent with past literature that has criticised 
the use of tools for causing practitioners to oversimplify strategic management 
(Shay & Rothaermel, 1999; Thomas, 1984) and for not being pragmatically 
relevant to practitioners (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; 
Marcus et al., 1995). This helps explain the past problems In these firms since 
interviewees suggest that those responsible for introducing and using the tools 
did not consider the firm's history, culture and/or management style. As a result, 
the strategies that were developed were perceived as unrealistic since they did 
not address many of the company's specific challenges and weaknesses, thus 
hindering their ability to implement the recommended strategies "that may have 
looked good on paper" (SA, MediumCo). 
Academic Endorsement 
Within all three companies strategy tools are largely considered 'too academic' 
and 'not practical, ' with the CEOs all saying that they wanted their management 
teams to avoid this approach in their strategy-related work. Like some of Knott's 
(2008) interviewees who explained that their organisations did not value 
'textbook' tools, executives in the three firms are reluctant to be seen relying on 
academic concepts since these are not respected by their CEOs and other 
superiors. At MediumCo there is the oft-repeated story about how the CEO saved 
the company from failures that he blamed on consultants and their tools. 
Similarly, the fact that BigCo's former Strategy Department had been eliminated 
for its perceived failures means for many interviewees that the academic tools 
and techniques commonly used by this department are not something with which 
they want to be associated, and as such many people are 'gun-shy' about using, 
and being seen to use, such tools. Similarly, as with Grant's (2003) finding that 
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some practitioners are sceptical of the jargon associated with tools, BigCo's 
managers are told to remove any academic jargon from their strategy 
presentations since this obscures their own ideas. Both SmaliCo and MediumCo's 
CEO also use many colourful euphemisms when describing the relevance of 
academic Ideas, saying In essence that their work is not practical and serves no 
one but themselves. Thus, while the strategy literature tends to suggest that 
particular strategic practices are often considered as more legitimate when they 
have been created or endorsed by academics and consultants (e. g. Whittington, 
2003), this study found the opposite to be true: strategy tools associated with 
academics and consultants are considered less legitimate by the CEOs and, thus, 
apparently, by most of their top managers. 
Even though the use of tools may easily be justified and supported due to their 
endorsement by respected consultancy firms and academics (Johnson et al., 
2007), and from previous research and anecdotal information demonstrating 
their utility (Seidl, 2007), within the three firms the general view Is that none of 
this provides the tools, or their users, with any credibility. Instead, the use of 
externally-created strategy tools Is seen as detracting from the practitioners' 
credibility as strategic thinkers since using tools is Interpreted to mean that a 
practitioner is not knowledgeable or experienced enough to strategise without 
them. This includes not only well-established tools but also modern techniques 
and approaches that practitioners have heard of and/or read about, even though 
previous research suggests that utilising new tools may also enhance a 
strategist's credibility since it represents a modern and progressive approach 
(Lozeau et al., 2002). The reluctance to use such tools counters Carson et al. 's 
(2000) supposition that managers may adopt external ideas In order to outsource 
their critical thinking. Similarly it suggests that within the hotel industry 
managers may trust their own judgements, or at least be admonished for not 
doing so, and thus are not prone to adopting currently popular strategic 
management tools as easy and ready-made `panaceas' (Nohrla & Berkley, 
1994). 
Practitioners at MediumCo and SmaliCo also seem to recognise that strategy 
frames are particularly problematic during periods of intense environmental 
change (Dunbar et al., 1996). They, for example, criticise the Idea of using well- 
established strategy models and frameworks since they force their users to think 
in certain ways that are likely either outdated or too similar to competitors. At 
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BigCo, some practitioners believe that using established, popular tools that are 
easy to use and familiar prevents their colleagues in other firms from 'going 
outside their comfort zone' and experimenting with newer or perhaps better tools 
that, while less familiar and which would require time to master, could possibly 
provide them with fresh perspectives on their company and the Industry. Such 
views are consistent with previous research which has suggested that a reliance 
on popular tools may cause practitioners to refrain from adopting unfamiliar yet 
potentially powerful tools and techniques (Hill & Westbrook, 1997). As such, one 
can see that their efforts to remain competitive may lead them to look for new 
concepts and tools as Ghemawat (2000) suggest firms do as a result of the un- 
sustainability of competitive advantages. At BigCo, for example, Interviewees 
suggest that some of their Industry colleagues have become overly-accustomed 
not only to working In certain ways, but to thinking In particular ways as well. 
They consider that this is a severe weakness in the strategy-making effort since, 
for them, many industry standard approaches, such as market segmentation and 
competitor analysis, need to be updated based on new research and thinking. 
Conceptual vs. Quantitative Tools 
A concept is seen as non-obvious and valuable when it adds insight to existing 
and acceptable ideas and rules of thumb (Thomas & Tymon, 1982). This study 
found that practitioners see many well-known conceptual strategy tools as 
fundamentally simple and basic and therefore not legitimate or necessary 
replacements for their own personal analytical and decision-making techniques. 
For them, therefore, there is little value in using these tools, especially because 
they believe that by using them they would come to the same conclusions that 
they either already knew or which they could arrive at in a more simple, casual, 
fast and less expensive manner. At BigCo, for example, using such a tool like 
SWOT analysis is said to not only waste time by pointing out what everyone 
already knows, but also discourages people from continuing in the official 
strategy process because of boredom and frustration through monotony. Thus, 
even though the more basic tools such as SWOT analysis have been found to be 
more easily grasped by practitioners and thus more popular (Frost, 2003), the 
simplicity was also revealed to be considered a detriment In this study. Such 
views about the perceived triviality of many tools confirms the literature that 
suggests that practitioners see many institutionalised concepts and tools as 
obvious because they have been widely disseminated and used (Priem & 
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Rosenstein, 2000), and demonstrates as well that this is one reason why tools are 
rejected. 
While many conceptual tools were seen as obvious and of little value, the same 
was not true for quantitative and financial methods, and while these were not the 
focus of the study, juxtaposing views of these with more conceptual tools does 
shed some light on why the latter are rejected. Although Grant (2003) found 
there to be a greater concern with financial analysis tools than with conceptual 
ones for a few firms in difficult environments, this was found to be the norm, 
rather than exception, even In the relatively munificent hotel industry 
environment during which this study was carried out. This finding that financial 
rather than conceptual tool are more esteemed and used contradicts both 
Stenfors et at. (2004) and Clark (1997) who found that mathematical tools are 
often rejected in favour of those that are simple to use. Within the firms the 
executives are expected to be able to think conceptually based on their 
experience, while tools for assisting them with financial analysis are expected to 
be used. This view can be explained by the fact that hospitality organisations' 
cultures are marked by a strong emphasis on quantitative data. 
Although Eppler and Platts (2009) suggest that a valuable use of strategy tools' 
diagrams Is that they can represent and synthesise both types of data, this study 
found such tools are seen not only as being intended only for qualitative rather 
than quantitative information, but also that they are unable to incorporate the 
latter Into their models. As a result there is limited expectation that they can 
assist with much of the strategy work that the executives are expected to 
undertake and which Involve financial calculations. The ESP and 7V were, for 
example, based largely on quantitative data rather than conceptual analyses, 
especially during the strategic analysis phase, which conforms to previous 
research that has suggested that quantitative data is strongly relied upon within 
the hotel industry during such exercises as environmental scanning (Costa and 
Teare, 2000). At BigCo each potential expansion region was evaluated according 
to nearly a dozen criteria, each of which was supported with extensive amounts 
of quantitative data, and although this was inputted Into templates (and later 
analysed with the results extracted), the conceptual tools used in one department 
were not used in conjunction with this analysis. This Is standard policy since the 
firm is described as `maniacal' about numbers due to the CEO's `obsession' with 
data and because the conceptual analysis is seen as a separate and undesirable 
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process rather than as something that can or should be Interlinked with financial 
projections. 
Mintzberg (1994) has noted that within strategic planning an obsession with 
financial quantification can often weaken a company's financial performance since 
strategic thinking is deferred in favour of financial planning. This view is not, 
however, shared amongst the CEOs or their top executives. For example, BigCo's 
CEO described his Strategy as "More", and MediumCo's CEO's primary focus was 
on how to quickly create greater returns through more hotels for the 
shareholders who were impatient regarding their investments. For them, the 
financial concerns dictated the strategies, and financial tools largely replaced 
conceptual ones. Such a focus on finance and growth can be traced back to the 
fact that most hotel companies were founded by visionary entrepreneurs whose 
growth concerns installed a system where strategy was largely seen as being tied 
to more hotel units (Olsen et al., 2008) and which, as is later discussed, led to 
multiple expansion methods which also restrict the use of some tools. 
Industry vs. Non-industry Tools 
DiMagglo and Powell (1983) suggest that organisations often replicate the 
practices of successful competitors, and this implies that specific strategy 
practices and techniques may be industry standards (Spender, 1989). This study 
found, however, that hotel firms purposely do not emulate their competitors' 
formal strategising practices. This also contradicts Gunn & Williams (2008) 
survey results which suggest that senior managers mostly rely on the tools that 
are most popular In their industry. At BigCo, for example, a common perception 
is that competitors are very outdated with their strategy work as they rely on 
well-established techniques that do not accurately capture the nuances needed to 
successfully come up with new strategies. For them, the strategists within the 
industry have become complacent as they are accustomed to repeatedly using 
the same tools and techniques as they did several decades ago for analysing their 
competitive situations and brands, often relying on approaches that have become 
institutionalised within the industry even though they do not provide their users 
with any competitive advantage. Their views may suggest that they recognise 
the inertia and competency trap within the hotel industry that Ingram and Baum 
(1997) suggest has resulted from large hotel chains exploiting a consistent set of 
routines. 
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These BigCo practitioners commented that this reliance on established but 
Ineffective tools may be a result of the fact that new tools which better reflect the 
industry's current challenges and competitive dynamics have not been created or 
disseminated. Thus, it is not just academics (e. g. Becker & Olsen, 1995; 
Okumus & Wong, 2005b) but also practitioners who note that management 
techniques for the hotel Industry have not been created to parallel the changing 
needs of the Industry's managers, and this lack of development contributes, In 
part, to the rejection of tools as a whole rather than just to any one specific tool. 
Thus, while firms may copy existing tools from their competitors In order to 
minimise the benefits it affords them (O'Neill et al., 1998), this study found the 
opposite to be true since the practitioners think that the tools used by 
competitors are providing them a disservice rather than any competitive 
advantage since the Industry's tools are outdated. 
Rather than looking to competitors for techniques and tools, some top executives 
at BigCo are hiring staff from outside the industry as these personnel are thought 
to have experience with strategic practices that are not yet familiar to either the 
company or hotel industry since other industries have, they say, developed new 
and perhaps better tools and techniques. Unlike much of the hospitality strategic 
management literature that suggests that tools created in and for consumer 
goods and manufacturing industries are not applicable to the hotel industry (e. g. 
Becker & Olsen, 1995; Olsen & Roper, 1998; Olsen et al., 2008), these 
practitioners see value in such tools not only because they are not being used by 
other hotel competitors, which perhaps provides their own firm with unique 
insights, but also because, for them, certain issues such as brand management 
and concept development can draw on knowledge from outside the industry. 
They observe that all industries are subject to similar macro-environmental forces 
and need to constantly innovate their products and/or services, which resembles 
some of the arguments Harrison and Enz (2005) make for suggesting that the 
strategic management tools and processes used in the mainstream can and 
should be applied by hotel firms. This contradicts arguments that hospitality 
firms cannot be managed based on manufacturing models and technique (Olsen 
et al., 2008). Similarly, these practitioners note that their primary task in 
creating strategy is to analyse their firm and its evolving ability to adapt to, and 
proactively anticipate, changes in its environment, which is the primary task in all 
industries including the hotel sector (Olsen, 2004). 
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Although some executives across the three organisations shared this view that 
the strategic challenges facing hotel industry are not fundamentally different from 
other industries, many of them, especially at the smaller two firms, many believe 
that the hotel industry is in fact substantially different and that this reduces the 
ability to apply strategy tools. Reasons for this are examined in the next section. 
6.2.3 Hotel Industry Contextual Implications 
Much of the SasP literature suggests that strategy practices may not be relevant 
for all Industries and that industry differences may render certain tools more or 
less useful. Many strategy tools are also thought to perhaps be valuable only 
within the Industry or national contexts In and for which they were created 
(Furrer & Thomas, 2000; Narayanan & Fahey, 2005; Porter, 1991), and as such 
they may not be relevant for different levels of environmental uncertainty, 
national contexts or Industry sectors. Across the three firms practitioners often 
cite specificities of the industry as some reasons why they and their firms also 
reject tools. These include the nature of hotels as service firms, the difficulty In 
creating sustainable competitive advantages, and the current ownership - 
management structure of most hotel companies. 
Service industry characteristics 
While service industry characteristics are said to have significant implications for 
strategic planning in the service sector (e. g. Carman & Langeard, 1980; 
Schmenner, 1986), there is little empirical evidence which demonstrates why this 
is the case (Okumus & Wong, 2005b). This study's findings demonstrate that it is 
as much the perception that the industry is different as it Is actual differences 
which practitioners use to explain, or justify, their rejection of tools. That Is, 
because they perceive the hotel industry to be uniquely different from other 
industries, such as manufacturing, technology and consumer goods, practitioners 
at various hierarchical levels believe that the use of generic strategy tools is often 
unwarranted. 
Many practitioners suggest that the hotel Industry Is more complex than other 
industries. They state, for example, that due to the Intangible but fundamentally 
important role of service, tools cannot capture the most Important strategic 
issues that are relevant at the operational level. For example, some argue that It 
is more difficult to conduct a SWOT analysis for a hotel due to the intangibility of 
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service since people, including employees and guests, often have very different 
perceptions and expectations. This was evident at MediumCo when participants at 
the strategy session engaged in a discussion of competing luxury hotel brands 
and there was vocal disagreement about the strength and weaknesses of different 
brands and of different branded properties. Similarly, the long list of different 
opportunities and threats collected as part of the ESP at BigCo, which is 
consistent with previous findings of hotel industry CEOs (Simons & 
Namasivayam, 1999), also demonstrates little agreement about service issues, 
much as Okumus (2004) suggests may be true in the hotel industry. 
Others suggested that because it is their lowest paid employees who are 
responsible for implementing brand strategies at the operational level, there is 
little that formal strategic planning tools can do to help ensure that guest 
experiences are delivered as expected. At BigCo, former brand strategies and 
standards are said to have failed since the Strategy Department did not 
understand the limits of implementing them at the unit level. This failure may be 
explained by the fact that brand buy-in and strategy implementation are 
particularly difficult in the hotel industry since line-level employees are rarely 
associates of the hotel company itself but rather of the hotel unit (Bender et al., 
2008). 
Strategy transparency 
Developing successful strategies In the hotel industry is considered particularly 
difficult due to the transparency and replicability of Innovative Ideas and the 
influence this has on raising the level of competitiveness (Olsen et al., 2008). As 
a result of this inherent challenge in creating sustainable competitive positions, 
service sector firms may be required to more frequently reposition themselves 
(Thomas, 1978). These issues are represented in the views of the executives at 
all three firms who suggest that their brands and product/service portfolios need 
to constantly evolve due to the industry's Increasing commoditisation. Within all 
three firms there were references to examples of new product and service ideas 
that originated internally but which were soon copied or Imitated by competitors, 
as well as ideas of competitors that the firms had replicated. Executives believe 
that the RWRI and REG concepts will soon be imitated by other hotel firms and 
that they will need to find new strategic Initiatives to keep differentiating their 
companies. This Increases their need to devote time and energy to constantly 
creating and Introducing new marketing and product ideas and reduces the effort 
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that they can spend on . formal analysis and strategy processes. Here one sees 
Whittington et al. 's (2006) view that 're-strategising' is becoming an increasingly 
important part of a firm's strategic management process. However, while he 
believes that the mastery of tools and techniques forms a part of this re- 
strategising, the opposite was found to be the case in this study since the re- 
strategising is seen as prohibiting the use of such tools and techniques due to 
some of the reasons previously discussed (i. e. time, creativity, etc. ). 
While a rational view of strategy formulation and strategy tool use suggests that 
practitioners can possibly avoid costly mistakes due to a better alignment 
between their firms and the environment (Hill & Jones, 2005; Olsen et al., 
2008), this is not always seen as a required practice since the financial cost of 
many possible mistakes is thought to be relatively small. At SmaliCo, for 
example, other than investing In new properties which is capital Intensive, most 
new ideas for enhancing the firm's competitive position are considered relatively 
inexpensive and easily correctable. The RWRI, for example, was easily tested at 
a few properties before being rolled out across the brand. Had it been a failure, 
then the cost would have only been in some marketing Initiatives and menu 
creation, neither of which was a concern for the firm, and the initiative could have 
been easily and inexpensively reversed had it been necessary. A similar situation 
is evident at MediumCo where with creation of REG most costs are assumed by 
the PEG which made MediumCo's need to spend resources analysing the brand's 
prospects largely unnecessary. At BigCo, meanwhile, the firm was described as 
spending large amounts of resources analysing strategic Initiatives before 
Implementing them on even a limited scale because of the potential danger to 
their brand and company reputation that would be associated with any failure. 
Similarly, their need to convince franchisees and ensure their economic returns 
also requires BigCo to conduct and present more strategic analysis before 
Implementing new Initiatives. Thus, although Thomas (1978) suggests that 
service businesses can modify their business developments even after they have 
been introduced, this is not a generalisable comment to all firms or all strategies 
in the hotel Industry. While some strategic initiatives are more easily remedied, 
which reduces the perceived need for strategic analysis and strategy tools, there 
are clearly Instances where this is not the case. 
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Industry structure 
The hospitality industry structure is fragmented, capital intensive, and involves 
extensive quantities of real estate that is usually owned by investors rather than 
the hotel companies (Olsen et al., 2008). These characteristics help some 
practitioners rationalise their rejection of specific strategy tools and the use of 
tools in general. The current asset-light strategy that led MediumCo and BigCo to 
manage, but not own, the vast majority of their hotels means, for them, that 
they are not free to make all the strategic decisions that they might want to 
make. They cannot, for example, expand in all geographic regions that they 
might wish to due to the territorial restrictions included In their management and 
franchise agreements. Similarly, although there are many strategic Initiatives that 
they wish to implement at the property level, they are not able to do so without 
the commitment of their hotel owners who are generally the source of capital for 
such projects. In other words, as Brookes and Roper (2008) have noted, the fee- 
based model has made the hotel companies largely dependent on the cooperation 
of stakeholders such as franchisees and property owners when making strategic 
choices. While previous research has shown that franchising imposes restrictions 
on discretionary strategic decision-making at the unit level (Roberts, 1997), the 
current findings suggest that this Is also true for corporate entities In the hotel 
industry, and that this negates some of the benefit to formal studies Involving 
strategic planning tools and techniques. 
Various examples of how this structure affected the use and perceived value of 
generic strategy tools were encountered during the research at both BigCo and 
MediumCo whose hotel portfolios comprise a vast majority of hotels with third- 
party owners. At BigCo, for example, several executives point to this structure as 
one reason why they do not use the BCG matrix. A traditional use of portfolio- 
planning matrices would imply that the firm could examine its different brands 
against one another and objectively decide which ones it should, for example, 
invest in ("Rising stars") or withhold funds to ("Dogs"). Unlike a consumer goods 
firm that could stop manufacturing, selling or marketing a particular product, 
these executives note that because of their hotel firm's fiduciary responsibility to 
the hotel owners who have invested in establishing and following brand standards 
and policies, it is not necessarily possible to `let a brand die'. They also note that 
while the use of this type of tool could possibly suggest that a particular brand 
should receive financial investments in order to strengthen its likelihood of 
becoming a "Star, " this investment would generally need to be made at the 
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property level by the individual hotel owners, and from their experience the tool 
did little to demonstrate to the owners that their capital investments would lead 
to direct financial improvements for their individual businesses which is a key 
imperative since owners often put the interests of their own properties ahead of 
the brand (Bender et al., 2008). In other words, the generic strategy tools do 
little to help the companies convince franchisees to implement strategic changes 
and investments, and as such they are not often used for communication 
purposes with owners and managers. 
However, because many investments are necessary for the brand but not 
necessarily for a particular hotel and thus third-party owner, BigCo and 
MediumCo are required to convey to their owners the strategic reasons why as 
owners they still need to contribute to the success of the brand with which their 
property is affiliated. With the hotels that are owned by large investment funds 
and organisations that are financially astute, BigCo and MediumCo rely almost 
primarily on financial tools and quantitative data analysis to converse with owners 
about the capital investment requirements necessary to ensure the success of the 
respective brands. Observations that owners' influence and involvement in 
decision-making has grown over the years (Gannon, 2008) was thus found to also 
extend, albeit perhaps without their knowledge, into reasons why hotel 
companies refrain from using certain tools. That is, even Internal decision- 
making processes and practices are affected by the firms' strategic content 
decisions such as its ownership structure. 
Fragmentation is another hotel industry characteristic found to reduce the 
perceived value and practical application of tools such as positioning charts, 
SWOT analyses and Porter's five forces. The firms need to simultaneously 
compete against other multi-unit companies globally in many markets, while at 
the same time competing against a unique set of rivals in each individual market. 
Informants at the two larger firms pointed out that while their past efforts to use 
a positioning-chart analysis sometimes suggested that on a global scale a certain 
brand was becoming uncompetitive versus that of a competitor, the value of 
using the tool had been rather limited since the underlying analysis or 
communication power of the tool could not be used to justify that this was the 
case for an individual hotel unit belonging to a particular owner. Harrington 
(2005) similarly notes that geographic distribution impacts strategic decision- 
making. Thus, while certain capital investments or other changes were deemed 
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necessary in order to reposition specific brands, such actions were not clearly 
necessary for all hotel owners since not every property was underperforming its 
competitors. Those that were often were doing so for a variety of different 
reasons. Such situations confirm that the ownership-management separation to 
only results In challenges to integrated global strategies for hotel firms (Whitla et 
al., 2007), but also that it impacts the pragmatic validity of some strategy tools. 
A tool's relevance Is said to be limited to the firms or industries whose 
characteristics are In line with its assumptions (Porter, 1991). However, while 
the practitioners provided only a few concrete reasons for why they thought 
certain generic tools did not fit the industry or were particularly difficult to use, 
there was a consistent perception that the industry and firms were too unique to 
use standard tools. These findings begin to help explain why some previous 
studies have found that service sector firms make little use of most strategy 
analysis tools (Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Glaister & Falshaw, 1999). The 
findings from this study about how strategy tools are used are discussed In the 
next section. 
6.3 The Use of Strategy Tools 
The top management (CEOS and most direct reports) at all three firms maintain 
that conceptual strategy tools are not used in their firms. At BigCo, executives in 
several departments list various financial tools which they consider strategic. 
These include several which are well-known industry tools, others that are 
prevalent across industries, and others that are proprietary to the firm itself and 
which are held as closely-guarded secrets. Many of these more senior employees 
who have attended business school and are familiar with various generic 
conceptual strategy tools from their education were quick to point out that they 
had not only never used these since they entered the hotel industry and/or 
started working at BigCo, but that they had not seen them being used by others 
and that none were used during the ESP. A similar situation exists at the other 
two firms where top executives are confident that tools are not being used, but 
here many of the executives do not have formal business-school educations. 
While they acknowledge that they are unaware of many of the examples of tools 
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with which the researcher provided them (SWOT being the general exception), 
they believe that they would notice if these were being used. 
However, while these individuals are confident that conceptual strategy tools are 
not used in their respective firms, the empirical research found that tools are In 
fact sometimes being used, but in ways that make them relatively unknown by 
many other organisational members. Thus, while the empirical research reveals 
that strategy tools are only rarely used in the three organisations, several 
interesting findings about their use were still discerned. The findings reveal that 
the tools are used in discrete and unexpected manners not fully addressed by the 
limited extant research on strategy tools. These findings pertain to the fact that 
it is generally the lower level corporate employees (i. e. directors and staff 
members) who use and advocate their use, that they are used primarily for data 
collection and knowledge sharing purposes, are often times used in an implicit 
rather than explicit manner, and that the industry's specific characteristics shapes 
how they are and are not used. These issues are discussed next. 
6.3.1 Individual and Departmental Use 
The extant strategy tool literature suggests that, given their strategic 
responsibilities, it Is top managers who are most likely to use strategy tools as 
part of their strategising activities (e. g. Hill & Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson et 
al., 2006). Similarly, top managers are thought to be more involved In strategic 
analysis and thus more likely to use strategy tools designed for this part of the 
strategic management process (Johnson et al., 2007). Previous research utilising 
list-based surveys have targeted this audience (e. g. Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; 
Rigby, 2001b; Stenfors et al., 2004). Studies have also found that greater 
amounts of professional experience and higher levels of academic training tend 
to correlate with more use of tools (Gunn & Williams, 2008; Jarzabkowski & 
Giulietti, 2007). In this study, however, the opposite was found to be true as it is 
often the lower-level corporate personnel that use, or advocate the use of, 
strategy tools. 
At BigCo, for example, associates, directors and vice presidents used a variety of 
different models and frameworks during the ESP project and also assert that they 
use similar tools in most projects. Examples of SWOT, positioning charts, PEST 
and the five forces framework were among the examples found in various 
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working documents (i. e. personal drafts) that formed part of their experience 
during the ESP project. At MediumCo, meanwhile, several corporate interns and 
directors believe that much of the work they, are doing would benefit from more 
structure that could be accomplished through some visual tools. For example, 
they believe that within the organisation there are many instances when 
executives seem to believe they are agreeing on an issue when, in fact, there are 
important differences in their views and there is confusion about what specifically 
it is they are meant to be discussing. This was witnessed at the strategy session 
when a discussion of competitors inadvertently included references to specific 
properties as well as to their brands and corporate parents. At SmaliCo, 
meanwhile, the only use of tools revealed during the study emanated from the 
management trainees who were told to remove their SWOT and five forces 
analyses from the final draft of their `action recommendation' document since 
these `clouded the issue' and overly-formalised their ideas. 
These junior-level corporate employees are almost all recent graduates from 
business and hospitality management progammes, where they learned various 
tools, and they cite their education as a key reason why they Incorporate some 
tools Into their work. For example, BigCo's D-BI stated "You know, I have an 
MBA, so I love frameworks. " Similarly, the management trainees at SmallCo 
mentioned that they thought they had been hired because of their education and 
not despite of it. At MediumCo, meanwhile, many executives and managers are 
enrolled in a company-sponsored MBA programme and though they have been 
told that they are to apply what they learn on-the-job, they tend to only "think 
academically" (GM1) while working with each other on company-related projects 
for their degree. They reflected on how they have not applied any tools In their 
actual jobs since their superiors often not only do not want to use them, but often 
times seem not to know, or want to know, about them. These experiences tend to 
support tentative suspicions from previous research that those more recently 
exposed to tools as part of their education are more likely to employ them 
(Jarzabkowskl & Giulietta, 2007) since these concepts are not only more fresh In 
their minds, but also because these ideas may have a greater `share of mind' 
(Cummings & Angwin, 2004). Unlike their colleagues with greater work 
experience and more time lapsed since their education, these Individuals consider 
that those tools associated with formal education and academics do, as some 
previous research suggests, hold credibility and help legitimise their Involvement 
in strategy work (e. g. Johnson et at., 2007). Thus, while the literature claims 
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that more work experience tends to correlate with a greater tendency to use tools 
(and more tools), and thus that this experience may encourage individual 
practitioners to use tools, the findings here contradict this as the less-experienced 
practitioners are seeking to justify their strategising roles and abilities through 
the use of formal concepts and tools. Their desire is consistent with Botha's 
(1989) view that the rational perspective of tool application suggests that once a 
practitioner has learned the `tools of his trade', his/her task is to apply them to an 
increasing number of areas. 
Across the three firms many middle and top managers cite the disdain that their 
CEOs have for formal strategy tools and techniques as dissuading them not only 
from using any model or framework in their own strategising, but also from 
encouraging their colleagues to use them. This is consistent with previous 
research showing that top management support may be required for tools to be 
successfully introduced (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002). 
At BigCo, for example, the SVP-F who had been hired from a non-hospitality firm 
with a mandate to introduce a "broader decision-making perspective" and to 
"challenge conventional thinking" suggested that the firm's long-range financial 
planning process introduce formal strategy meetings and tools and "The people 
just gagged. Gagged! (and said) `What the hell are you thinking? We don't do 
that here! " Such views and influence over the perceived usefulness of tool is 
explained by the fact that middle-managers help provide contextual knowledge 
for shaping strategy (Dutton et al., 2001) by, for example, sharing their practical 
expertise and knowledge about acceptable and normal behaviours and about how 
organisations `really work' (Hoon, 2007). 
This view and discrete use of tools also extends to the hotel property level. 
Although most - but not all - of the GMs were found to be unfamiliar with the 
concept (and specific examples) of strategy tools, they believe that they are not 
expected to conduct any formal conceptual analyses of their properties' strategic 
situation since they have never been asked for this. They also believe this since 
they have not seen the use of any such tools in any corporate-level strategic 
analyses. This can be explained by Dutton et al. 's (2001) previous finding that 
middle managers interpret top management's strategising activities as an attitude 
about specific strategic issues and as a signal to how they themselves should 
approach the issue. In other words, the GMs view the limited conceptual analysis 
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shared with them, or asked of them, as implicitly directing them to focus their 
analysis and time on other `more important' issues. 
Another reason why there is little recognition that tools are being used is because 
some tool use is taking place within very specific `pockets' of the organisations 
and not being shared across departments. At MediumCo, for example, various 
SWOT, PEST and competitor profile analyses were undertaken by the JVCEO and 
his team, but these were not distributed to other EC members during the JV 
project `update reports' or presentations. This was because such tools are not 
seen as relevant or practical by the JVCEO's peers, which is a common critique of 
academic research and concepts (e. g. Marcus et al., 1995). Similarly, the matrix 
created by several EC members was not used even by those who had mandated 
that it be created. Nor was the SWOT analysis that another EC member prepared 
for the strategy session, which further hid the fact that tools were used by some 
members of the firm. 
At BigCo, meanwhile, practitioners within BI, whose mission it is to help 
"structure and manage" (SVP-BI) important projects, rely on tools for their own 
analytical purposes but they do not generally use these openly with members of 
other departments where there is less appetite for conceptual models. Tools are 
generally the province of consultants (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007; Morecroft, 
1992), which may explain why those using the tools during the ESP were largely 
from BI where much of the staff, including the project managers, are former 
consultants. BigCo's Marketing Department relies on many of its own tools for Its 
internal work but only the outputs of their analysis are shared during cross- 
departmental projects since they believe that across departments there is not 
only trust that they "know what we are doing" (EVP-M) but because the 
techniques and language they use are very department-specific and not 
necessarily applicable for others. Morecroft (1992) states that practitioners are 
more likely to use models when they believe that their own ideas and knowledge 
figure within them, which helps explain why department-specific tools may not 
find their way across departments since they may not be useful elsewhere. 
In addition,, the Brand Management's `Business Profile Framework' was very 
closely protected with access to it limited to only a few people in the department, 
even though the information collected was based on the input throughout the 
organisation. At BigCo, therefore, time is spent not on demonstrating the 
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analysis that is undertaken but rather on the results and action plans derived 
from the analytical tools. Similarly, tools are sometimes used as background 
work for presentations and projects, but this work is not provided to others (i. e. 
the audience or readers) unless it is requested. For example, BigCo's D-BI notes 
that during the ESP she used some frameworks to, if asked, show that she had 
"really dotted my Is and crossed my T's ... as a validation of my work ... (to show 
that )I really did my homework and I know what I'm talking about. " She also 
notes that this work was never requested and that the fact that she used these 
tools was not known. Thus, tools are used as a support for more complex 
strategic analysis in that they help departments provide strategy knowledge to 
other managers and teams (Paroutis & Pettigrew, 2007), but they do not do so 
by providing the tools and evidence of the analysis. Instead, they do so only 
through the results, which contributes to the fact that use of tools is not readily 
known in other areas of the firm. 
This situation is further exacerbated at BigCo since there is no centralised 
Strategy Department coordinating the work of the different functional areas. 
Instead these departments' leaders are mandated to 'own their departmental 
strategies'. This coincides with the fact the company is functionally structured 
and this is blamed within the firm for a rather extensive `silo effect' problem. 
Functional structures are often blamed for decreasing the quality and quantity of 
coordination and communication (Mintzberg, 1979), including In the hotel 
industry (Harrison & Enz, 2005), and this seems to contribute to the fact that 
tools and their use are not known across departments. Similarly, there is little 
transfer of personnel across departments at the corporate level, further 
minimising the transfer of tools that such persons might bring with them. 
Although tools have been found to act as boundary objects that bridge hierarchies 
and departments (Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006), which familiarises more people 
with them, the opposite use of tools, that is, keeping them within the 
department, serves to reduce the familiarity of individuals not only with the tools 
being used elsewhere in the organisation, but also with the fact that tools are 
even being used at all. 
6.3.2 Non-prescriptive Application 
An additional reason why tool use appears not to be as well-known within the 
firms is related to the way tools are applied. Most prescribed uses for tools 
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revolve around their role as decision-making aids that are to be applied for 
analysis purposes to help practitioners examine information and ideas in rational 
manners. Knott (2006) suggests, similarly, that tools can be used as techniques 
to assist with very specific and focused purposes involving detailed work. This is 
the role for which the JVCEO employed some tools during MediumCo's JV. It was 
also the role for which tools were used during BigCo's ESP where a number were 
employed in very particular ways and for very specific purposes, all of which 
masked their role within the firm. 
BigCo's ESP project managers were tasked with structuring and overseeing the 
management of the project and they followed what they described as a `basic 
strategy approach' of environmental scanning, analysis and decision. This use of 
the classical strategic management process (Whittington, 2001) as a tool for 
structuring the project is what Knott (2006) refers to as using a tool as a 
`concept' since it provides the user with a general structure for approaching a 
problem and deciding what information is relevant. The project managers did 
not, however, share with the team members that their approach for developing 
the strategy was based on a well-known `strategy model', and this was for several 
reasons. Firstly, the project structure was not atypical, and the project managers 
did not believe there was any reason to spend time on 'the basics'. Secondly, 
because the approach is a standard one for the firm, and already well-known to 
most team members due to their tenure with the company, the project managers 
assumed that their colleagues are already familiar with the rationale (i. e. model) 
underpinning the approach taken to solve the problem. Thirdly, the project 
managers assume that there was little or no perceived need to clarify how the 
project structure was built on existing concepts since the team members' 
methodology for carrying out projects is rarely, if ever, shared, since it is rarely, 
if ever, questioned. Rather than being interested in the methods or methodology, 
the executives are simply concerned with the results. As such, most team 
members suggest that the project was run like `any other project' and not 
according to any formal strategy model. For many this was just BigCo's `way of 
doing things, ' and the fact that strategy tools underpinned the work was not 
apparent to the team members. 
During the course of the ESP the project managers' methods Involved the use of 
various tools, but these were often not employed according to their commonly 
prescribed or recommended uses, which helped obscure the fact that they were 
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being used. For example, although tools may be explicitly used as metaphors to 
generate alternative thinking about strategic problems (Knott, 2006), they were 
not used In this way. Previous research also suggests that tools are often used In 
groups (Mantere & Whittington, 2007) and that used in this manner they may 
foster debate and discussions (Knott, 2006; Morecroft, 1992) or mediate 
strategising activities (Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006). Since many tools are 
represented as visual diagrams, they can be considered 'processual toys' that are 
easy to use interactively (Eden, 1992). Used like this, one would expect that the 
tools, and the fact that they are being used, would be familiar to those who 
interacted with them during meetings and workshops, both of which are activities 
during which strategy tools are frequently used (Hodgkinson et al., 2006). 
During the ESP, however, tools were not used by groups, or during the team 
meetings, and as such they were not used to coordinate the managers' activities 
as Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007) and Grant (2003) found to be true In their 
studies. 
Instead, the project managers used the tools largely as `recording devices' with 
which to `interview' the team participants `one-on-one'. They then later recorded 
their findings into the templates they had created (many of which were from 
other similar projects), which they then condensed and analysed themselves 
rather than with the team members. These interviews were often carried out 
with the members of the team members' departments (i. e. subordinates), or by 
email, as the more senior personnel were "short on time and patience" for such 
activities. This perspective is consistent with Olsen et al. 's (1992) observation 
that in the hotel Industry it is active problem solving, rather than 'soft' activities 
such as scanning, which is valued, with the latter often considered to be a waste 
of time. The use of tools in this way is representative of Nordqvist and Melin's 
(2008) view that practitioners who are successfully involved In the strategy 
process sometimes act as `artful interpreters' since, by understanding local norms 
and routines, they adapt practices to specific contexts. This artful Interpretation 
of the use of tools, however, meant that the team members were only using them 
in an indirect manner and were thus largely unaware of them. That is, because 
many hotel executives see formal tools and techniques as wastes of time, yet 
have Important strategically-relevant information, the project managers rely on 
an implicit use of tools with them, as opposed to actively engaging with the tools, 
and as such the use of tools within the firm, and in specific projects, Is not 
apparent to these top-level practitioners. The project managers considered this 
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approach to be successful and this may be because they acted in a capacity of 
'known strangers' (Nordqvist & Melin, 2008) whereby they balanced familiarity 
and distance to provide their colleagues with a sense of confidence and objectivity 
which in turn facilitated better information exchange. 
By using the tools to implicitly help them determine the questions for which the 
team members would need answers also helped obscure their use. For example, 
BigCo's D-BI and her associates drew on SWOT analysis, value chain analysis and 
BCG matrices to narrow down the range of questions they needed to ask and 
answer about the competitive situation in Europe. For her, the tools provide a 
quick and efficient checklist of the issues that need to be considered while 
allowing her to eliminate various parts of the different tools that were Irrelevant 
or not necessarily priorities for this project. This use of tools is consistent with 
Dutton et al. 's (1983) view that strategy models provide frameworks within which 
to explore strategic decision contexts or issues. Thus while the tools were used, 
few people were aware of this since they were used to determine questions for 
the team members to answer rather than for the latter to use to diagnose specific 
situations. 
These tools often served as templates for recording Information and for 
presenting the results in easily understandable visual devices to their superiors. 
As such, they were used to communicate large amounts of Information and ideas 
in a way that was efficient to transmit and understand. This application of the 
tools, while not the suggested analytical role prescribed by much of the literature 
(e. g. Learned et al., 1965; Porter, 1980), corresponds with what Eppler and Platts 
(2009) suggest is a valuable use of strategy tools. They suggest that, used In this 
way, strategy tools can elicit and synthesise data and help managers to process 
more Information without unnecessary data overload or mental shortcuts. This 
use is also consistent with the literature suggesting that strategy models and 
frameworks are useful for organising, simplifying, filtering and synthesizing large 
amounts of information (Dutton et al., 1983; Morecroft, 1992). The predefined 
structures of the tools, which Knott (2006) refers to as a 'needs-centred' 
application since the user chooses the Information and categories according to a 
specific perceived need, helped the managers to structure extensive amounts of 
information for their own use which Is perhaps a little recognised application of 
such tools (Eppler & Platts, 2009) and one that, since it is not shared throughout 
the organisation, Is not often known. 
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Due to the top management's resistance to use tools associated with consultants, 
academics and the term `Strategy, ' the ESP project managers regularly referred 
to the tools as 'templates' and `grids' even though they were similar to better- 
known SWOT, competitor-profile analyses and PEST frameworks. Thus, while the 
prescriptive use of tools, and some previous research, claims that one benefit of 
using established strategy concepts and tools is that they provide a common 
language around which strategy can be understood and formulated (Cummings & 
Angwin, 2004; Paroutis & Pettigrew, 2007), this was not the case during the 
ESP. Instead, the tools were called by other names, and the particular labels 
within the tools are not necessarily those of established tools, since the more 
technical and formal identifications are disdained throughout the organisation. 
For example, when interviewing the team members about their understanding 
and thoughts of the European hotel sector, the project managers did not present 
their questions as part of a SWOT analysis even though they assert that this was 
clearly the foundation to their questions. Similarly, they did not present the 
outcomes of their interviews in the form associated with tools such as a TOWS 
(Weihrich, 1982) or other 2x2 matrices. Rather than refer to the different brand 
expansion possibilities according to well-known terms like `Dogs' or `Stars' that 
are part of the BCG matrix, and which are said to form part of the standard 
language for strategic management due to their popularity (Dutton et al., 1983), 
the Marketing Department uses their own labels, which further serves to minimise 
the familiarity with certain tools and perhaps reduce their linguistic legitimacy. It 
is interesting to note that the ESP project managers were surprised to hear that 
many of the team members maintained that tools were not used during the 
project. They acknowledge that by calling them templates, by not using specific 
names for most tools ("I don't think we name things a lot. I think we have an 
aversion to it" SVP-BI), and for not explaining that they had created the tools, 
most team members could be unaware of their use, which also helps to explain 
why the use of tools is somewhat obscured. They similarly suggest that as 
academic concepts and tools are not respected by the top management, certain 
of their colleagues may be hesitant to acknowledge using them. 
Phillips et al. (2004) suggest that texts help institutionalise concepts and ideas 
since they permit multiple readings that help share the concepts across time and 
space. Strategists also are known to include tools in their documents, reports 
and presentations (Paroutis & Pettigrew, 2007). The documents produced during 
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the ESP, however, do not contain any examples of the SWOT and other tools 
implicitly used by the project managers. While some templates summarising key 
views were documented in the appendices of the full report, only the shorter 
executive summary without these appendices was circulated across the firm, and 
the full ESP document was said to be read only by the project chair and 
managers. Similarly, presentations made to the project sponsors and BOD also 
do not contain evidence of the tools used to structure the project or to collect the 
information. At the same time, however, the company is described as being fond 
of reports and presentations. As such, although there were many possible 
opportunities for tools to be shared this way, they were not. Thus, the fact that 
individuals are constantly reading documents and attending presentations that do 
not contain explicit use of tools further reinforces the perception that such tools 
are not part of the company's standard strategising activities. As a result, 
knowledge that tools are used is further reduced. 
While the tools did serve to help communicate information (Whittington, 2006), 
this communication was primarily from the team participants to the project 
managers and not vice-versa. The resulting analysis was then conveyed back to 
the team prior to each meeting in brief memos and was also used as discussion 
points during the meetings. As the Information was not shared within the tools 
but rather only as the results of having used the tools, the team members did not 
attribute the results they discussed to the tools themselves, nor did they see that 
the eventual decisions, or actions, were a result of having used the tools. In other 
words, the tool use was conceptual rather than Instrumental (Beyer & Trice, 
1982). This means that the research results were used for general enlightenment 
as opposed to producing actions that resulted In very specific and direct ways. 
The tools thus did not play as visible a role for the team members who 
maintained, later, that the tools were not used during the ESP. 
6.3.3 Hotel Industry Contextual Implications 
The literature questions whether the use of generic strategy tools is influenced by 
industry context (Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2004) and some have 
suggested that the appropriation of tools is largely influenced by a firm's 
institutional context (Schwarz, 2004). In this study, the use of tools was found to 
be masked by particular characteristics of the industry structure involving the 
separation of ownership and management as well as the management structure 
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involving franchising as opposed to owned, leased and managed (OLM) hotels 
since in the latter the hotel company has greater control over the property and its 
management. 
In his study of restaurant companies, Bradach (1997) found that franchisees 
often challenge the parent company's business logic and strategic decisions and 
that through their challenges they helped contribute to the company's strategic 
choices. Franchisees are also, according to the literature, sometimes included In 
strategic conversations with the hotel companies as they pass information from 
their local areas. Within the hotel industry, however, little research has been 
conducted as to how hotel units and corporate entities work together in the 
strategy process and in more micro-practices. Thus, while it has been posited 
that because they encounter a large number of diverse environmental conditions 
due to their internationalisation, multi-unit hotel companies may conduct more 
sophisticated strategic analysis practices (Harrison & Enz, 2005) such as formal 
environmental scanning and analysis (Olsen et al., 1994) at the unit level (Olsen, 
1989), this has yet to be documented. 
In this study, it was found that while BigCo has a corporate department 
responsible for franchisee and property owner (F&PO) relations, Including a 
governing committee elected by the franchisees and owners, projects, meeting 
and strategy discussions Involving the company and this committee do not, for 
the most part, use strategy tools and especially not those that are proprietary to 
the firm. Certain tools are occasionally used with the owner/franchise group, but 
academic concepts are generally not used as the company prefers to reinforce 
that they are concerned with practical rather than theoretical Issues. They see 
most tools seen as overly theoretical and rarely pragmatic, which confirms much 
of the previous research about the lack of relevance of academic concepts, 
research and tools (e. g. Lyles, 1995; Marcus et al., 1995). Still, brand discussions 
based around an implicit SWOT analysis are sometimes used with the F&PO, and 
this is said to be done so as to gain support for initiatives the company was 
already planning rather than to elicit new Ideas from the owners and franchisees. 
Such use is representative of the idea that tools may be used during the strategy 
process to increase 'buy in' for strategic initiatives (Westley, 1990). It similarly 
confirms previous research which has found that concepts (Beyer & Trice, 1982) 
and formal analysis (Langley, 1990) are often used to symbolise a need for 
participatory decision-making and to sustain predetermined positions, as well as 
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to help persuade superiors to support a decision. A similar situation was 
described at MediumCo where the annual General Manager meetings (company 
and region specific) often Involve sessions that address company and brand 
issues. The involvement of the GMs is largely a way not only to allow the GMs to 
see for themselves the challenges facing the company that they, the GMs, needed 
to address, but also as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate their importance in 
shaping the company's future. According to one interviewee, by having the 
franchisees and property owners involved this way, it also helps keep them 
focused on specific agenda items rather than other perhaps more contentious 
ones. This is consistent with Langley's (1990) finding that formal analysis is often 
mandated by managers to help control their subordinates by forcing them to 
attend to particular problems. 
BigCo's more sophisticated and proprietary tools are not shared with the F&PO 
since the latter are considered important business `partners' but not as part of the 
company itself. These tools are, however, sometimes used together with the GMs 
responsible for properties under lease and management contracts. This 
difference is explained by Chen and Dimou's (2005) observation that ownership 
and management contracts imply a lower risk of proprietary knowledge leakage 
than do franchise arrangements. That is, the firm shares its company tools with 
GMs who are its own employees and refrains from doing so with GMs that are 
employed by its franchisees. 
While there are some differences in the way the two sets are treated In relation to 
tools and the strategy process, more often than not the hotel units are not 
involved in the strategic analysis and data collection using tools. For example, 
while information for the Business Profile Framework Is sometimes gathered from 
F&PO representatives, they are not explicitly Informed about the tool. GMs from 
managed properties, on the other hand, are specifically requested to provide 
information relevant to the analysis. Bender et al. (2008) remark that because 
property owners can have similar business relationships with other hotel 
companies, a particular firm may lose the ability to leverage its know-how and 
resources Into any advantage over its competition. This was found to influence 
how tools are used at BigCo where the vast majority of its hotels are owned by 
third-parties. While owners of hotels are provided with some results gathered 
from the use of tools, such as the reasoning behind new customer and brand 
segmentation strategies, most are not involved in any formal decision-making 
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process or provided with the tools themselves due to their affiliation - or potential 
affiliation - with competitors' brands. Thus, as the ownership structure and fee- 
based model implies more stakeholders (Brookes & Roper, 2008), including more 
influential owners (Gannon, 2008), the company maintains a level of secrecy 
regarding its proprietary strategy tools and techniques since owners, 
understandably, put the interests of their hotels over that of the company or 
brand (Whitla et al., 2007). 
Bender et al. (2008) similarly note that hotel owners may be reluctant to share 
information with other hotels in the chain. This study also found this to be a 
reason why the use of tools to discuss strategic issues and facilitate information 
sharing and analysis is rarely used with owners. That is, because the company's 
hotels are owned by many hundreds of different owners, BigCo has found a 
general hesitance on their part to collaborate with one another, or even with the 
company, on sensitive issues that they believe provide them with competitive 
advantages. As a result, most owner meetings focus on addressing transparent 
brand-wide issues and little effort is spent trying to get the owners to collaborate 
in high-level discussions in which some tools would perhaps be used. 
The findings in this study thus support previous research that has found that 
hotel companies do not rely on formal processes to record new ideas from 
franchisees and OLM units (Brookes & Roper, 2008). Similar to Brookes and 
Roper's (2008) observation that corporate units are distinctly uninterested in 
franchisee innovations or best practices, this study found that many of the 
proprietary tools which the firm believes provides it with advantages over the 
competition are not shared with most owners or GMs. This means that they are 
not interested in their strategic insights, or at least not interested enough to risk 
transferring their competitive know-how. Instead, they seem to rely mostly on 
learning from their own experiences (Ingram & Baum, 1997) and internal 
knowledge-sharing. This is consistent with findings that have revealed little 
mutual learning from the hotels to the corporate entity. It also extends this by 
demonstrating that the limited explicit coordination and communication efforts 
across the divisions (Brookes & Roper, 2008) also occurs at the level of distinct 
strategy practices and activities such as using tools to collect, share and analyse 
information for strategy formulation and decision-making. As such, the multiunit 
structure, combined with the fact that many hotels are owned and franchised, not 
only makes it difficult for hotel companies to apply their experiences across their 
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units (Ingram & Baum, 1997), but also difficult to gather information and learn 
from these units through the use of strategy tools. This therefore calls into 
question Harington's (2004) belief that because more knowledge is spread 
throughout large hotel organisation, more individuals will be included in the 
strategy process. The limited use of tools with external owners and managers 
also further `veils' the company's use of strategy tools. 
6.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the empirical findings from the three case studies in 
relation to the extant literature discussed in chapters two and three. Two main 
issues were addressed. The first is that tools are widely rejected in the three 
firms for several reasons: 
1. The strategy formulation responsibilities were highly vested with two of 
the CEOs who rely on intuition and vision, and thus not formal techniques 
or tools. 
2. The strategy praxis was also shown to not include many instances of 
strategy meetings and workshops during which strategy tools could have 
been used and their potential social benefits revealed to counteract past 
frustration with the prescribed analytical functions of many tools. 
3. Most strategy tools were also shown to be considered too academic and 
not practical, and this, combined with a lack of sophisticated and modern 
industry-specific tools reduced their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
practitioners. 
4. Specific service and hospitality industry characteristics such as the 
intangibility of service, geographic dispersion and ownership structure 
issues lead many practitioners to reject generic tools since they perceive 
the industry to be too different from those for which the tools were 
originally created. 
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The second main theme is that when tools are used, their use is `veiled' by 
several factors. 
1. Rather than being used by top managers as suggested by much of the 
literature, it is the lower-level corporate associates who are often tasked 
with using the tools, and they do so implicitly through data collection 
templates which are not referred to as strategy tools and which are 
neither named nor often included in formal presentations and circulated 
documents, both of which disguise their use. 
2. Similarly, tools are often department-specific and therefore are not shared 
across functional areas which also minimises knowledge about them, and 
their use, throughout the firm. 
3. Characteristics of the industry structure, most notably the owner- 
management split, also restrict the use of tools across organisational 
divisions. 
The next chapter concludes this thesis with a discussion of the thesis's 
contributions to knowledge, its limitations and recommendations for 
management, education and research. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws conclusions from the study in relation to its aims and 
objectives. It first demonstrates how the aim and objectives have been met and 
how the specific empirical findings begin filling in the knowledge gaps about the 
use of strategy tools as were identified in Chapter One. It then discusses the 
contributions this thesis makes to the strategy tool, SasP and strategic 
management literature, as well as to researching the practical use of strategy 
tools. The study's limitations are then identified. Based on the findings, several 
recommendations are provided for practitioners and educators, as well as for 
future research. The chapter concludes with some personal remarks about the 
research journey. 
7.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
This study sought to identify the role that strategy tools play as part of the 
strategising activities of practitioners in three hotel companies. To achieve this 
aim, the research specifically sought to determine: 
1. Why practitioners use strategy tools when strategising. 
2. How practitioners use strategy tools when strategising. 
3. How contextual factors influence the use of strategy tools. 
The following section discusses the study's specific findings with regards to each 
of the three research questions, and how these contribute to the extant 
knowledge about the practical use and role of strategy tools. 
7.2.1 Why practitioners use strategy tools when strategising 
Although this study set out to investigate why strategy tools are used, the 
findings were much more focused on why strategy tools are not used since, for 
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the most part, the practitioners in the three firms do not utilise strategy tools as 
part of their strategising activities. As such, this discussion is focused largely on 
this finding. 
By examining the use of strategy tools across hierarchical levels this study 
reveals that, contrary to the literature which suggests that top managers are 
likely to use strategy tools because they have more strategic responsibilities and 
more strategy-making experience (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 
2007), these are two reasons why these practitioners reject rather than use 
tools. They believe that strategy tools are more the domain of Inexperienced 
executives and middle-managers who require a structured and formal analytical 
approach to strategy analysis. They believe this since they perceive tools as a 
substitute for, rather than complement to, the strategic thinking abilities of top 
leaders who have extensive strategy-making experience. 
Strategy tools are usually recommended and taught as part of a deliberate and 
rational-linear approach to strategy-making, even if this approach may rarely 
exist in reality (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and/or be detrimental when used 
(Hayes & Abernathy, 1980). However, the practitioners, many of whom have 
learned about strategy tools within an academic context, are found to reject any 
use of tools since they perceive them as being purely for rational and analytical 
decision-making purposes. They therefore reject the use of tools, and decisions 
based on them, in favour of intuition and experience-based knowledge. This 
finding serves to empirically confirm the literature that has suggested that 
strategy tools may restrict the deployment of experience-based knowledge 
(Grant, 2003) and extends it by demonstrating that the suspicion of this 
`negative' attribute is one reason why tools, and their use, are rejected. 
Similarly, strategy tools are seen as part of a formal strategy process intended for 
the creation of deliberate long-term strategies, and the hotel executives are more 
concerned with fast decisions, immediate solutions and with quantitative rather 
than qualitative information. These concerns lead them to reject many 
conceptual strategy tools and specific strategy practices, such as meetings and 
the writing of reports, in which tools are often used. Thus, while previous 
research has suggested that hotel executives prefer individual and `hands on' 
practices to more formal and long-term focused processes (Costa & Teare, 
2000), this study demonstrates that this extends to the rejection of strategy tool 
usage as well. 
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While the literature suggests that strategy tools which have been endorsed by 
reputable academics and consultants (Seidl, 2007; Whittington, 2003), and 
practices which are used by competitors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), are 
considered more legitimate and therefore are likely to be used, the findings reveal 
that the hotel executives reject popular and well-known strategy tools for these 
very reasons. The findings confirm the extant knowledge with regards to the 
disparity between academic and practitioner expectations of strategy research 
and theoretical concepts (Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; Marcus et al., 1995; Rynes 
et al., 2001) by showing that the rejection of academic tools stems not only from 
past failures attributed to the use of tools, but also to the practitioners' 
exceedingly high expectations of tools. It also contributes to this knowledge by 
showing that failures with particular tools leads practitioners to resist using any 
tools since they associate the concept of such instruments with academics and 
consultants whom they do not believe understand the complexity Involved In 
making strategy. 
The findings similarly demonstrate that executives searching for unique strategies 
are reluctant to use the same strategy practices and tools as their competitors 
since they believe this will likely lead them to arrive at the same decisions as 
them. As such, it begins to demonstrate a link between the perceived 
relationship between strategy practices and strategy content which has also been 
called for in the SasP literature (e. g. Johnson et al., 2003). 
This study also helps fill an identified knowledge gap about the role of tools 
during strategy emergence (e. g. Fenema et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2003). The 
study's findings demonstrate that when tools are perceived as purely for 
deliberate and rational strategising, they are often rejected for use during the 
strategising activities carried out during the latter development of strategies 
which have emerged rather than been deliberately created. Although the 
literature suggests that the social use of strategy tools can provide alternative 
benefits, such as facilitating discussions (Morecroft, 1992), fostering debate and 
alternative viewpoints (Knott, 2006) and bridging departmental and hierarchical 
communication boundaries (Stenfors & Tanner, 2006), the practitioners do not 
use tools for these purposes. This is because they believe that such tools are 
only appropriate for the rational and analytical formulation of deliberate strategies 
in which they rarely engage. The study suggests that because tools are not used 
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during strategising activities such as strategy presentations and workshops, as 
previous studies have found (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Schwarz, 2004), and 
during which the purported social and communicative benefits could be 
experienced, the view of practitioners that tools are only intended for analytical 
decision-making purposes is reinforced, and they are not used to develop the 
details of emergent strategies. 
The study also identifies that tools are rejected as a result of the firms' 
ownership-management structure. It demonstrates that the ownership- 
management split renders the use of some strategy tools as Inappropriate. As 
this split between management and property owners Is relatively unique to the 
hospitality industry, the findings suggest that previous research which has 
revealed reasons why tools are used in other industries may not be relevant for 
the hospitality industry. It also serves to extend the findings of previous 
quantitative studies that have found both similarities and differences of tool use 
across Industries (Frost, 2003; Glaister & Falshaw, 1999) by providing some 
qualitative explanation for why certain tools may be less used In the hospitality 
Industry. The study thus also begins to answer the question of whether generic 
strategy tools created In and for the manufacturing sector are and/or can be used 
In the hospitality Industry by showing that while some strategy tools are rejected 
due to industry factors, this is not the primary reason why generic strategy tools 
are not used. 
7.2.2 How practitioners use strategy tools when strategising 
The study's findings reveal that at one firm (BigCo) strategy tools are used to 
identify research questions which are then investigated by lower-level corporate 
associates in a one-on-one `interview' format with senior-level executives, and 
that the Information is later condensed and synthesised in templates based on the 
more popular tools. The analysis is then conducted by only a few individuals and 
the results are shared through bullet-point memos and used for group discussion 
purposes. While the data-collection and analysis process is in line with previous 
findings that strategy models and frameworks are valuable for managing large 
amounts of data (Dutton et al., 1983; Morecroft, 1992), the findings add to the 
knowledge of how strategy tools are used. It does this by demonstrating that the 
resistance of many executives to use tools Influences how those responsible for 
managing the strategic project use tools inasmuch as they use them implicitly 
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rather than explicitly. By keeping the tools within their department, by only 
sharing the results with the executives, by referring to them as 'templates' rather 
than strategy tools, and by not sharing the theoretical and/or consultancy 
background to the tools, these individuals obscure the fact that strategy tools are 
being used and that many of these are based on well-known academic or 
consultancy models and frameworks. Thus, while organisational culture and 
power are known to influence the strategy process (Mintzberg et al., 1998; 
Pettigrew, 1977), the study's findings also demonstrate that this extends to 
specific strategy practices such as the use of strategy tools. 
While previous action research studies have found that practitioners modify labels 
and diagrams to either help rationalise their role in the strategy process (Chesley 
& Wenger, 1999) or represent their organisational challenges (Witcher & Chau, 
2008), this study extends these findings by demonstrating that the visual 
diagrams associated with many tools, and which are often said to be valuable for 
helping to achieve linguistic legitimacy and practitioner acceptance, are altered 
or removed so as to `disguise' their academic and consultancy foundations when 
these are perceived as decreasing the legitimacy of using tools due to 
organisational values. 
This use also demonstrates that it is lower-level associates who are often tasked 
with using the tools as opposed to much of the previous research which has 
suggested that top managers are more likely to do so. These finding therefore 
call Into question the results from list-based surveys that have almost exclusively 
asked top managers about the use of specific strategy tools within their 
organisations (e. g. Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Spee et al., 2008) and suggests 
that the actual use of tools may be more prevalent than top managers suspect 
since the use of tools Is often Individual, discrete or 'veiled'. It similarly raises 
these doubts about the purported popularity of specific tools since lower-level 
practitioners have rarely been queried about their Involvement with tools which 
this study demonstrates should be undertaken If one is interested in the actual 
popularity and use of strategy tools. 
The study has shown that the more junior-level practitioners seek to apply their 
academic strategic management education as they approach their role in the 
strategic management process from a classical perspective which is the 
predominant approach in business and hospitality management progammes 
(Johnson et al., 2003; Okumus & Wong, 2005a). It thus adds to the knowledge 
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about the use of tools by recent graduates as opposed to those who have been 
out of school for a longer time (Jarzabkowski & Giulietta, 2007) since this study 
found that those who had more recently graduated, as opposed to those who had 
been out of education for a longer time, had more favourable opinions of strategy 
tools and are more likely to advocate their use since they, as opposed to their 
superiors, (still) attribute academic legitimacy to the tools. Thus, as top 
managers are found not to use tools while lower-level managers do, the study 
suggests that strategy tools do not seem to be used throughout a career In the 
hotel Industry. Neither do they seem to have entered the lexicon of strategy for 
these practitioners or throughout the hotel industry as Jarzabkowski & Giulietta 
(2007) suggest might be true In the more mainstream business environment. 
7.2.3 How contextual factors influence the use of strategy tools 
While the above discussions demonstrate that organisational context influences 
how strategy tools are perceived and used, the study also identifies that 
institutional contextual factors also influence how practitioners use strategy tools, 
and demonstrates that industry context matters. For example, the use of tools is 
shaped by the ownership-management structure that is prevalent within the 
international hotel industry. While researchers in the strategic hospitality 
management field have suggested that hotel companies may involve their hotel 
units in their strategic management process (Harrison & Enz, 2005; Olsen et al., 
1998), this study's findings reveal the opposite to be true with regards to their 
use of strategy tools. The findings extend Brookes and Roper's (2008) finding 
that little or no mutual learning is taking place between hotel companies and their 
hotel units, and suggests that hotel companies are reluctant to share proprietary 
information with owners and franchisees (Chen & Dimou, 2005) by 
demonstrating that this holds true with the sharing of proprietary strategy tools. 
This ownership-management division also influences the perceived value of some 
tools. For example, portfolio planning matrices are identified as Impractical for 
making strategic decisions about the investments Into particular brands since 
they are tied to `hard assets' that are often owned by third parties and to which 
the hotel company has fiduciary responsibilities. This finding therefore provides 
some empirical support to confirm suggestions in the literature (Becker & Olsen, 
1995; Okumus & Wong, 2005b; Olsen & Roper, 1998; Olsen et al., 2008) that 
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generic strategy tools that have been created based on research in the 
manufacturing sector may not be transferable to the hospitality industry. 
7.3 Research Contributions 
The SasP field is relatively young and most of its literature Is still conceptual 
rather than empirical (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). As a result there are many 
calls for empirical studies into how strategy is actually, rather than theoretically, 
practiced. This thesis has answered this call through its empirical study and it 
contributes to the literature on the practice of strategy, the use of strategy tools 
and the strategic management process. These contributions are discussed 
further below. 
As the empirical research formed part of a doctoral thesis, the researcher was 
able dedicate a substantial amount of time to collect and compare large amounts 
of empirical evidence about the strategy practices of practitioners in these three 
companies, not only in relation to their specific strategic initiatives, but also with 
regards to the companies' overall strategy-making processes and practices. 
Balogun et al (2003) note that one of the obstacles to studying strategy practices 
is the need for extensive and 'intimate' interaction with practitioners which is 
often hard to do for time, financial and logistical reasons. Much of the research 
Into strategy practices has therefore been conducted within a single firm (Kaplan 
& Jarzabkowski, 2006; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003) which has led to the calls for 
studies across multiple firms In order to discern patterns of practices across them 
(Balogun et at., 2003; Wilson & Jarzabkowski, 2004). Through its research into 
three different hotel companies this study has served to begin answering this call 
and the empirical evidence demonstrates that such studies are Important since 
practices, much like processes and content, vary across firms due to 
organisational contextual factors such as culture, leadership and structure. 
By concentrating its empirical work within the hotel industry, the thesis has also 
addressed calls for studies about strategy practices, and specifically the use of 
strategy tools, within a single Industry since institutional context Is thought to 
perhaps influence not only which tools are used but also how they are used 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Johnson et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Whittington, 2006). Similarly, researchers within the strategic hospitality 
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management field have noted that there is very limited research into the strategy 
process and practices of hospitality companies and that many of the generic 
strategy tools may not be applicable to the hospitality sector (Okumus & Wong, 
2005b; Olsen & Roper, 1998). As such, they have called for empirical studies 
that specifically address these issues. The findings have provided support for the 
suggestion for such studies by demonstrating that industry does matter since 
contextual factors specific to the hotel industry appear to render certain 
mainstream tools less useful than is suggested by the theoretical literature that 
has assumed that such tools can be used regardless of institutional context. 
This thesis has also specifically addressed calls for in-depth studies that compare 
the use of strategy tools across multiple organisational levels (e. g. ]arzabkowski 
& Whittington, 2008a). While the extant literature has suggested that top rather 
than lower-level managers are more likely to use strategy tools, this study found 
the opposite to be true within the three sample firms, and as such it calls into 
question the results of previous studies that have queried top executives through 
list-based surveys. Since this study found that top executives more often than 
not reject strategy tools, it suggests that Knott's (2008) view that the reported 
use of tools by top managers through list-based surveys may only be "fashionable 
talk" (p. 29) is credible and warrants further investigation. This is further 
confirmed through informal discussions that the researcher held with hotel 
industry executives during the early stages of this work. These discussions 
revealed that most of these practitioners were unfamiliar with the names for 
academic concepts, but when these were discussed in more detail, some 
informants did recognise them from their education and professional experience. 
Similarly, the literature on strategy tools. has also suggested that tools are 
modified by practitioners to suit their particular organisational or individual needs 
and this study has responded to calls that the reasons for such adaptation be 
studied (e. g. Jarzabkowskl & Wilson, 2006; Knott, 2006). This study's findings 
demonstrate that such modifications not only may render tools more useful for 
particular situations or contexts, but also that these modifications help obscure 
the fact that such tools are being used. As such many individuals may not know 
that they are using variations of well-known tools which further raises concerns 
about the empirical findings of other studies that have used list-based surveys to 
gauge the popularity and usefulness of these tools. 
240 
Researchers have also expressed the need for more empirical evidence about the 
skills and capabilities required in practice at multiple organisational levels 
(Johnson et al., 2003; Paroutis & Palmer, 2007) This thesis' finding that 
practitioners, especially those at lower-levels, use strategy tools implicitly to 
guide their research and data collection has provided some answers to this 
question. The findings similarly address calls for empirical evidence about 
whether or not managers use the theoretical resources and academic concepts 
gained from their strategic management education (Jarzabkowski & Giulietti, 
2007). The findings with regards to why strategy tools are often rejected serves 
to explain why what is taught in academia may be rejected in practice due to 
contextual factors at the institutional, organisational and individual levels. It thus 
also contributes to the calls for better insights into how strategy tools are used In 
order to assist students and graduates to go beyond their Inherent tendency to 
rely on tools to provide answers and instead to recognise that tools are not 
always aids to judgement, are limited, and that their use Is affected by 
organisational and institutional characteristics (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 
2008b). By providing a fresh perspective on how tools are used and how strategy 
is practiced, It also contributes to calls for new and practice-based content for 
strategic management courses in the mainstream and in the field of strategic 
hospitality management (Okumus & Wong, 2005a). 
While the study's findings discerned much about why practitioners do not use 
tools, as opposed to why they do use them, the finding that tools are not used, 
and the reasons for this, are important contributions to the extant literature 
about how strategy is, in reality, made. The thesis has thus responded to calls 
within the SasP literature for empirical evidence about why the use of certain 
strategy practices are resisted and absent (Johnson et at., 2007) as well as for 
studies that reveal what is not practiced and why it is not (Carter et al., 2008). 
The findings serve not only to reconfirm that strategy is often formed through an 
emergent rather than deliberate and rational-linear process (Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985), but also that strategy tools are often rejected because they are seen as 
only appropriate for the realisation of strategy formulation according to the 
classical view. This thus raises concerns about the way In which strategy, and 
strategy tools, are taught in strategic management courses both in the 
mainstream and In the hospitality field. It suggests that students need to be 
better Informed about the way strategy Is actually practiced -and the fact that 
strategy tools are often used in ways different from how they are taught to 
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r.... expect them to 
be employed in the `real world'. In addition, the commonly cited 
reasons for why tools are used were found to be reasons why tools are rejected, 
which raises new questions about the reasons for the divide between academics 
and practitioners and why academic research is often not valid for, or used by, 
practitioners. 
This thesis has also contributed to the methodology of studying strategy tools and 
practices. Most researchers who have specifically investigated the use of 
strategy tools have done so through list-based surveys (see Aldehayyat & 
Anchor, 2008; Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Rigby, 2001b; Spee et al., 2008). Other 
studies that have revealed information about the use of tools In practice have 
been through action research as consultants (e. g. Chesley & Wenger, 1999; 
Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002), or in controlled settings (Hill & Westbrook, 1997). 
Yet others have been based on observation and interviews in a single firm 
introducing tools for the first time (e. g. Kaplan & Jarzabkowski, 2006). This 
study's research has, on the other hand, been undertaken through a qualitative, 
multiple case study approach in three firms and across multiple organisational 
levels and Is, to the researcher's best knowledge, the first to do so. It was 
through this approach, and the triangulation of data resulting from observations, 
interviews and document analysis, that the researcher was able to identify the 
`veiled' use of tools, the contextual factors influencing this, and the tendency for 
hotel Industry practitioners to reject tools. Had the study been conducted in only 
one firm, In a controlled setting such as through action research, or through 
surveys, these findings most likely would not have been revealed. It thus 
demonstrates the value of such an approach for studying how and why strategy 
practices are and are not used by practitioners. 
7.4 Research Limitations 
This study has numerous research limitations that the reader should bear in mind 
when considering its findings. 
(1) One of the study's limitations it is that it Investigated the use of 
strategy tools only within the context of hotel companies which limits the 
generalisability of its findings. This single-setting is, however, also a strength 
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since it answered calls from numerous researchers for studies of tool use by 
multiple firms in a single-industry setting since an industry's contextual factors 
were thought to perhaps influence the perception and use of strategy tools. 
Similarly, since the strategic hospitality management literature has regularly 
questioned the transferability of strategy tools from the mainstream strategy 
literature into the hospitality industry, the focus on hotel companies permitted the 
researcher to more fully investigate this issue and also to begin filling In the 
related gaps in the knowledge about how strategy is actually practiced in the 
hospitality industry. 
(2) A further limitation is that the study did not investigate the use of 
computer-based decision support systems as a type of strategy tool. 
Organisations are increasingly relying on technological tools for their 
management processes and it would perhaps be relevant to examine how these 
are used and whether the fact that they are more modern and sophisticated 
would influence how they are perceived in comparison with more traditional 
models. Similarly, the use of financial models was not studied. As the empirical 
research uncovered that financial tools are prevalent and highly regarded 
instruments in the strategic decision-making process of the hotel firms, the 
researcher could have modified his research study to include these. However, as 
previous studies have considered a wide range of instruments and techniques as 
strategy tools, one benefit from focusing only on conceptual frameworks and 
models is that it provides a more in-depth and focused understanding of how this 
set of tools, that make up an important part of strategic management courses 
and textbooks, as well as academic research, are used. 
(3) As discussed in Chapter Four, the case study method has several 
limitations such as researcher bias, reliability and validity. The researcher's use of 
observations, document analysis and interviews allowed him, however, to 
triangulate the data in order to, as much as possible, overcome these challenges. 
Similarly, the exploratory nature of the topic, along with the very limited extant 
research into how strategy tools are used, required a qualitative and in-depth 
study which the case study method permitted. 
(4) A further limitation pertains to the number of meetings and 
workshops that the researcher was able to observe. Initial agreements with the 
three hotel organisations to permit the researcher free access to multiple 
meetings was not, unfortunately, respected by two of the three organisations due 
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to internal developments in their organisations and fears of sharing confidential 
information that had not originally been a concern. Observation is highly 
recommended by SasP researchers as a way to provide `thick descriptions' of how 
strategy practices are actually carried out and more observations would have 
greatly added to the research findings. 
(5) An additional limitation is that the three companies required the 
researcher to focus his empirical research on one particular strategic Initiative 
within each company. While this provided a necessary focus for the data 
collection, it also restricted the ability to investigate how tools might be used In 
other areas of the firm and thus also limited the researcher's ability to Interview 
employees who may have provide important information. Since these individuals 
were not directly related to the case study projects, they may have provided 
contrasting views and/or additional relevant examples of how tools are used, 
especially as one finding pertains to the fact that tools are used in specific 
departments. 
(6) Another limitation is that the researcher was not able to conduct 
longitudinal studies and thus was unable to investigate how strategy tools are 
used in other phases of the strategic management process, such as 
implementation and control. However, most surveys on strategy tools have 
found that more tools are more often used during strategy analysis than in the 
other phases, and thus the researcher's focus on this stage was the most 
appropriate. Similarly, there are more studies about the use of the performance 
measurement tools than those of strategy analysis, which again suggests that a 
focus on the latter was appropriate. 
(7) One of the key objectives of the research was to study how tools are 
actually used, and the fact that the researcher discovered only limited use of such 
tools meant that he was not able to fill in as many knowledge gaps about the use 
of strategy tools as he wished. On hindsight, it would perhaps have behoved him 
to conduct preliminary interviews in the firms to determine whether or not they 
used tools before he embarked on his more detailed study. However, had he 
spoken with the top managers at the firms he would have been Informed that 
tools were not used and would thus not have discovered that tools are used 
within particular departments and by lower-level managers without the apparent 
knowledge of top managers, which were two of the study's key findings. 
Similarly, the finding that tools are not used, and the reasons for this, helped 
244 
answer the questions of what is not practiced, and the reasons for this, even 
though these were not the researcher's original aims. By revealing the reasons 
for the rejection of tools the researcher also helped to add to the knowledge 
about how strategy is actually practiced. 
7.5 Recommendations 
This section builds on the study's findings in order to provide recommendations to 
practitioners and educators. It also builds on these findings and the study's 
limitations to provide some suggestions for future research. 
7.5.1 Recommendations for practitioners 
(1) Managers of hotel companies are recommended to reconsider the 
various possible roles and benefits of strategy tools beyond their prescribed 
analytical functions. The practitioners tend to perceive tools as only analytical 
devices while not aware of the other applications such as their ability to facilitate 
debate and discussions and act as boundary objects across hierarchies and 
departmental divisions, and these latter benefits may help mitigate some of the 
communication and coordination challenges associated with the functional 
structure of hotel units and companies. 
(2) Practitioners should also recognise that recent business and hotel 
school graduates are eager to put their education to use In explicit ways that 
demonstrate their learning and value of their education. This Is especially true for 
organisations that encourage or sponsor the pursuit of advanced degrees since 
applying theoretical knowledge can assist with management development. This 
may be especially Important in the hotel industry due to its high levels of 
employee and management turnover. 
(3) Practitioners are advised to reflect on the way strategy tools are kept 
as departmental or corporate 'secrets' and to Include more persons In strategising 
activities with these tools since valuable . 
knowledge and information are likely 
held by persons throughout the organisation and their inclusion In the strategy 
formulation process may be as valuable as it is in strategy Implementation. By 
including them in their strategy practices involving tools, they may also improve 
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their understanding of the rationale and reasoning behind the strategies they are 
asked to help realise through implementation. 
7.5.2 Recommendations for educators 
(1) Based on the findings that many practitioners perceive that strategy 
tools are solely for analytical purposes as part of a rational decision-making 
process, and in line with the SasP focus on practice, educators are advised to 
facilitate their students' learning about the social and `divergent' approaches with 
which strategy tools can be used. An example would be to ask students to use 
the tools in a group setting rather than only individually and for the students to 
reflect on how the tools did (or did not) foster more and perhaps creative ideas. 
These experiences could then perhaps find their ways into the `real world' as 
students draw on the tools for such social as well as analytical purposes. 
(2) Educators are also advised to ensure that their students are aware 
that strategy is not necessarily practiced in the business context as prescribed by 
their textbooks. Unrealistic expectations could otherwise cause students to 
underestimate the value of their education and learning if they associate 
organisational or industry norms as reasons to believe that the concepts and tools 
they learned are unimportant rather than as valuable ways for them to develop 
their analytical and synthesising capabilities. 
(3) Involving more practitioners in the classroom is also recommended as 
a way to ensure that students learn not only the theory but the way things `really 
work' before graduating so that they can better adapt themselves and their 
knowledge set to their firms' expectations and requirements. This would also 
assist educators themselves with being able to link the theory to real world 
applications in their courses. 
(4) An additional recommendation is for educators to have their students 
not only use strategy tools as provided by the textbooks but to create their own, 
or modify existing ones, as it was found that such modifications are sometimes 
institutional practices. Reflecting on the use of these and standard tools would 
also provide the students with a better understanding of the tools' limits and 
benefits. 
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7.5.3 Recommendations for future research 
(1) Further research that investigates if the 'veiled' use of strategy tools 
exists in other firms and industries is recommended since this finding raises many 
doubts about previous studies concerning the popularity and perceived value of 
tools and as such warrants a closer look. Qualitative research is recommended 
since it was through the close observation and extensive Interviews that this 
situation was revealed to the researcher. 
(2) Additional studies of strategy practices, including the use of strategy 
tools, In hotel firms is also suggested. While this study responded to calls within 
the strategic hospitality management literature for more original studies about 
how strategy is practiced by hospitality firms, much remains to be studied. 
Specific recommendations include the role of lower-level managers In the strategy 
formulation process, the role of formal analysis and that of financial and other 
quantitative tools and data as these appear to be more popular and respected by 
top managers. 
(3) A further recommendation is that similar studies be conducted In 
other Industries to determine patterns of consistency, or contrasting results, with 
what was found In the hotel sector. An example would be to conduct such a 
study in the chain-restaurant Industry since the strategic hospitality management 
literature and its prescriptive advice generally does not differentiate between the 
two even though contextual factors may be different enough to result In different 
findings. If similar results were found, on the other hand, this would help justify 
some generalisations about the strategy practices across different sectors of the 
hospitality industry. 
(4) Although this study calls into question the results of many list-based 
surveys about the use and popularity of strategy tools, the researcher still 
recommends that such studies be done within single industries to determine 
large-scale patterns about their use in specific industries. Such a study within the 
hotel industry, for example, would help provide background data that could be 
used to further analyse this current study's findings. Such a study should 
attempt to question employees from multiple hierarchical levels and departments 
in order to determine not only who is using the tools, but also whether general 
views about their value and usefulness are consistent within and across firms. 
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(5) A longitudinal study of the use of strategy tools would also provide 
needed evidence of how different tools are used at different stages of the 
strategic management process, such as during strategy implementation and 
evaluation, and also begin to shed light on how the resulting pattern of actions 
and their effectiveness is related, or not, to the work done with tools. 
(6) A final recommendation is for strategic management researchers to 
continue efforts to build theory on practice rather than practice on theory. This 
study's findings demonstrate that the practical reality of strategy-making very 
often contradicts prescriptive advice, and through further in-depth studies where 
researchers work in close proximity to practitioners, they will continue to better 
reflect the reality which can then be better understood and passed on to students 
who will have a more realistic expectation of how strategy is `really' practiced. 
7.6 Reflections on the Research Journey 
The researcher's interest in understanding how strategy tools are actually used in 
practice emerged from his experiences working in the hotel industry and as an 
instructor of strategic management. During the early stages of his professional 
career he was not familiar with strategic management theory or tools since his 
education was in the liberal arts. As a hotel manager, he relied on intuition and 
the advice of colleagues but never on academic concept or tools. Recognising his 
severe limitations, he returned to university to study hotel management as a 
graduate student where he became familiar with, and fascinated by, the concepts 
and tools associated with strategic management. Returning to the industry, he 
was determined to apply what he had learned during his education. Even though 
he was now in a more senior position since he co-owned and managed an 
independent hotel management and consulting company, he very rarely used in 
any explicit fashion the tools he learned as a graduate student. Similar to what 
he found in the three larger hotel companies studied for this thesis, he seldom 
had the time, patience or desire to structure his thinking through formal tools. 
After selling his company, the researcher re-entered academia but this time as an 
instructor at a hotel school. After spending several semesters teaching 
communication, human resources management and organisational behaviour 
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courses, he was entrusted with the capstone course in strategic management. 
Even though he suspected that many of the concepts and tools in the textbooks 
and academic articles were not necessarily used in practice, he continued to teach 
them since not only had he learned (and like learning) about them when he was a 
student, but also because he did not know of suitable alternatives. In addition, 
as a mere instructor with limited research experience, who was he to doubt the 
gurus and their tools and concepts? As his career progressed, his curiosity about 
the use of such tools was further heightened as former students and new industry 
contacts provided differing views about the relevance and usefulness of what was 
being taught in hotel schools, including in his courses. As he found little evidence 
in the academic literature about how strategy tools were being used in the hotel 
industry, he decided this was a worthy thesis topic since it would not only add to 
the academic literature on strategic management, but would also enhance his 
ability to teach the reality and not just theory of strategy practices. 
While the findings suggest that he is not alone in having not explicitly used what 
he learned as a student when in the industry, the researcher still believes that 
students should learn about strategy tools as part of a course in strategic 
management. They need as much practice as possible in learning how to analyse 
and synthesise information and he has found that this learning often takes place 
when they are allowed to experiment with specific models and frameworks. For 
better or for worse, many tools have entered the lexicon of strategic management 
and students would perhaps be at a disadvantage if after graduating they were 
not familiar with the same concepts and tools as their superiors and colleagues. 
In addition, even though they may not use these tools in any explicit fashion 
during their careers, the findings suggest that they are likely to draw on them 
implicitly as they collect and interpret relevant (and irrelevant) data, information 
and opinions. 
The researcher, as Instructor, has over the past few years also modified the way 
he helps students to learn about, and use, strategy tools. His courses, both at 
the undergraduate and graduate level, are built around specific 'strategy 
challenges' facing real companies. The students are presented with this challenge 
by representatives of a particular hospitality company and are given the better 
part of a semester to devise their own solution which they then present and 
defend in front of the Instructor and company representatives. The students 
prepare two documents as part of this project. One is a short management report 
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targeting the company. The second is a longer `academic report' in which they are 
asked to demonstrate how they arrived at their solution by using the concepts 
and tools covered during the course. The students are also free to not use such 
tools but must explain why they did not believe that using the tools would help 
them arrive at and defend their solution. 
The research journey Into the use of strategy tools thus did not begin with the 
enrolment as a doctoral candidate but, rather, nearly two decades ago as a young 
hotelier. It also does not end with the submission of this thesis but will likely 
continue as long as the researcher is provided the opportunity to teach students 
the theory and reality of how strategy is practiced. 
7.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This study identifies that conceptual strategy tools are largely rejected by the 
practitioners in the sample firms due to their lack of formal strategy-making 
processes and practices, their perception that many tools lack legitimacy, and 
because the use of many tools is seen as impractical due to the hotel industry's 
particular structure. The study also identifies that use of tools is largely hidden or 
`veiled' since they are used by junior-level associates and within rather than 
across departments, are primarily used in an implicit fashion to structure data 
collection efforts in a one-on-one interview format rather than socially through 
meetings or documents, and because proprietary tools are not shared with those 
outside the corporate structure such as franchisees, property owners and most 
general managers. This study makes a number of contributions to the knowledge 
of the practical use of strategy tools and these are discussed in the following 
section. As a result, recommendations are made on the use and teaching of 
strategy tools. 
This research study's overall aims were to identify why and how strategy tools are 
and are not used within the context of hotel companies. Although limited In 
various ways, the study achieved that objective and in doing so has helped to 
begin answering many of the questions about how practitioners 'do' strategy and 
the role of strategy tools in strategy-making. It has also suggested numerous 
practical recommendations for managers and educators, and raised new research 
ideas for researchers in order to build on this study's findings and continue to 
develop the SasP literature. 
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University Research Ethics Committee 
Headington Campus Gipsy Lane Oxford OX3 OBP UK 
t. +44 (0)1865 483758 f. +44 (0)1865 483937 
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050138 - Strategy as Practice: The use of tools and techniques during the Strategy 
Process 
Thank you for your email of 24 May 2005 outlining your response to the points 
raised in my previous letter and attaching the revised E2U form and participation 
information sheet. 
I am pleased to inform you that, on this basis, I have given Chair's Approval for 
the study to begin. 
In order to monitor studies approved by the University Research Ethics 
Committee, we will ask you to provide a (very brief) report on the conduct and 
conclusions of the study in a year's time. If the study is completed in less than a 
year, could you please contact me and I will send you the appropriate guidelines 
for the report. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Teresa Smallbone 
Deputy Chair 
University Research Ethics Committee 
cc Dr Angela Roper 
Dr Levent Altinay 
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Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 
PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET 
Strategy as Practice: The Use of Tools and Techniques during the Strategy Process 
Introduction: 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to 
participate it is important for you to understand why this research is being conducted and 
what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
Purpose of the Study: 
There is a common belief that the strategy theories, concepts, tools, and techniques created 
by academics and management consultants do not necessarily help practitioners in their 
strategising activities. This study aims to investigate how such tools and techniques are (and 
are not) used by firms and practitioners during the strategy process. The ultimate purpose of 
the research is to help practitioners improve their ability to strategise as well as to help 
academics and consultants to understand how strategists use (and don't use) different tools 
and techniques during the strategy process as well as how these tools are changed by 
practitioners to better suit their own needs. 
Your role: 
You have been chosen to participate in this study due to your experience as a senior 
executive in the hospitality industry who has had extensive experience creating and 
implementing strategies. Approximately 10 other executives will also participate in this study. 
It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in this study or not. If you do decide to 
participate, you will be given this information sheet and asked to sign a consent form (see 
attached). If you decide to take part you may still withdraw at any time without needing to 
provide a reason for your decision. 
If you decide to participate you will be interviewed by the researcher regarding the process by 
which you and your firm create and implement strategies. You will not be asked to divulge 
any financial, performance or other confidential data. Approximately 2 hours of your time will 
be required for the initial interview (including preparation time). An additional follow-up 
interview of one hour may be asked of you at a later date. 
Costs and Benefits to Participating: 
The researcher does not foresee any disadvantages or costs associated with participating in 
this study. 
The researcher hopes that you will benefit from participating in this study in several ways. 
First, you will be given the opportunity and time to reflect on your and your firm's strategy 
process, perhaps allowing you to generate some insights and perspectives you have not 
previously had or realized you had. Second, you will contribute to a deeper understanding of 
how strategy is created and implemented in hospitality firms. Third, you will help academics 
and consultants to understand how to better help managers to strategise. 
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Use of Results: - 
All information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. Your privacy and 
anonymity will be ensured as only I as the principal researcher will collect, store and analyse 
the data and information. All individual and firm names and other identifying information will 
be changed during the writing up and publication of this research in order to ensure 
anonymity of the participants. You should also be aware that in order to ensure academic 
integrity, all data generated in the course of this study will be retained in paper and electronic 
form for at least five years after the completion of the research project. 
The results of this research will be used in my doctoral thesis. I will also attempt to publish 
the results of this study in academic journals and may present its findings at industry or 
academic conferences. All participants will be supplied with an executive summary version of 
the research and may receive the full thesis from the researcher if so desired. 
Other: 
The researcher is conducting the researcher in his role as a doctoral student at Oxford 
Brookes University, School of Business Administration, Department of Hospitality, Leisure 
and Tourism Management. 
This research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford 
Brookes University. 
For further information, please contact me. If you have any concerns about the way in which 
the study has been conducted, please contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics 
Committee at ethics@brookes. ac. uk 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
Sincerely, 
Demian Hodari 
Principal Researcher 
27 March 2005 
Lausanne, Switzerland 
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Strategy as Practice: Strategist Use of Tools and Techniques 
Demian Hodari 
Doctoral Student 
Chemin des Coumenets 24 
1000 Lausanne 26 
Switzerland 
Please Initial Box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded 
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in 
publications 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Name of Researcher Date Signature 
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F... Appendix C: Sample Interview Transcript 
Please note that names of firms and persons have been removed to maintain 
anonymity. 
(TRANSCRIBED FROM MEMORY) 
Hi (name). I'm Demian. I appreciate you taking the time to answer some of my 
questions. Are you sure now is a good time for this? 
Now is fine. Happy to help. 
Great. Do you mind if I record this conversation so that I can make sure to get 
things right? No obligation, but it does help. 
Sure, no problem. 
(RECORDING STARTS) 
Great, that makes thing easier for me. Okay, its' recording now. 
Okay 
This is all confidential, of course. I'll protect your anonymity as well as that of 
(name of company) at all times. I 'd suggest that you assume that people know 
we are speaking since (CEO's) secretary arranged my schedule, but they won't 
ever know who said what. Is that ok? Did you get a chance to read the Participant 
Information Sheet? 
Ok, that's fine. Yes, I read it. 
Would you like me to explain more about myself or what I'm doing? 
Yes, maybe a little. That might be a good idea. 
Ok, no problem... So I'm an instructor at the Lausanne Hotel School in 
Switzerland which is where I met (name of CEO) and (name of SVP-HR).. Before 
that I was in the hotel industry, working in hotels and restaurants for a long time. 
Anyway, now I'm also working on a PhD part-time and (name) suggested that I 
might be able to do some of my research here at (name of company). So my 
questions are just for that purpose, the PhD, and not for any kind of consulting 
work. I really appreciate that the company agreed and that everyone here has 
been so helpful and forthcoming. This is really a unique chance for me ... 
Anyway, It's important to know that I'm not studying (company name's) 
strategies. I mean, I'm not looking at what (company name's) strategies but 
rather at how it comes up with these strategies. And at this level I am not 
looking at the big picture so much as much as I am at how the it uses strategy 
tools. I'm looking at the process of making strategy, and not actually at the 
actual content or decisions that are taken, though some of the decisions are 
important to put the process and practice in context. 
Right, I see, mm hmm. Okay, that's what I gathered from the document. All 
right. 
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Do you have any questions about any of that? 
Nope, I'm good. Let's get to your questions. 
Okay .... So my first question for you is, if you can explain to me what you think (company name's) strategy is? 
I'd say its to constantly innovate to provide guests with an unusual and exciting 
experience. And that that, if it works, will help us to stay interesting for guests 
so that we can grow and make money for the owners. 
Ok, thanks. Now, like I said I'm more interested in the processes and practices 
here that are used to makes strategic decisions. So if you could describe for me 
how you perceive the strategy making process here at the company? 
I think it's very important, the first thing that I start with, is we start with the 
overbearing decision which is made by the top level of people, the likes of (CEO 
name) and (CFO name), that is based upon how the rooms are doing, how the 
brasseries are doing, and how busy things are, and if they aren't busy, how we 
can physically drive them, drive the people there. At the end of the day, I think 
my job is perceived as being something which is a creative one, and more of a 
pictorial one. However, it is a strategic thing, and what I can do, can truly affect 
the strategy of how the company goes. So you saw me at the presentation when 
we talked about the fact that previously we were "(slogan)". The change in 
strategy came about, came from (CEO name) and a dinner we had where we 
realised we needed to focus more on the food side and then (CEO name) decided 
that'I want us to be a restaurant with rooms'. Now, you're not going to do that 
overnight, and you're definitely not going to do that with people on the shop 
floor. So, you start with the executive decision that is, we are now a restaurant 
with rooms. In order for that to be communicated and what I would term as 
"sign posted", to the members of the general public, you have to do that through 
advertising, and you have to integrate the strategy which I came up with, which 
was the "(new slogan)" thing, at every level, throughout everything that you've 
produced, down to websites, down to how it appeals to the Christmas themes, 
how it appeals to general themes, and so that slowly but surely, the members of 
the general public are initiated with this theme, "(new slogan)", as In watching 
you physically get there. 
Now, what then happens from there is, you think that strategy is out in the public 
demand, and you have this a lot with things where you think, oh, well, I've 
produced so much for the last six months based upon a theme, but the reality Is, 
you must size up - and I'm talking to you in strategic terms here - how much it's 
actually seen by members of the general public, as regards the actual exposure 
to nationwide exposure of that. Then it's relatively little because it's only been 
seen in maybe a dozen big national magazines, in terms of the theme. So that 
needs, in national exposure levels, we are never going to truly grow as a 
company, if we're only appealing to the customer who already knows us. 
I'm going through this with (Brand Name) - this will be of use to you, as well. 
(Brand Name) is never going to grow. It's said it has a very loyal customer 
base, but that is of absolutely no use to us, goingforward. What we do is, our 
strategy here is to box off those people and keep that sweet, and they are happy. 
But what we have to do is grow the brand so that it appeals to a more 
widespread theme, so that the members of the general public who haven't, go 
"Ah! I relate to that -I want to buy into that. " 
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So, that's something that's happening where to grow, you have to make 
something just that little bit more ... it's not mainstream. That would be bad for both brands, but I suppose the phrase is to be more palatable to the members of 
the general public so they buy into it, and then they become fans. 
So, that's kind of in a nutshell how, where we're currently at with (Brand Name) , in terms of that brand strategy. That brand strategy will be pushed away at even 
more over the next few months, and I will be able to focus a lot more and making 
that work a lot harder on the website, so that people will see that we are 
passionate about what we do. The duality of "(new slogan)", apart from It being 
a descriptor Is seeing that we are passionate. That, then takes me to the next 
level in terms of strategy where you've had (CEO name)'s level -I want us to be 
a restaurant with rooms - how do we pass it down? (Interviewee name), can you 
then sort out what our visible strategy Is. That's the top line strategy, and the 
visible strategy. Once I've got that there, I quickly realized that whatever we 
come up had to actually translate down. You can sit here in your Ivory towers 
and we can design and we can come up with top level decisions, but the hard, 
cold reality is, how does that translate down to the person who is serving a cup of 
tea in the cafe, or is serving some food in the brasserie? And, in order for a 
company to think In one thought, you need a phrase or a strategy or an ideal 
which allows them to go down, all the way through down to the way the people 
make the beds, the way they answer the phone. 
And my next level, in terms of the "(new slogan)", which is It's passionate leg, 
which I've already started doing, is instil that passion In heads of departments, in 
GMs - not only to say that ... you say that if the guest 
leaves with such a fabulous 
experience, they'll come back. I use the phrase, "I am purely a signpost to get 
people to the hotel. " After that, it's down to you to take that brand strategy and 
then go and give them the fantastic experience, leave them coming back for 
more. "I had such a great time. " "He told me about this wine. " That it's near a 
satellite tracking station. "It was brilliant! " And then people go away with the 
feeling, the emotion, that they can take those stories on elsewhere and they can 
feel like they're a little bit more (Brand Name) , and a bit more passionate to 
someone who would eat, drink and sleep the things they love. And then, we're 
starting to get the real top level strategy, and then they feel ownership, which Is 
a very important thing, in the brand. And when they have ownership, they come 
back. "Oh, yes, I love (Brand Name) ", they say. "I'm a big disciple of (Brand 
Name) ." And when you get that, then you get them coming back. 
On the next level ... so we've got this strategy which 
has gone, let's educate 
everyone to what we are. Let's tell them about passion. Let's get them 
passionate. The next level is, how do we translate that further to rooms? Well, 
we've got our customer base that we're trying to educate in terms of passion. 
That's great. The next thing that we are doing strategically is, you saw my brand 
twitch points that we set up. Now, those brand twitch points are based on, 
they're an edict for living across the brand, summed up In terms of "(new 
slogan)" But they're an edict for living, and everything that we do must be 
represented with some of those things. Not all of them, It would be Impossible. 
Only I'm representative of all of those things. But In some of those things. 
So, the next thing we do is we look at how the current market is going. Very 
Important to assess. We cannot ... be strategic in a blind manner, thinking that 
the market is built around us. Arrogance like that, leads to collapse. So what we 
have to do is we assess what's currently going on. The current trend with where 
257 
we are, is that the market is tightening its belt, so that then leads us strategically 
to be incredibly aggressive with rate and tighten up all around. So my mailings 
that we produce are based on ... this is not a creative thing. This Is based on a 
theme or an idea that involves a discount, which is this passport to the (Brand 
Name) campaign, which we are currently running on email terms, and on the 
website. 
It's already been proven that it works Incredibly successfully through the figures 
and the research we've got from the web, from its hits and from its actual 
transference down to how much money we've actually made from it. So that Is 
one theme, in hard times, that we felt we needed to drive. 
The other thing, because we always like to perceive that we are giving value, Is 
we need to come up with, we have on one end of the scale, we have a discounted 
rate, and on the other end, we have our "added value" rate. I'm calling it, as a 
working title, "Life's Little Pleasures", but what it essentially Is, Is a campaign 
which allows us to upgrade at the desk when you check In, or ask for it because 
you've seen the emailer, and talks about the fact that you can upgrade for an 
extra £30 or something, and you'll get champagne, you'll get chocolates, you'll 
get rose petals, you'll get things on the bed that make you feel that you're just 
that bit special. That this is more of a special stay. And that's the direction we 
really need to be heading In, if the climate wasn't like this, where we're always 
adding value. You know yourself, the reality of, if we add £30 onto our rate onto 
a night, and we get the champagne for relatively little, and the chocolates for 
relatively little, buying In bulk, that the person feels that they're getting 
something special, but it's actually very little outlay to us, and we end up making 
money from adding that value. 
So that's a very definite benefit, adding value and discounting. We'll get both 
ends of the market from that. And that is happening over the next six months on 
a national level, to drive room occupancy. When you get them In - and it's the 
same with (Brand Name) - when you get them In, you find they eat. So, you 
find there's not many of them that are actually heading outside to eat, because 
they are told from a strategic point of view at reception, ask if they want to 
upgrade, and they physically have a sheet which says, "Ask if they want to 
upgrade", "Ask if they want a table at the brasserie". Those things translate Into 
real money because ... I could advertise it and advertising 
is quite passive. I see 
an ad, going "no". But when you are confronted by "I hoping you have a lovely 
stay, and would you like a table at the brasserie? " And the manner and the 
passion with which they talk about, and the touch points that they actually were 
told, that have been set out from the top level, actually translate to, "Oh, yes, I'd 
love to. " Or, "I've got to tell you, you have to try the fluffy mash with" this and 
that, and the steak and eel pie, or whatever. "Oh, that sounds nice. " And it's 
down to giving knowledge, becoming expert about the subject. All things that are 
top level, brand touch points. They actually translate down to the desk, and the 
shop floor when people are actually selling in and up selling on people. "You 
could have this wine, but actually, if you try this ... " And it's not a point of trying 
to screw people into the ground. It's like, "You can have this wine for £16", but 
the hardcore reality Is when you're talking to the person, you go, "But you must 
try this, because of that. " It sounds a horribly philistine way of doing it, but 
unfortunately, it's business. 
On a food and beverage level, In terms of strategy, we are emailing on a local 
basis. We have an email database, and you have to be very wary In emailing 
terms that you don't send out too many emails, because people get sick of It, and 
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you get unsubscribed, and then you've lost that person. So, I always like to think 
of my email database, I do emails out on a local level, and I see all of the names 
in the spreadsheet, and I always like to think of them and go, I hope I keep this 
client. I hope I get some more added. And it becomes a personal thing. If you 
imagine our database that is 80,000, which is our national database, there will be 
some that drop off. There will be some that gain. Some will invite other people. 
It's a very organic thing, a database of people, and you must care for them, and 
make sure that you don't overexpose them or underexpose them, so they go 
somewhere else. So on a national basis, a regional basis, we're producing a kind 
of food competition thing, a "Did You Know? " thing, which allows to give people a 
private dining experience, but we're not pushing room rate. Absolutely no need. 
Room rate is happening on a national basis, on a discounted and added value 
basis, so the food, in terms of strategy, is very simple. Food - regional. Room 
rate - national. And two kinds of mailings for that, only one kind of competition, 
however we want to call it, on a most rudimental basis, it's a competition to get 
people to come in and know and educate about the food, the brand, and in a 
manner which Is befitting of the top line strategy which says that we are a 
restaurant with rooms. The voice is always, you always knew we did rooms well. 
Now, we do fabulous food. Did you realize we did that? And that is tone. 
That's great. Very helpful. Thanks. Let me go back to the beginning as I have 
some questions if that's okay.... So the decision to focus more on food,. How 
do you think the company got to that decision? 
The thing you should realize about (CEO name) is he has ... he comes across as a 
chap who is very intuitive. Everything seems like a gut reaction. A gut reaction, 
which we believe is doing very well so far, and will continue to. But he has his 
fingers in every pie, so to speak, of the business. From the housekeeping, down 
to the ... from housekeeping, all the way to the 
likes of marketing and operations. 
He knows every aspect of performance on how things are doing, and makes an 
informed decision based upon operations, maintenance, which is part of that 
which is based upon sales, driving people into the hotel. It's based upon the 
marketing, how visible we are. And then, if I ask someone ... have you called 
(VP-RM)? 
Yes ... 
He'll be able to tell you the cold, hard facts upon how that is translated to room 
revenue. 
Do you see any documents, any sort of formal work that lead to the refocus on 
food? 
No. 
And how about, you mentioned, at one point, allowing the company to think one 
way, one thought. 
Yes. 
How do you achieve this common understanding of why this is the strategy? 
How do you achieve it? You achieve it ... I mean, things are very much done on a 
people basis at (Brand Name) . You're probably getting that from the people you 
spoke to so far. You get it through taking the word to the people, almost like a 
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pilgrimage. I cannot sit In this term that you would call an ivory tower, where I 
sit behind my computer, or I sit in a restaurant talking about how ... working 
away In isolation, thinking that if I have this strategy, then It's going to actually 
translate down to everybody. No. They'll think you're a fool. You are dealing 
with people who aren't marketing based, who are experts in their own field, but 
don't want to be told that they know nothing. So what you do is you take that 
message in a people sense, and you go and talk to people about It, and you 
present It in that manner. There are no documents, because In most cases, at 
this kind of ... at all 
levels, you can't have that message. I can't talk brand touch 
points to a member of housekeeping. They don't understand that. I can't even 
talk brand touch points to a member of sales. You can't get stuck in your own 
language and believe that you can do that. I see so many people In terms of 
brands that you see messages that are passed down from it, and they'll look at it, 
and people will go, "What on earth are they talking about? " You have to 
translate, and you go to the people. You don't bring the people to you. You go to 
the people, and that in a sense, is engaging, and you take the message. It's hard 
work. You have to be out and about, and you have to be pushing that away, and 
you also have to do something which is find, kind of heroes and disciples who are 
going to carry that message on. I have a couple of people In London, at the 
London (Brand Name) , that I know are very much on board, and every time I 
see them, I give them some extra attention to know how things are currently 
going, so they know that they can pass that on down through the ranks 
afterwards. It's very important to have your disciples and your diehards within 
the structure of a brand. They are like your generals, your sergeants that keep 
the work going for things like that. But there Is no substitution for actually just 
physically going there, and saying, "By the way, my name's (name concealed). 
I'm responsible for your brand. " For your pictures, for the words, for signposting 
people to come to your hotel. But I'm only part of the story. 
How do you make sure that people across the organization have the same vision 
of the brand? 
Because only one person does it - me. 
But if you've got the salespeople, HR people, accounting, operations people, 
spread out across ... 
I see what you mean. I visit them all, is the only way I can do it, and In terms of 
the brand, there is only one sounding point - me. 
Do you do any exercises where you get them to share their views on the brand, 
see if they're getting it, if they're sharing and if they have the same idea of the 
strengths of the company, of the opportunities the firm has, of what's really 
adding value in terms of the ... 
We haven't, actually. 
Do you find a need for that? 
Um ... I think what you get on a 
level, for example, with the likes of (SVP-FB), 
who is the food and beverage director, he will get the groundswell, as you call it, 
and that will be translated up through me. So I will not sit there necessarily and 
go ... 
"'What do you think about that? " Because often, that can be a dangerous 
thing when you get an awful lot of opinions, and you suddenly feel obliged to take 
those things on. This is not a dictatorship, however, there needs to come a point 
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where people, a launch pad for people to take off from and buy into. My strategy 
that I talk about, is not something that is alien to people. You come Into 
hospitality, you are passionate. All we're saying is, you just need to keep that 
passion going, and this is the sign above the swimming pool, that says, "Do not 
jump in. " Right, that's what it is, essentially. But it's a sign that's very 
important. When we have ... If you talk about a need for people to actually add 
their opinion, that comes at the level of (name of Sommelier) talking to his 
sommeliers. That comes at the level of (CFO name) talking to his brasserie 
managers. That is, then, translated up and the need for that opinion comes from 
(CEO name), as well, who will be on the floor actually assessing the groundswell. 
Those things all come together, and they all come together In a meeting of minds 
here, that say, by the way, we're finding that this is not working. We need to do 
this. 
Why do you think it's done this way in this firm? 
It's done this way, I believe, because we're surrounded by highly passionate 
people, and highly relied upon people. It's never been an industry, or this 
particular place, it's never been a place to have reports. That sounds almost ... I 
used to work for a company that it would almost be deemed a suicide if you didn't 
have a report for it. When you drive people, and you empower people, which is a 
vitally important thing, and believe in those people that you have at this level, 
things happen. Things happen, and you are not charged with a tick list of what to 
do. Led from the top, you know what you have to achieve, and you almost don't 
want to let the person down because they have such a ... It's an emotional form 
of leadership, and you pass that down through your people, because you are 
passionate about what you do, and because you don't want to let the person 
above you down. 
This passionate and emotional aspect, which is driving this approach to making 
strategy. Why do you think that is? 
I think it's curiously enough, I've only been working in this kind of field for about 
four years, but I find it a very organizational thing. I actually think it needs to be 
this way for things to happen, and hospitality is a passionate place, but I actually 
think the way the system works as we currently have, it works because of ... it's 
not a house of cards because we all support each other, but it works because we 
are all passionate about doing the very best, and we'll almost overachieve and do 
things to get the job done right. I've never seen it, I have to be frank with you. 
I've never seen it in my advertising agency I used to work at. There was always 
a very back-sniping attitude. This is place which has individuals who are placed 
equal, who are just fighting for the good of the brand, and are looked after, and 
are treated with respect across the group, across everywhere, to a point where 
they know that when you are given the power to make a decision - this is a really 
important thing. If you are given the power to make a decision, you have to 
make sure that decision is right, and you research it, and you make sure that 
you're not making ... For example, if I 
have a brand decision to make, I'm not 
going to make wayward decisions or flippant decisions based upon a good 
reaction. Whether I will research it, I will do all the things that I need to do in my 
mind to do so, so that I feel comfortable with the decision. But when I present it 
to (CEO name), (CEO name) will say, "I love it. " "Maybe it should be like this ... But he will not research it, because he's realized that I have done my research. 
Is he asking you to see the research, or just your conclusions drawn? 
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He believes me. He believes me. It's as simple as that. 
So, he's not asking to see the research and analysis. 
He doesn't need to see the research. 
Is that just with you do you think or companywide? 
Throughout the company. 
Why do you think it's like this? 
They don't need to. But they're doing it. Don't think that we are, if the man at 
the top is a good reaction man, don't ever, ever think that everyone below him Is 
actually going, "Oh, yeah ... of course, that would 
be great! " We are dealing with 
millions and millions of pounds, and how that research is taken about, from my 
point of view, is different from how it may happen with sales, but we are 
informed. Massively informed, about everything that we need to do. When we 
speak to the man who will ultimately give its go-ahead, he is informed, but his 
opinion and his manner as such that might come out, is based upon "Yes, I love 
it", but don't think that he's not informed also. 
When you said, part of what you have to do is constantly look at how the current 
model is going - what kind of research and analysis do you do for that? 
In terms of the current model of (Brand Name) ,I take it In. I see it. I work In 
the environment. I watch how people talk to staff. I see how the food is 
presented. I watch how people are checked In. I see how the rooms are 
presented, as a person who visits it. I live the brand, and therefore I will see how 
it can be improved. I also will hear comments from people that say, "Wouldn't it 
be good if we could do this? " Now, not everyone gets, "Oh, yes, that's a great 
idea. I think we'll change that. " But some things do. 
And why do you think that is? 
I'd say it has to do with the industry. Yes, very much. You wouldn't get to do 
that if you were a brand director for a company that made nuts and bolts, or DVD 
players. You would get to do it even more if you work in hospitality because by 
the nature of me going round the hotels, I physically live In them, sleep in them, 
and eat in them, and I watch it. 
You watch people do that. 
Well, if I'm lucky. Now, not only that, I also get to see the competition because I 
go, when I don't stay in the hotel, I go to other hotels and see how they do it. 
Do you have any kind of formal tool that you use when you visit these properties, 
or is it just ... 
This is my only task. When I say I live it, I don't need to go around with a tick 
box that says, does it need this, does it need this, what are the toiletries like? 
You assimilate that information when you essentially live and breathe the brand. 
So you're going to (Name of competitor) for example, and you'll find that it's 
written in Spanish and English. You'll find that toiletries are a little weak. The 
rooms are quite light, but that's no good for you when you want to use your 
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laptop. And, you'll find that they have wooden tables, which Is far better than 
glass tables for (Brand Name) , because your laser mouse doesn't work. So you 
have certain other aspects that you find about that particular brand. If you go 
into the Thistle, etc., etc. You go to (name of competitor). And you check those 
things out, and you see the literature, and you see the tone of voice, and you 
build a picture from all that information that you've simultaneously assimilated 
about the brand, and you'll clock it. And then you'll clock the next time - Ah, 
(name of competitor) got a pillow menu now. Why are they doing that? And 
then you go back into the (Brand Name) and you look at the (Brand Name) , and 
you go, do we need a pillow menu? No, we don't. It's just more collateral that 
goes Into a room, which could potentially make the place look messy. Maybe 
what we need to do is say, what sort of pillow would you like In your room? 
Could that be booked online, to save environment, quite frankly, and also save 
time. Why do we need another piece of card that goes in the room? You go Into 
hotels and you see the amount of collateral that's in the room. I know this Is my 
job, but that needs to cut down to a point where people say, "I'm having a great 
time, and I'm getting the right amount of Information from them. " You can only 
get that through seeing lots of hotels, but there's no formal system as such to do 
that. 
So when you're asked your opinion about the competition, you don't have a 
formal way to present that in a grid or anything, where you're comparing 
different brands across different criteria? 
I could do that, but I have an immediate impression of a brand, so if someone 
told me something, this would be quite a flippant way of actually describing it, 
but if someone said to me, if I said to (CEO name), and this is obviously an Inn 
thing - (CEO name) said to me, "What did you think of the (name of 
competitor)? " And I go, fantastic reception. It's a waste of a reception to put all 
of those rooms on. Tiny rooms. The toiletries are small. Just not enough space. 
And we can sum up all the things from there. You can talk about the bar they've 
got. You can talk about the Interesting things that you put outside the door that 
says, "I'm off to Carbon Bar", which is the in-house bar. But there are other 
problems with that. That actually says, oh, by the way, I'm not in my room, so If 
you want to break In .... So you think, right, okay, 
that would be a good idea, but 
actually, it's not. All it's doing is saying, in real terms to someone, we have a 
bar. There are better ways to do that, In security terms. So, I could sit and do 
that, but when you are so Intense and you live that, you are literally a 
photocopier or a camera. Everywhere you go, you take in about that particular 
brand, and you apply that, on how you can actually improve your brand.... now 
this might change sometime in the future if we keep growing. Then we might 
have to be more formal or do more research and justify ourselves. 
Why do you think that? 
I think undoubtedly, when you pass ... not necessarily, I'm taking someone on to help me with this, so I can concentrate more on these aspects. When you take 
someone on, and you employ, if (CEO name) has his generals, okay? Generals 
certainly have sergeants. How do you keep that message? It's Invariable a 
diluted version of that, because they're never truly you, and they will never truly 
have that passion. If they were a clone of you, they would be. How do you pass 
that down? You have to apply an incredible amount of hard work, and I'm afraid 
there is no other way for It but to get slightly systematic about it. Not too much, 
because the thing that makes you stronger, essentially is not the thing that's 
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going to kill you. The reason why we are strong, is because we are passionate 
and emotional about it. Obviously, we have our research in the background. If 
we are suddenly to become more systematic, we are not the kind of people that 
flourish in the list making system. 
How about reporting up to the board of directors? How about working with them 
in light of all this? 
It's a funny old story. We know our completion, and we know of our competitors. 
We know our brand share. I could find the figures somewhere. In terms of our 
people who will buy us, or our new owners, the chances are those people are 
buying into us because of what we stand for, and they will probably love us, and 
they will look at potential that we have. What they'd want to know is, how we 
are going to move it forward. I could give them research and I could give them 
figures about our market share. I can show them awards that we've won. But 
essentially, what they'd want to know, as someone who wants to make money 
out of the company, would be, how are we going to make more money out of the 
company? And the way to do that, is currently with (Brand Name) , is to drive 
people more aggressively, without sacrificing the brand voice, so that you don't 
suddenly become a (name of competitor). Without sacrificing our brand voice, is 
to drive more people to believe in (Brand Name) life, or more people to be 
(Brand Name) . And that is the way forward, and I would have a plan to do that, 
and I have plans to do that. I can't give you exact figures on how those things 
would pan out over a month on month basis, but that is essentially not my kind of 
style of working. My style of working would be to inspire and to say that in the 
past, this has proven to do this. We have no reason to believe, given the current 
climate, that this would not continue, and we will report to you as and when with 
figures on how things are doing, but based upon my knowledge of the brand, and 
my experience in hospitality, I believe this would be the way forward. That's how 
I would do it. It's emotional. 
So, all right, almost done. Let me just ask you overall, the idea of using 
conceptual strategy tools at (name of company), what do you think? Do you use 
them or not here? Why or why not? 
Easy answer. No. Things are not run like that here because (name of CEO) 
doesn't want us to be formal or academic. You should probably have gathered 
that by now. He wants us to be fresh and exciting and individuals. We're not 
ticking boxes and filling in formulas and preparing reports and all the other things 
they do at the bigger companies. They're boring and cold, we're hot and exciting. 
I don't think, and rightfully, that he would want us to lose this edge and we 
probably would if we had to use these boring tools. Remember, (name of CEO) 
tells us that we don't need to worry about being rational all the time. He wants us 
to be irrational if it works in the end because the customer is not rational when he 
makes decisions about where to eat or sleep. Or drink. 
Okay. I think that's it. Thanks, I really appreciate it. 
You are very welcome. 
[END OF INTERVIEW] 
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Appendix D: Sample Contact Summary Form 
Contact Summary Form 
Please note that specific information regarding names, location and company 
have been removed to protect anonymity. 
Site: MediumCo 
Interviewee: Name Concealed 
Contact Type: Visit 
Contact Date: 13/10/ 2007 
Today's Date: 14/10/ 2007 
Main themes and issues that struck me from this contact 
" Believes the firm has no strategy process other than that of CEO and FD 
making key decisions; but does not believe this is a negative. 
" No tools used - never even heard of tools other than SWOT 
" Believes freedom and trust key to innovation and creativity 
" Not used to formal documents or presentations or meeting 
Issues not addressed by answers 
No examples of how tools used 
No other examples (only RWRI) 
Thoughts to follow-up on 
" Make sure to get BrandB documents to review; including that of consultants 
" Follow up on creativity/innovation (3`d reference so far) 
" Check on meetings and document issue (lack) with next interviewees 
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Appendix E: Sample Fieldwork Notes from MediumCo 
Strategy Session 
Please note that certain information has been blacked-out to protect anonymity of 
individuals, the company and competitors. 
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Appendix F: Force Field Analysis 
Forces Supporting and Encouraging Obstacles Limiting and Preventing 
the Use of Strategy Tools the Use of Strategy Tools 
SmaIICo 
" Staffing of interested/trained hotels 
school graduates 
  Organisational simplicity 
  Organisational size 
  Management qualification/training 
  CEO values and leadership 
  CEO operational background 
  Need for innovation/creativity 
" Decision-making speed 
  Strategy formulation process 
  Value of experience-based knowledge 
  No staff dedicated to strategy or 
consulting 
  Distrust of consultants 
" Disdain of academic research 
  Focus on practical 
  Lack of formal meetings 
" Lack of presentations 
  Lack of formal strategy (and other) 
documents 
MediumCo 
BigCo 
  Growing professionalism of firm an 
employees 
  Company-sponsored MBA program 
  Growth and internationalisation 
(increasing complexity) 
  Recruitment of non-hospitality 
background executives 
  Organisational complexity 
" Organisational size 
  Large number of brands 
  Geographic dispersion of units / 
internationalisation 
  Management qualification/training 
" Financial resources 
" Participatory decision-making 
  Need for consensus 
  BI department 
  Functional/departmental strategy 
responsibilities 
" Recruitment of non-hospitality 
background executives 
" Cross-functional meetings 
" Organisational simplicity 
" Organisational size 
  Management qualification/training 
" CEO values and leadership 
  CEO operational background 
" Strategy formulation process 
" Value of experience-based knowledge 
  No need for consensus 
" No staff dedicated to strategy or 
consulting 
  Distrust of consultants 
" Disdain of and academic research 
" Focus on practical 
  Lack of formal meetings 
  Lack of formal strategy documents 
" Franchisee relations 
  Third-party owners 
" Responsibility to third-party owners 
" CEO values 
  CEO background 
  Removal of centralised strategy 
department 
  Focus on quantitative data and tools 
  Focus on practical 
" Presentations focused on results not 
analysis 
" Documents kept short and focused on 
actions plans 
" Resistance to "Strategy" 
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